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REVOLUTION IN 
HUNGARY 1956: Yugoslav 
and Post-Yugoslav Perspectives
 Five years ago we launched a Cold War 
program covered by LimesPlus journal with the issue Challenging the Shadow of 
the Iron Curtain (2013) dedicated to the urban culture and the everyday life in 
Eastern Europe (Balkans-Finland-Baltic states). Th is volume, Revolution in Hun-
gary 1956: Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav Perspectives was conceived during the 
roundtable discussion of Croatian and Serbian historians held in Belgrade on 13 
December 2016. Our main topic was Yugoslavia, with its policies and the public 
impressions, and the neighboring Revolution in Hungary in 1956. Instead of the 
semi centennial, we marked only the sixty years from the Hungarian Revolution. 
Th e delay probably confi rmed unwillingness in a general need to face all the con-
sequences of the absence of organized resistance to the Soviet domination and 
communism in the Second Yugoslavia. Th e inability of Yugoslavia to understand 
and support the Cold War resistance movements in Eastern Europe (DDR, Poland, 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, occupied and annexed Baltic republics) was one of the 
permanent symptoms of its general political weakness that led to its violent end 
and disintegration.
Th e 1956 was one of the “worst” years of the Cold War. After the failure of 
the discontents in DDR in 1953, and in Poland and Hungary in 1956, Eastern Eu-
rope was left to decay and dictatorship until the Prague Spring in 1968. After the 
suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, the U.S. left their allies in the Suez crisis. 
Yugoslavia approached the Soviet Union. Th e Western Europe remained deprived 
of political and moral willingness to accept the consequences of the Soviet occupa-
tion and repression, and the collectivist experiments in Eastern Europe, regardless 
the previous experiences, and similarities, with Nazism and fascism.
Yugoslavia played an important role in Hungarian Revolution. Despite the 
known facts, we needed new research, perspectives and interpretations. Th e cen-
tral points were the Khrushchev and Malenkov meeting with the Yugoslav pres-
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ident Tito on the Brijuni residential resort, and the forthcoming Tito’s success to 
persuade Khrushchev to choose János Kádár instead of Ferenc Münnich as the 
new Hungarian leader. Th e faith of Hungarian refugees, especially these who fl ed 
in Yugoslavia, was not of a less importance within the cadre of the neighboring 
relations.
For me, personally, this topic has an additional peculiar importance. My fa-
ther, historian and professor Radovan Samardžić collaborated for several years 
with professor Béla Király, the army general and the commander of the National 
Guard in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, who led the attack on the building of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party. From 1964 professor Király taught 
Military History at Brooklyn College, New York. Maybe that is why this volume 
could be dedicated to all our successful human ties and all our missed chances.
In Belgrade, December 25 2017.
Nikola Samardžić
Part I
E
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES
HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION 
IN 1956

9UDC: 
REVOLUTIONS OF 1848 
AND 1956 – PARADIGM 
OF BUILDING THE NATIONAL 
IDENTITY OF HUNGARIANS*
Th e national identity of the Hungarians was built in several stages and 
several directions during the process of historical longevity. Firstly, it had 
been profi led through the anti-Ottoman and anti-Habsburg struggle; 
later on it was formed as unifi cation of the territories under the Crown 
of St. Stephan, to receive later on anti-Russian and anti-Soviet features. 
Th e Revolutions of 1848/1849 and 1956 are particularly characteristic 
in this respect. Th e national defeats that followed the aforementioned 
Revolutions were consolidated by the anti-Habsburg and anti-Turkish 
tones / 1848 /, and especially anti-Soviet / 1956 /. Th us, the cult of 
freedom, national sacrifi ce and tragedy, which was dominant earlier too, 
has now been upgraded into one of the most important components of the 
contemporary national identity of Hungarians, particularly highlighted 
by the refl ection of the events of the fall of the Berlin Wall and of Accession 
to the EU and NATO.
Key words: Revolution 1848, Revolution 1956, Hungary, national identity, 
Habsburg, Austro-Hungary, Trianon, Soviets, Imre Nagy
 There are many factors that determined 
the identity frame and the form of the creation of the Hungarian national political 
concept in the modern age. Deeply entrenched fi rstly in the anti-Ottoman, and 
then anti-Austrian tradition, at the beginning of the 19th century the creators of 
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the concept of the Hungarian political and stately nation had before them an open 
space with a look into the past. Th ey took as idiom the tradition of the crown of St. 
Stephen / St. István, which served as a point of support in their ideas and thoughts. 
Th e myth of the painful defeat at Mohacs in 1526, when Hungary was the only 
obstacle to Ottoman advancing on the Christian Europe, represents a part of one 
of the points of reference that we referred to. Discords caused by the dissolving 
of the Hungarian medieval state, anarchy among the aristocracy, mutual intoler-
ance within the ruling class, all this is of secondary importance compared to the 
courageous last act of the defense of the Christian Europe, symbolically connected 
to the death of the last medieval monarch, King Lajos (Louis). Painful and tragic 
defeats such as Mohács in 1526, Világos in 1849, then Trianon in 1920, and fi nally 
the Revolution in 1956 give a lasting stamp to the sense of martyrdom in shaping 
of the Hungarian national identity.
Th e fi erce anti-Ottoman and anti-Habsburg fi ght, refl ected in the battles of 
the Long War in 1593−1606, followed by the Bochkai’s uprising, the movement 
of Gabriel Bethlen, the war of the kurucs of Imre Th ököly, and the uprising of 
Francis Rákóczi were all eclectically added to the idea of  a unique Hungarian po-
litical nation and Hungarian state and historical law embodied in the Hungarian 
Parliament. Th e end of the Great Turkish War (1683−1699) when the prerogatives 
of Hungarian independence were handed over to Emperor Leopold. Similar was 
the case of the status of Ardeal resolved by Diploma Leopoldinum (1691). (Rokai 
et al. 2002; Kann and Zdenek 1984; Okey 2002)
Discontent with the violent re-catholicizing inspired by Cardinal Leopold 
Kollonitsch was particularly prominent in the anti-Habsburg ideas, already strong 
in Aerdel. Hence, we’d like to point out to the the uprising of Francis Rákóczi with 
the slogan Cum Deo pro Patria et Libertate, which became one of the key points 
of support for creation of the national identity of Hungarians. Th e fi rst dethroning 
of the Habsburgs in 1708 at Onod, gave rise to the same route during the Revolu-
tion of 1848. In addition, there was the adoption of Hungarian Pragmatic Sanction 
in 1723, which, together with the large number of laws in the 1751, 1764, and 
1790−1791, strengthened and determined the idea of state continuity within the 
Habsburg Empire1. It was the Hungarian Pragmatic Sanction that was the spiritus 
1  At the Diet meeting 1790−1791, the gradual affirmation of the Hungarian language 
began. Article 16 stipulated the establishment of a Hungarian language department 
in gymnasiums, academies and universities. Then, in 1805, the Article 4 of the Law 
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movens of the idea to determine the legal and political position of the Hungarians 
in Monarchy on the legal grounds, and that idea would become the starting point 
for the negotiations and agreements of both sides all the way up until the Settle-
ment in 1867. (Kann 1964a; Kann 1964b)
In the time of national revival, founding of institutions such are the Acade-
my, library, the National Th eater, as well as the launch of a whole series of newspa-
pers and the adoption of laws that replaced the Latin language with Hungarian in 
the state administration, laid the foundations for the National Revolution, which, 
in the midst of the European Revolution2 of 1848, became one of the factors of 
enforced the decision that all the letters of the Hungarian court office and the National 
Assembly must be written parallelly in Hungarian and Latin. Article no. 8 of the Law 
from 1830 passed the order that every official, save for those in Croatia, must know the 
Hungarian. Laws which had as a purpose gradual Hungarianization were all passed by 
1832. From January 1, 1834 onwards, only those who knew Hungarian language could 
become lawyers. Not long afterwards, the proposal was disputed that the laws should be 
passed only in Hungarian, and the lawsuits on the Royal Council should be conducted 
also only in Hungarian. According to the article 6 of the Law from 1840, the Latin 
language was replaced by Hungarian. In the same year, the rule was that in non-German 
municipalities, all church books should be kept in Hungarian and the transfer should 
have lasted no more that three years (Article 6, point 7). The Law of 1844 (Article 2, 
Count 3) stipulated that the members of the Hungarian Parliament could use exclusively 
Hungarian language. On the other hand, Hungarian politicians considered the session of 
the councils of 1832−1836 as a reforming one. One of the basic ideas came from Count 
Miklós Veseleni. According to his idea, the Hungarians were surrounded by the ocean 
of  Slavs and Romanians, so it was necessary to strengthen their own political position 
and form a new political elite. Regarding the introduction of the Hungarian language, it 
was considered that the Latin language got obsolete and that there was no possibility of 
its further use, and that it was necessary to educate people and prepare them for new 
challenges. From that moment, Hungarian as a language was in the service of legislation, 
government affairs and especially education. The Law on the Language of 1844 protected 
the Hungarians from German clerks. German remained the language of correspondence 
with the imperial authorities. Vasin 2011.
2  Hungarian national revival began with a greater intensity in the late 18th century. Ferenc 
Kazinczi is among the reformers of the language. Th e dialect of the Danubean region 
of Hungary was taken as the basis. Th e dialect from the area of  the upper Tisa was also 
partially represented. Th e synthesis of these two dialects made what became contem-
porary Hungarian. Th e fi rst standing acting society was founded in 1790 in Pest, while 
the fi rst permanent theater was founded in 1837 under the name of Pestan Hungarian 
Th eater (since 1840 National Th eater). What is considered to be the beginning of the 
press in Hungary was the publication of Mercurius Veridicus еx Hungaria in 1705. Th e 
fi rst permanent newspapers were the Pressburger Zeitung founded in 1764, and the fi rst 
newspaper in Hungarian was Magyar Hirmondo, which started in 1780. Not long after-
wards Magyar Kurir came out. Modern press in today's sense of the word begins in the 
1930s. Th e circles close to the Count Szécheni founded Jelenkor in 1832. Th e famous 
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determining the survival of the Habsburg monarchy, and the permanent determi-
nant of the development of the national identity of the peoples of the Monarchy 
itself, up until its end in 1918. Th e fall of the Chancellor Metternich on March 13, 
1848, that is the proclamation of the Statute of Freedom in Austria, was a signal 
and encouragement the youth in Pest to formulate on the following day the Hun-
garian National Program in 12 points, with the requirements of respect for civil 
liberties and equality. Th e fi rst Hungarian government was formed on March 17, 
led by Lajos Batthyány as president and Lajos Kossuth as the minister of fi nance3. 
Th e Hungarian Parliament in Požun very soon (April 11) adopted 31 law (the so-
called April Laws), which were supposed to completely change the political order 
of Hungary. Th e ruling elites in Vienna were left with nothing but to agree on a 
compromise, since the bulk of the imperial forces was engaged in heavy fi ghting 
in Italy, especially since March 1848. However, the peace lasted shortly - until 
Radeczki pacifi ed the situation in Italy, and Windisch-Graetz quenched the Czech 
Revolution in June 1848. In the meantime, since 1848, Hungarian revolutionary 
government started its own war with Serbs and Croats who, having the very same 
Hungarians as the role model, stated their requirements in March and May 1848 
(Kann and Zdenek 1984).
Changes on the battlefi eld, and soon afterwards on the political scene too, 
prompted the beginning of the war between Austria and Hungary, which began 
on October 3, 1848. In such a situation, confl icts between imperial and Hungarian 
Revolutionary Army spurred very quickly. Ban Josip Jelačić became the imperi-
al commissioner, with all military and civil authority. After Radeczki’s victory in 
Italy, and the breakdown of the Czech Revolution, the court decided to start the 
war against the Hungarians as well4. Confl icts that lasted for months in which the 
Hungarian Revolutionary Army recorded great successes gave way to the Hun-
garian national spirit and, much later, had a considerable infl uence on creating an 
newspapers, Pesti Hirlap, came out the fi rst time in 1841 under the editorial offi  ce of 
Lajos Kossuth. Th e fi rst Hungarian daily newspaper was Budapesti Hirado from 1848.
3  Frist Hungarian Government form 1848 was comprised of President Lajos Batthyáni, 
Count István Szécheni as Minister of Transport, Lajos Kossuth as Minister of Finances, 
Ferenc Deák, Minister of Law, József Eötvös, Minister of Education and Religion, Gábor 
Clausul, Minister of Economy, Bertalan Szemere, Minister of Internal Aff airs, Lazar Me-
saroš, Minister of Defence, and Prince Paul Esterhazy, Minister of Foreign Aff airs.
4  Ban Jelačić began his campaign to Hungary on September 11, 1848. As early as Septem-
ber 14, Bacani decided to form the home-guard troops, and Hungarians were stopped on 
October 30 in a battle near Schwechat.
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idealistic and romantic picture of the heroic struggle for freedom. Since the begin-
ning of 1849, the Hungarian army was leading the off ensive. General Bem defeated 
imperial troops in Aerdel. Th e infl uence of the radical current, led by Count Tokay, 
general Mór Perczel, and László Madaras was on the rise among the Hungarians. 
Th eir main idea was to establish the republic and overthrow of the Habsburgs. 
Th e peak of the Hungarian Revolution took place on April 14, 1849, when the 
Habsburgs were dethroned and when Hungary declared its independence, with 
Lajos Kossuth as the regent. Strong anti-Habsburg tradition culminated in Debre-
cen, as a continuation of strong and perceived ideology that that stemmed from 
the uprising of Ferenc Rákóczi. On August 9, the Russian and Austrian troops 
defeated the Hungarian army in Timisoara. Kossuth abdicated on August 10th 
and fl ed to Turkey. General Artur Gergei surrendered to the Russian army near 
Világos on August 13, 1849. On October 6, 1849, thirteen Hungarian generals were 
executed in Arad. Th e scenes of execution from Arad were permanently incised in 
the culture of memory as one of the most signifi cant events in the tragic history, 
a symbol of destruction of the ideal of freedom, the aspirations for respecting the 
rights and legality, and indication of continuing the persistent and constant strug-
gle of Hungarian elites for their national state within the state of the Habsburgs. In 
this respect, the Revolution of 1848−1849 represented another important identity 
link, a thread that connected traditions, which carefully kept the memory of the 
revolutionary and most beloved politician of the 19th century – Lajos Kossuth. In 
the communist historiography of the Second World War, the cult and spirit of the 
revolutionary Kossuth was especially well-nurtured and exemplifi ed as an illus-
tration of demolition of the old order and awakening of the new social justice, the 
republican ideas out of which the grew the ubiquitous and nationalist-romantic 
image of injustice and the breakdown of the Revolution, refl ected in the tzar-rus-
sian army near Világos. (Mикавица et al. 2016)
Since the renewal of the system of limited parliamentarianism / the end of 
Bach’s Absolutism / the passing of the October Diploma (1860) and the February 
Patent (1861), the idea of  a compromise between the Habsburgs and the Hungar-
ian political elites had begun to be implemented and was fi nally realized with the 
Settlement in 1867. Th e core of the politicians gathered around Gyula Andrássy 
and Deák Ferenc, accepted the dynasty and Austria, but on the foundations of the 
Goran Vasin Revolutions of 1848 and 1956 – paradigm of building…
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so-called Hungarian pragmatic sanctions of 17235. From that moment on, until 
5  Th e issue of reorganizing the Empire began with the October Diploma. Th e Hungarian 
part got back the administrative bodies. Th e Hungarian Royal Regent Council was estab-
lished in Budim and Hungarian Royal Courtroom was centered in Vienna. Th e territory 
of Hungary was reunited. Th is situation did not last long. Th e adoption of the February 
Patent brought new regulations in terms of national centralism. In April 1861, the Hun-
garian National Assembly was convened. At the session, two currents were formed. Th e 
fi rst was led by Ferenc Deák, who is in his Address (his option was called the Address 
Party) insisted on a common state with Austria on the basis of the Pragmatic Sanction. 
Th e second current led by count László Teleki (Party of Decrees) considered that the 
future state must rest on a personal union like the one in 1848. Deák’s idea was more 
dominant. Demands were that Francis Joseph must be crowned as Hungarian king and 
that the Hungarian government must be formed. Immediately after the submission of the 
Adress, the Parliament was dissolved, because of the refusal of the Hungarian Parliament 
to send its deputies to the Reichsrat, as a common imperial council. Dissatisfaction of 
Hungarians was great. In the period 1861−1865 the county system did not work, Aerdel, 
Croatia and Slavonia were out of Hungarian territories. Th e entire state apparatus was 
managed from Vienna. Hungarian politicians led by Deák, József Eötvös, Lajos Moczary 
and Ágoston Trefort were of the opinion that Hungary must remain part of the Monar-
chy, but as an equal partner. Aristocracy brought its memorandum in 1863. Th e writer 
was Count Apponyi György. An independent Hungarian government with some joint 
aff airs was proposed as a solution. Ever since 1864, negotiations between representatives 
of the court and Hungarian politicians had been intensifi ed. In April 1865, Deák pub-
lished his Easter article in which he wrote that Hungarians were ready to pass their laws 
in line with the needs of the survival of the Empire. Since August 1865, the session of the 
Hungarian Parliament began, where the preparation and adoption of the Settlement was 
planned. On February 17, 1870, the Emperor Francis Joseph appointed Gyula Andrássy 
as Prime Minister. On May 29, 1867, the Parliament voted the 12th article of Law and 
thus legalized the Settlement (the emperor Franz Jozepf was crowned on June 8, 1867 
for the apostolic king of Hungary, while the crown was placed on his head by Gyula An-
drássy, the prime minister, former Huszar colonel who had been sentenced to death by 
the kangaroo court during the Revolution of 1848−1849). Th e two parts of the monarchy 
were united in the person of the ruler. Common aff airs were: foreign policy, military and 
fi nance (for fi nancing the army and foreign policy). In all other matters, member states 
were completely independent and accountable to parliaments and governments. Th e 
common ministers were appointed by the ruler, without agreement with the members of 
the governments of Austria and Hungary. Th ere was a Collegium comprised of common 
wealth ministers, while some of the other ministers of the member states were invited to 
attend some sessions. Above this collegium there were two delegations of the member 
states, with 60 delegates each. Very important person for the functioning of the newly 
created state was a joint minister of fi nance. Out of the eleven ministers of fi nance ap-
pointed by the First World War, only four were Hungarians. As regards the political scene 
in Hungary, it gradually grew stratifi ed after the Settlement. Deák’s party was formed 
before the adoption of the Settlement in 1866. It was comprised by those who were for 
settlement with the monarch. Th ere were aristocrats, conservatives, liberals, members 
of the nobility, citizens, while other than Deák, the leading fi gures were Eötvös and An-
drássy. Th e supreme opposition party was the Moderate Left led by Kalman Tisa. Th ey 
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the end of the Monarchy, the anti-Habsburg emotions frequently appeared when 
the Parliament was discussing fi nancial questions, or those military or foreign af-
fairs interest, mainly as a political platform in terms of pressure on the Viennese 
court. (Mикавица 2011) By gaining their part of the Double Monarchy with wide 
powers in the internal administration, the Hungarian elites tried to fi nd their mod-
el for resolving the national question. Th e transfer of the Kossuth Lajos’s body 
in 1894 was a manifestation that put the relationship between the Hungarians 
and the Habsburgs to a test, but did not endanger the state order. Nevertheless, 
identities-wise, the events from the Revolution lived in the consciousness of the 
Hungarian elites, and very often the speeches of the Hungarian deputies in the 
Hungarian Parliament mentioned Hungarian confl icts with the Habsburgs and the 
necessity of preserving and respecting the Pragmatic sanctions. Often, one could 
have read about the events in Világos and Arad. In this respect, the assessment 
of the Russian politics was very often twofold. Depending on the relations of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire with Russia, the danger of a new attack of the Russian 
Empire was kept being mentioned together with the way in which the Revolution 
had been suppressed. Ever since the time of formation of the Entente Cordiale and 
the further break between Russia and Austria, insisting on Russian domination in 
the Slavic world and pointing to the need to connect the Slavs from Monarchy, 
especially the Serbs with Russia, was becoming more and more intense. Svetozar 
Miletić, for example, even though he was a critic of the Tsarist regime, called very 
often on Slavic unity and closer connection with Russia. Th e same was the case of 
Laza Kostić and Mihailo Polit Desančić, leader of the Liberals in Hungary. During 
the Russian-Turkish war of 1876−1877, the Serbian public was daily reported on 
Russian successes and failures with very often panegyric texts about the Russian 
army and criticism of the Hungarian elites who celebrated Turkish military suc-
cess. Mihailo Polit Desančić, especially in his later years, predicted and insisted on 
the collapse of the Double Monarchy in the potential war with Russia. Very similar 
ideas were often also made by radical leader Jaša Tomić, which certainly caused 
favored a civil state and rejected the Settlment because of the fear that the Hungarian 
part would become dependent entirely on the Austrian one. As a main task, the party 
had the preservation of the independence of Hungary, through a peaceful parliamenta-
ry ways. Th e third important group was the Extreme Left Party (Forty-one-Party) led 
by Joseph Madarash, whose actual leader was Lajos Kossuth. It demanded a complete 
separation from Habsburg by peaceful means. (Пал 2001; Kann and Zdenek 1980; Okey 
2002; Sked 1989)
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suspicion of the Hungarian political public. Th e Russo-Japanese War of 1903−1905 
caused a real fl ood of negative emotions and mutual debates on both sides. Th e 
Serbian liberal press mostly lamented Russian defeats, while the Hungarian press 
celebrated Japanese victories. Mutual accusations in this regard were expressed 
at the sessions of the Hungarian Parliament. Serbs and Slovaks, less often Roma-
nians, were portrayed as part of the Russian Pan-Slavic outpost and were charac-
terized as peoples who would be among the fi rst to betray Monarchy and, in the 
fi rst place, Hungarians. In this particular case, the anti-Russian sentiments were 
essentially aimed at Pan-Slavism, which especially disturbed the Hungarian elites 
because of the frequent voices that Monarchy itself should be reorganized in the 
fashion of Trialism/ especially since 1906. (Vasin 2015)
Regarding the famous events of 1956, the continuity in identity creation is 
unambiguous and has an important role. Th e collapse of Hungary (Trianon 1920), 
then very often the justifi cation of the regime of Horthy (the establishment and 
return of the old territories seized in 1920, rebuilding of the St. István state). In 
the interwar Hungary, learning about the loss of historical territories was one of 
the boiling points of the national tensions. Th e former Hungary was reduced to 
a third of its territory, and therefore approaching Mussolini, and then Hitler, was 
explained by political pragmatism and national (justifi ed) revisionism for the in-
justices suff ered by the winning forces. Within the policy of Horthy’s approaching 
to Italy and Germany, anti-Communist and anti-Soviet ideological concepts had 
considerable signifi cance. Th us, already from the beginning of the 1930s, the cli-
mate of the mixture of revanchism and anti-communism, was fl ourishing. Th is 
was conducive to the strengthening of national frustration, which would also be 
refl ected in the events of Hungarian occupation / liberation of a part of Slovakia in 
autumn 1940, and the occupation of a part of Yugoslavia in April 1941 / repression 
of the civilians in Bačka which culminated in January 1942, expulsion of colonists 
settled after 1918, and settlement of 15,000 Hungarians from Bukovina /.
A signifi cant number of Hungarian units, actively participated in the Eastern 
Front since 1941, with the ideological matrix of anti-Communism and anti-Sovi-
etism. Th e defects that Horthy’s units experienced with high death toll increased 
the fear of the Soviet breakthrough in Hungary. Th e balance was the following: out 
of 45,000 soldiers every tenth was killed, every third wounded, and three quarters 
of military equipment was destroyed so the division was returned to Hungary in 
December 1941. Th e catastrophic defeat of the Hungarian army of 200,000 people 
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it the battle of Voronezh in January 1943 / one third of the soldiers were killed, 
one third captured, was the prelude to the dismantling of Horthy’s Hungary. Ever 
since the second half of 1943, the public was daily informed of the crimes that the 
Soviet army was committing in the occupied territories. Images of the war with the 
Soviets in the autumn of 1944, were added to the already existing image, which we 
already addressed. National tragedies, awareness of defeat, but also the constant 
return to their own image of values, were an important part of the events of 1956. 
Deportations, arrests and murders of the Jewish (about 400,000 of them) and per-
secutions in March 1944, were put in the context of the pressure of Hitler’s Nazi 
Germany. Abdication of Miklós Horthy on October 15−16, 1944, arrival of Ferenc 
Szálasi and the Arrow Cross Party only accelerated the process of liquidating the 
Jewish population and destroying of their property, more than it raised resist-
ance to the Soviets. From January 20, 1945 onwards, Hungary eff ectively ended 
its active military participation in the war, when the truce was signed in Moscow 
between the representatives of the USSR, the United States and the United King-
dom. Slowly but surely, since the fall of 1945, the Soviet infl uence in Hungary was 
becoming predominant and more permanent. During the second half of 1945 and 
the fi rst half of 1946, this time 160,000 Germans were deported.
Although on the elections on November 16, 1945 they won 16% of votes, the 
communists became part of the executive government. Th e middle class and the 
small holders who won the election, strongly anti-Soviet-oriented, were suppressed 
under pressure and eventually marginalized. (Rokai et al. 2002) Th e methodology 
of the work of the communist / Bolshevik party that took power in East Europe 
based on the cult of leaders / dictators was not that much diff erent in Hungary 
either. During 1945, 620,000 landless people received estates; until 1950, 59,429 
persons were trialed before courts (477 were sentenced to death). Th e Communist 
Party itself, from several thousand members in the autumn of 1944, reached nearly 
half a million members by the mid-1945. Leading people were Mátyás Rákosi, Imre 
Nagy, János Kádár and László Rajk. A special treaty with the USSR was signed on 
September 25, 1945. On the following in 1947, the Communist Party became the 
leading political force in the country. A bad foreign policy situation for Hungarian 
interests that culminated in the expulsion of Hungarians from Slovakia, Zakar-
patja and Yugoslavia gave Stalin the opportunity to strengthen the position of the 
Communist Party which, on the other hand, supported him in his attempts to deal 
with Broz Yugoslavia. Nationalization of schools, persecution of Catholic priests, 
Goran Vasin Revolutions of 1848 and 1956 – paradigm of building…
18
capture of the opponents, were only a part of the coloring that accompanied the 
strengthening of the power of the Communist Party in Hungary. Stalin’s death 
(March 1953) and the election of Nikita Khrushchev and the re-examination of 
Stalinist politics infl uenced also the events in Hungary, fi rstly hierarchically in the 
communist party according to the Soviet model by removing Rákosi and his mar-
ginalization (July 1953). With the arrival of Imre Nagy, the previous Stalinist policy 
in Hungary itself started to be questioned. An enormous number of intellectuals 
gathered around the Petőfi  circle (symbolically related to the Revolution of 1848) 
suggested demands for change, a pronounced anti-Soviet note and a return to 
certain national traditions forgotten after 1945.
Th e events of October 1956 begin symbolically on October 6 (the same day 
when the Hungarian generals, commanders of the Hungarian Revolutionary Army 
in Arad, were executed in 1849, among which a particularly important place had 
Serb Janoš Damjanić) when László Rajk, Tibor Senjaji, Andras Salai, György Pálfi  
(a former Horthy’s general who joined the Workers Party), convicted and executed 
on the mounted process during October 1949, and at the funeral was attended 
by about 100,000 people. Antal Apró, a member of the Central Committee of the 
Workers Party, emphasized that it was a matter of rehabilitation of innocent con-
victs, while the public was looking for the culprit in the Rákosi regime. (Congdon, 
Kiraly and Nagy 2006)
On October 17, 1956, the association of writers requested for March 15 
(1848) to be declared a national holiday as the day of the Revolution / Uprising. 
Students from the Technical Faculty in Szeged on October 22 requested (in Revo-
lutionary 16 points) for Koshut’s coat of arms be returned as the national symbol 
of Hungary and for the Soviet troops to withdraw from the country. In the mean-
time, Rakosi withdrew, and the demonstrations were scheduled for October 23. 
In the following 10 days, until November 4, the political survival of Hungary was 
being resolved mostly on the streets of Budapest. Th e rise and fall of Imre Nagy, 
the formation of the new government on October 25, withdrawal from the Soviet 
Warsaw Pact on November 1, engaging Cardinal Mindsenti in international polit-
ical mediation (asylum in the US embassy), together with the famous events in the 
Yugoslav embassy (November 4−22) and the Soviet tanks on the streets of Buda-
pest, all this gives a sketch for the collective and individual portrait of Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956. Idea of  national and personal freedoms, abolition of a total-
itarian regime, struggle for civil rights and freedoms, attempts to bring Hungary 
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out of the hands of the Soviet authorities were suppressed by Soviet tanks, in street 
fi ghts and in the fi nal collapse of the Revolution. Th e epilogue was 2,500 people 
killed, 20,000 wounded, while in the period from 1956 to 1959, 35,000 people were 
processed, out of which 22,000 were convicted and 360 executed. In the fi rst weeks 
after the revolution, 20,000 people left Hungary. Th e image of the fi rst attempt to 
overthrow the Soviet authorities remained as a permanent collective identity clue 
in the minds of Hungarians. (Congdon, Kiraly and Nagy 2006; Kissinger 1994; 
Calvocoressi 2009; Samardžić 2008)
Th e Revolutions of 1848 and 1956 represent components in the culture of 
memory and formation of the national identity that are two of the three points of 
support for this long process (Rákóczi Uprising). Hundreds of memorials through-
out Hungary, symbols and fl ags from 1956, the constitution of two national hol-
idays in March and October, symbolizing 1848 and 1956, the Museum of Terror 
and Victims of 1956, but also a constant reminder of the most famous heroes of 
the nation Koshutt Lajos and the events in Arad 1849, give a picture and a guide-
line for looking at the idea and creation of contemporary identity in Hungary in 
today’s, turbulent political times. Th e ideas and images of the two Revolutions 
that ended in the short-term defeats, in the long-term identity regard gave the 
possibility to the national elites to upgrade and expand collective consciousness 
by strengthening the idea of  freedom, resistance to foreign violence, as well as the 
idea of nation’s specifi city and essential belonging to the Western world. Th at is 
why the decision was made in 1989, when a break with the Soviet-Communist 
politics was decided and succession was made simply and consensually. Hungary’s 
path to the EU and NATO was natural and expected. Th e Ideas of the Revolutions 
of 1848 and 1956 are therefore one of the pillars of support of this road, that is in 
the minds of Hungarians based on the idea of  freedom, the struggle for the pres-
ervation of Hungary and the wider European and Christian heritage of the old 
central European state.
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Revolucije 1848. i 1956 − paradigma izgradnje nacionalnog 
identiteta Mađara
Nacionalni identitet Mađara izgrađen je u više etapa i više pravaca tokom 
procesa istorijskog dugog trajanja. On je profi lisan najpre kroz antiosmansku 
i antihabzburšku borbu, da bi kasnije primio oblik objedinjavanja teritorija 
Krune Sv Stefana i vremenom antiruska i antisovjetska obeležja. Posebno su 
Revolucije 1848/1849 i 1956. karakteristične u tom pogledu. Nacionalni po-
razi koji su usledili posle pomenutih Revolucija učvršćeni su antihabzburškim 
i antiruskim tonovima /1848/ i posebno antisovjetskim /1956/. Tako se kult 
slobode, nacionalnog požrtvovanja i nacionalne tragedije koji je bio dominan-
tan i ranije sada nadogradio u jednu od najvažnijih komponenata savremenog 
nacionalnog identiteta Mađara, posebno naglašenih kroz refl eksiju dešavanja 
od pada Berlinskog zida pristupanja EU i NATO.
Ključne reči: Revolucija 1848, Revolucija 1956, Mađarska, nacionalni identitet, 
Habzburzi, Austrougarska, Trijanon, Sovjeti, Imre Nađ
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Zycie Gospodarce, Warsaw, November 26, 1956
Revolutions are always highly complex events which can complicate 
historical remembrance. To understand their impact, it is important to 
take a holistic view of their progression and connections, especially in the 
interconnected modern world. Th is paper prevents some of the variety of 
impacts of the event and the ways in which various networks, from the 
individual to the international, were aff ected by and aff ected the event. 
Incorporating the multitude of networks and positions aff ected by the 
revolution allows for a construction of a more complex understanding of 
history. While the space available does not allow for a full investigation 
of the variety of networks touched on by the revolution of 1956 it, 
by providing a sample of the complex networks involved, provides a 
new framework for further research. Taking a holistic approach to the 
revolution this paper reviews the variety of complex networks aff ected by 
the revolution and the impact of existing networks and systems of belief 
on the responses to the crisis.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1956 was a turbulent year for both the Socialist and Capitalist world. Th e 
year added the “Secret Speech”, a crisis in Poland, a revolution in Hungary, and 
a war over the Suez Canal to a world still recovering from the Korean War and 
the Formosa Crisis. However, the Hungarian revolution was no simple increase 
in tension as it aggravated tensions within the Socialist bloc, revealed underlying 
hypocrisies in US foreign policy, and resonated with Hungarian émigré communi-
ties and fl ooded the west with a wave of refugees. How should we, more than fi fty 
years after the event, understand the complexities involved in the event itself and 
the responses by various governments and organizations throughout the world?
In order to understand this, we must recognize the nature of the intercon-
nected world in which we live and have lived. All actors are embedded in a dense 
network of connections, from the bipolarity of the interstate system, to religious 
networks, to the inter-personal networks formed through family and communi-
ty. Th e existence of these networks complicates any attempt to understand the 
dramatic events which took place in Hungary 1956 and explains the variety of 
reactions to the event. Despite this complication, it is important to take a holistic 
approach because it is specifi cally these dense networks, the interactions between 
them, and the impact of the event upon them which must be remembered. To 
ignore any one of these networks, such as the Jewish exodus from Hungary or 
the impact on Hungarian émigré communities in Canada and the US, is to ignore 
important aspects of the impact of the revolution. Indeed, the study of networks 
allows cultural and historical studies to move beyond presumptions of causality 
to study the transformation of forms and contact between diff erent forms (Levine 
2015, 113).
Admittedly this is a project which cannot be entirely undertaken in the space 
available in the space allowed. However, just because it is impossible to optimize 
it does not mean that it is not a valuable undertaking. Th is article shall attempt to 
add to the discussion on the remembrance of this tumultuous event by highlight-
ing the variety of networks which were touched by the revolution and attempt to 
show how it is necessary to take this holistic approach to remembrance. Proceed-
ing fi rst through a discussion of the event the article will then proceed through a 
discussion of the variety of networks; national and international, local and global, 
which were impacted by the events of 1956.
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2. HISTORY
Th e Socialist bloc in 1956 was rocked by a fundamental crisis of leadership 
and confi dence when the process of de-Stalinization formally began as Soviet Pre-
mier Nikita Kruschev. Kruschev attempted to exorcise the ghost of Stalin from the 
Soviet system by denouncing Stalin, and his crimes, to the Twentieth Congress of 
the CPSU and to have his speech printed and distributed amongst the communist 
parties in the bloc (Paczkowski and Bukharin 2015, 372). Intending to shore up 
support at home and to expose the crimes of the “cult” of Stalin so a new historical 
memory could be constructed the speech instead provoked reactions and ques-
tions which pushed the interrogation of the past and of the system beyond the 
ambiguous “offi  cial” line taken in the speech (Jones 2013, 23−4). Th e fi rst cracks 
appeared in Poland where, in addition to dealing with a crisis in leadership caused 
by the resignation of the entire Polish Politburo, workers began demonstrating in 
Poznan demanding increased bread and better conditions (Luthi 2008, 54). Th ese 
protests, which were eventually resolved to the satisfaction of the Soviets and to 
a certain extent the protesters, served as an inspiration for the events in Hungary.
Students began protesting, offi  cially, on the 23rd of October when students 
from the Technical University joined those of the Arts Faculty and marched togeth-
er to the statue of General Bem, a hero from the revolution of 1848 (Cox 2006, 42). 
However, events quickly spiralled out of the governments control and by the 24th 
Soviet troops had been requested by General Secretary of the Hungarian Working 
People’s Party Ernő Gerő (Granville 2001, 453). Th e popular ex-Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers Imre Nagy was invited back into the government that night 
and, despite initial optimism, it became clear that events were beyond his control 
and the Soviets invaded to overthrow his regime and install János Kádár (Cox 
2006, 42). Th ese events, which proceeded with all the turmoil and chaos as befi ts 
a revolution, touched on many networks from the international to the national 
which helped frame their interpretation of and responses to the events.
3. CHINA
As there was no independent media in China during the 1950s it represents 
the least networked state to be discussed here. However, there still existed net-
works of individuals within the ruling clique of China and of course China was 
embedded in the international system and as such was embedded in the political 
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and ideological networks which made up the system. Internally the party created a 
single, offi  cial narrative of events as presented in its newspaper: Th e People’s Daily 
(Renmin Ribao). However, this presentation of events was by no means a single 
coherent discourse which refl ected the evolving position of the regime at diff erent 
stages of the revolution.
October 27 marked the fi rst report in People’s Daily titled: “Students in Buda-
pest and other cities held peaceful demonstrations; counterrevolutionary elements 
infi ltrated and created armed riots; Hungarian government invited Soviet army in 
Hungary to restore order” which set the tone for the following few days that the 
political upheaval was dying down”1. November 1st, the newspaper published the 
“Declaration by Soviet Government on the Principles of Development and further 
Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States”, 
in which the Soviet government said it was ready to negotiate the withdrawal of its 
army in Budapest with the new Nagy government.2 On the following day, the pa-
per published the Chinese government’s statement supporting the Soviet stance3 
but this peace was not to last as, however, and the relaxed tone lasted only until 
November 4. An editorial on the front page claimed that the Nagy government “is 
not halting its treacherous activities against Hungarian socialism and Hungarian 
national interests” and declared its support for “Hungarian working people’s strug-
gle”4 On 5th November, the entire front page was dedicated to the developments 
in Hungary and included a report that “counterrevolutionaries” had humiliated 
Chinese embassy personnel5 and another article which described that “Nagy gov-
ernment and counterrevolutionaries had completely exposed themselves”6. Th ere-
after the reports in People’s Daily fi nally became consistent, celebrating the “great 
victory of Hungarian people” while condemning the Nagy regime which “paved 
the way for the counterrevolutionaries”7.
With an uncritical glance at those reports, one might believe that the con-
fusing position on the Hungarian Revolution of People’s Daily simply mirrored 
1 People’s Daily, October 27 1956, 5.
2 People’s Daily, November 1 1956, 1.
3 People’s Daily, November 2 1956, 1.
4 People’s Daily, November 4 1956, 1.
5 People’s Daily, November 5 1956, 1.
6 People’s Daily, November 5 1956, 1.
7 People’s Daily, November 5 1956, 1.
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the volatility of the Soviet policy towards the uprising. In reality the situation was 
more complex and was based on both the interpersonal and international net-
works of the Chinese Communist Party. Indeed, even something as basic as cover-
age of the event was determined by the ability of information to pass through the 
Chinese diplomatic network. People’s Daily did not report on the event until the 
27 October (Zhihua 2007, 24) as communications between the Chinese embassy 
in Budapest and the Foreign Ministry in Beijing had broken down from 23 to 26 
October. Th is does not mean that the government was unaware of the events as 
Kruschev informed Liu Shaoqi that Soviet troops had entered Budapest on 24 
October, with Liu deciding not to make a comment. Th us, Chinese party did not 
play a role in the decision of fi rst Soviet military intervention (Zhihua 2007, 26; 
Vámos 2014).
 From 27 to 29 October, Beijing was promoting inter-Communist state re-
lationship based on Pancha Shila, in an attempt to weaken Soviet control over 
other socialist countries (Zhu 2016, 82). Th is was the reason behind the Soviet 
declaration on equal relations adopted on 30 October, which was then published in 
People’s Daily on 1 November. However, Mao soon changed his mind after reading 
Soviet cable report on Hungarian situation on 30 October (Zhihua 2007, 32; Zhu 
2016, 83). Chinese Party now stood fi rmly against Soviet withdrawal from Hunga-
ry. On the next day, the Soviet presidium changed their mind at Liu’s suggestion. 
Th is time China’s role was crucial to the decision of the second Soviet intervention 
(Zhihua 2007, 24).
Th is reveals the network eff ects of the positioning of the Chinese govern-
ment and individuals. Although all avowedly, at the time, part of the same inter-
national movement the Chinese were unwilling to take any action or make any 
statement about the events in Hungary until they could verify the information 
for themselves and thus had little infl uence on events in Hungary during the rev-
olution itself. Th e decision to re-invade, however, was more complex as Chinese 
leadership prompted the Soviet decision to oppose the Nagy government after 
receiving reports through the Soviet information network. Th us, information form 
the Soviet network was fed through the ideological lens of the Chinese leadership 
before being fed back into the Soviet Presidium. Th e network eff ects inherent in 
the Chinese and Soviet position thus allowed the Chinese government to position 
itself as an anti-imperialist bulwark internationally, through their role in the Ko-
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rean War and recent Formosa Incident, while also hiding the weaknesses of their 
own centralized information network.
4. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Although we cannot know the impact of the Hungarian Revolution on the 
Chinese population we can study how the events resonated with the various net-
works and communities which make up the US. All levels of society were impact-
ed, from the government down to civil society, by both the events and their fallout. 
Th e networks which were aff ected were changed for years to come which in turn 
impacted further networks both revealing the complexity of the events and the 
complexity of the interaction of networks in society.
Coverage of the events in Hungary was spotty at best which shaped popular 
reaction to the events and refugees. Although coverage began on November 2nd, 
which is admittedly ten days after the beginning of the revolution, some American 
news sources failed to provide full details until November 24th when Th e Saturday 
Evening Post fi nally deigned to cover the event (Varga 2002, 125). Even when they 
covered the event the facts were misleading or false due to the diffi  culty of estab-
lishing and maintaining reliable information networks on the other side of the Iron 
Curtain. Several newspapers assumed initially that Hungary would be allowed to 
follow its own independent path to Socialism and many assumed that Marshal 
Tito of Yugoslavia had been responsible for the uprising, at least indirectly (Varga 
2002, 128).
Th e US establishment’s response to the crisis was equally delayed and 
half-hearted, refl ecting both the sheer volume of concurrent international events 
and underlying contradictions in US policy. Although international law consid-
ered the Soviets to be aggressors by the second intervention the US failed to off er 
anything substantial to support the Hungarians (Wright 1957, 268). Th e fi rst US 
speeches given on the subject deplored the actions of the regime and off ered sym-
pathy for the people (Borhi 2004, 297) which was in line with US policy (Borhi 
2016, 118). Th e US had been broadcasting messages of its “liberation policy” and 
“rollback” strategy through the Radio Free Europe since 1951 (Lendvai 2008, 185). 
Despite these stern words, and a half decade of strong diplomatic language, the 
US establishment chose to assure the Soviet leadership that there would be no 
intervention (McCauley 1981, 780). Th is contradiction, combined with the US me-
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dia’s focus on Poland and the Suez crisis, allowed Eisenhower to claim that he was 
defending freedom while taking no specifi c action (Varga 2002, 130). Th is position 
was vehemently opposed by the military which opposed any attempt to close off  
possible courses of action arguing that it might harm US credibility as an ally 
(Marchio 2002, 795). In the long term, it also forced a change in policy away from 
fostering a “spirit of resistance” and CIA action towards supporting the breakup of 
the Soviet empire by fostering nationalism (Marchio 2002, 787).
Humanitarian tendencies in the US rose to the fore after the failure of the 
US to respond forcefully to the crisis, supported almost universally by the wid-
er US political establishment (Markowitz 1973, 52). Th e Government allocated 
$40,000,000 to help which augmented the $18,000,000 which was voluntarily 
raised (Sapir 1958, 310). Vice President Richard Nixon even fl ew to Austria to vis-
it the refugee camps and a rapid response system was put in place which brought 
in, successfully, 38,000 refugees (Markowitz 1973, 58). While this was the largest 
number per capita it pales in comparison with other nations when wealth is con-
sidered as the initial outpouring of sympathy was eventually replaced with fears of 
communist infi ltration (Markowitz 1973, 52). Indeed, this fear was present at the 
outset as the US banned refugees who were former communist party members 
from coming after December 27, 1952, unless they could prove they’d been invol-
untary members or were “defectors” (United States: Immigration and Nationality 
Act 1952, Sections 212 (a) (28) (I) (ii)). Th is contradiction, between the aspirations 
of US policy and the depths of US fears, would be a recurring theme in the Cold 
War and especially shaped the policy of the same Richard Nixon when he later 
became president (Kolodziej 1976, 125).
Th e issue of refugees revealed the complexity of the US’s position, balancing 
its domestic history with its diplomatic needs. US governmental legal practice 
had not, historically, even distinguished between refugees and immigrants (Carey 
1953, 66). However, progress was made prior to the revolution to deal with the war 
in Europe which culminated in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 which allowed 
341,000 as an emergency measure. Although this was not the fi rst instance of the 
US making a distinction between refugees and immigrants it was the fi rst emer-
gency measure to deal with a specifi c refugee crisis which provided precedent for 
the invocation of parole power by the Attorney General to allow for an emergency 
group of 16,500 refugees, out of the 38,000, to be brought in (Roberts 1982, 4). Th e 
decision also overturned longstanding tradition which banned the importation of 
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workers who had been promised work upon arrival (Carey 1953, 69). Indeed, the 
US government took out advertisements asking for job off ers to be sent in, includ-
ing in academic journals (“Jobs for Hungarian Refugees” 1957, 187). However, it 
would take until 1980 for the US to adopt the UN’s defi nition of a refugee (Huyck 
and Bouvier 1983, 40). Th is refl ects continuing ambivalence and diffi  culty within 
domestic legal and political networks towards bringing US domestic legislation in 
line with international humanitarian law.
Th e Jewish community in the US was particularly aff ected by this passage as, 
although a shocking 2% of the Hungarian population fl ed the Soviet invasion, 14% 
of the Hungarian Jewish population fl ed. Th is infl ux greatly altered the makeup of 
Jewish communities in the US in the Jewish areas of cities as entire communities 
were transplanted from Hungary to the US (Sapir 1958, 311). Th is transportation 
created a series of network clusters as pre-existing nodes in the Hungarian Jewish 
network community moved en-masse to the US (Levine 2015, 120). Non-Jewish 
refugee arrivals, however, did not experience the same concentration as the Hun-
garian community in the US as, while they were generally concentrated in Greater 
New York, they were in no way as concentrated as the Jewish Hungarian com-
munity often due to intra-group confl icts such as class and politics (Kosa 1956, 
367). Th ey did, in the end, make up the third largest contingent of Hungarians in 
the large Hungarian New Brunswick community disrupting local community net-
works and helping establish new, transnational networks with communities still in 
Hungary (Tamas 1997, 620)
5. SOCIALIST WORLD
As in China little to no data exists on the individual networks impacted by 
the event and as such the network eff ects which can be studied are the interperson-
al networks between leaders and leading cliques and the impact of technological 
networks on information diff usion and policy construction. A perfect confl uence 
of these two networks was at play in the Romanian response and understanding of 
the crisis. Romania took an actively anti-Nagy stance to the revolution due to the 
reports issued by the Romanian ambassador to Hungary, Ion Popescu. His reports 
to the Romanian government were repeatedly criticized for being of poor quality, 
being usually late and even involving obvious spelling mistakes (Granville 2010, 
312, 315). Instead of relying on direct information gather he often relied simply on 
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the reports generated by the East German ambassador Sepp Schwab, thus com-
pounding his previous pro-Rákosi biases by parroting the Soviet line on the revolt 
rather than investigating the real causes (Granville 2010, 306). However, despite 
repeated reprimands by the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs his close personal friend-
ship with the leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, due to their time spent together in 
prison (Granville 2010, 316), he maintained his position and was even promoted 
afterwards (Granville 2010, 330).
Technological networks also disrupted both the Romanian and other gov-
ernments’ attempts to gather information about the crisis. Due to the violence 
communication lines were patchy during the crisis, as with the Chinese embas-
sy, and newspapers stopped reporting after the fact as journalists went on strike 
(Granville 2010, 326). Th is shaped the understanding of events as some networks 
were disrupted while others managed to operate, changing with story was dis-
seminated. Polish embassies and journalists maintained close links with the pop-
ulace at large, thus shaping the Polish line to critique the “Rákosi- Gerő” clique 
(Granville 2003, 282−284) which contrasted with the Soviet line blaming foreign 
agents which was adopted by the Romanian establishment (Granville 2010, 306). 
Th is allowed the Polish government to walk the fi ne tightrope of reporting on the 
situation while maintaining suffi  cient allegiance to Moscow to avoid an interven-
tion there (Granville 2003, 286). In East Germany, Walter Ulbricht performed the 
exact opposite feat as he was able to use the Stasi, an information network, and 
his interpersonal connections with the Soviet regime to enforce Stalinist discipline 
despite the emergence of the destalinization campaign even evidence of popular 
violence against communists in the GDR (Granville 1998).
As it was outside the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia was a unique case in the so-
cialist world with its own networks, both personal and ideological. Tito maintained 
tentative links with Kruschev and the Soviets, including meeting with the Soviets 
in 1955 and signing a joint declaration in Belgrade which was interpreted in the 
West as an attempt to allow Tito to “act as a kind of branch manager for some of 
the satellites” (Th orning 1956, 101). Th ese meetings, however, were overblown and 
instead should be understood to be an outcome of Kruschev’s attempt to unify the 
Socialist camp through interpersonal network contact which continued through 
the revolution (Zonova 2007, 198). Even though these meetings came with sub-
stantial aid packages, including a promise of a combined $456 million from the 
Eastern Bloc (Lovitt 1958, 159), these eff orts were complicated due to the presence 
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of Yugoslav reporters and academics at meetings of Hungarian dissidents before 
the revolution (Granville 2003, 275). Indeed, even the message of Destalinization 
was complicated as it was fi ltered through the internal ideological network of Yu-
goslavia leading Tito to believe that it would lead to sovereign equality of all Social-
ist states, not solely being confi ned to Soviet-Yugoslav relations (Barghoorn 1956, 
30). Rhetorically the situation was further complicated due to Tito’s continued 
statements in support of the superiority of the “Yugoslav Way” which created the 
illusion of an off ensive attitude much like Eisenhower’s “Liberation” rhetoric, both 
of which came from a position of geo-political stalemate (Granville 1998, 497). Th e 
arrival, and generally temporary stay, of 20,000 refugees from the Hungarian rev-
olution (Kosinski 1978, 321) created real consequences for this rhetoric, bringing 
the domestic and international networks into direct connection. Although these 
refugees paled in comparison with the 502,000 Hungarians in Yugoslavia, as of the 
1953 census, the delicate national situation in Yugoslavia required equally delicate 
management, a situation of which Tito was well aware (Ludanyi 1979, 233).
Th e complexity of these networks in the region help explain the variety of 
responses to the crisis and why many of the aims of destalinization, such as re-
pairing the rift with Yugoslavia, failed to achieve their goal. Destalinization as a 
process revealed the tension inherent in Soviet policy: too much control weakens 
domestic support while too much autonomy threatens control (Jones 1977, 220). 
However, to simply place the states in the region upon this spectrum is to reduce 
the complexity of regional personal, information, and cultural networks to a single 
issue. Tito’s complex relationship with the revolution, including fears of national-
istic spill-over and violence, played into his initial support of the Soviet invasion 
while his need to visibly appear and act independently of the Soviet Union vis a 
vis the third world and the West led him to allow Nagy asylum and thus led to the 
re-setting of Soviet-Yugoslav relations to their initial frosty status before destalin-
ization began once Nagy was abducted (Granville 1998, 702). Indeed, the same 
ethnic fears were used as intellectual cover by Popescu in his messages shaping 
both his view of the crisis and the view of the Romanian government (Granville 
2010, 316−317).
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6. WESTERN WORLD
Th e international networks aff ected by these events represent the variety 
of communities as well as the relations between networks. Communist parties in 
Western Europe were all strongly negatively aff ected by these events, shedding 
members both locally and nationally (Th ornton and Th ompson 1997, 73). Th is 
was due to both the psychological impact of the “secret speech” and due to verbal 
and physical abuse by the general populace (Th ornton and Th ompson 1997, 82). 
Indeed, the Dutch Communist Party headquarters were the locations of protests 
and even riots after the second Soviet intervention (Hellema 1995, 174). Howev-
er, this did not necessarily lead to the complete collapse of these parties as some 
managed to negotiate a subsidy from the Soviets which helped compensate for 
their loss in membership funds (Th ornton and Th ompson 1997, 73) while others 
distanced themselves intellectually from the Soviet line following furious internal 
debate (Denitch 1978, 151). Th e question of which parties could and did choose to 
continue to follow the Soviet line was down to informal network eff ects as, after 
the disbanding of the Cominform, there was no formal organization dedicated to 
coordinating and enforcing alignment with the Soviet brand of communism and 
control and infl uence was disseminated through networks of world communist 
leaders and apparatchiks (Bracke 2007, 58). Th us, individual social networks with-
in communist party leadership groups helped maintain or weaken the communist 
parties in Western Europe as those who maintained coherence under domestic 
forms of legitimation, and thus were not so closely tied in with Soviet communism, 
were able to maintain support (Bracke 2007, 55).
Austria, as a country freshly liberated from Soviet occupation, was embed-
ded in a particularly dense network of ideology, international politics, and popula-
tion movements. Th e fi rst impact was to drive Austria further into neutrality both 
as politicians reacted to the events and as the populace learned fi rst-hand of the 
Soviet invasion (Lendvai 2008, 203). How could they not be impacted by the arrival 
of 95,000, then 150,000, and fi nally 170,000 refugees from November to January 
(Sapir 1958, 307)? Th ese refugees were not simply new arrivals in the region as, 
due to the historic connections between Austria and Hungary, interpersonal and 
intellectual networks existed between these communities which in part acted as 
a draw for refugees (Granville 2006, 64). Indeed, just as individuals were fl owing 
from Hungary to Austria after the revolution information had fl own from Austria 
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to Hungary beforehand which inspired reformist farming communities along the 
border (Zonova 2007, 199). Th is jeopardized the newly adopted Swiss model of 
militarized neutrality, absent any guarantees from major powers. Internationally 
this was tricky as the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, wanted to use Aus-
tria as a Trojan horse to pull other EE states towards the US (Bischof 2000, 150). 
While this plan was obviously overly-ambitious, as has been addressed above, the 
events did have similar eff ects as with other Western countries with the added 
eff ect of rebuilding the perceptions of the armed forces, helping them overcome 
the shame of the Anschluss of 1938, and helping with the rehabilitation of their 
position in the state (Granville 2006, 70). To this day Austrian politics is riven by 
the revised position of the Austrian military, interfering with attempts to grapple 
with Austria’s World War II past and stoking the hopes of the far right (Musner 
2000, 79).
In terms of international alliances there was no concerted response due to 
the complexities of international networks. Although there was widespread con-
demnation led in part by Pakistan (Rajput 1973, 4) little else was done. Th e Dutch 
attempted to lead a diplomatic embargo of the Soviet Union but this had fallen 
apart by the 27th of December (Hellema 1995, 176). Indeed, despite the harsh lan-
guage of Dutch diplomats they were domestically even harsher than the US when 
it came to the issue of refugees with Prime Minister Drees even requiring all ref-
ugees to sign a declaration that any “residence in the Netherlands would only be 
temporary” (Hellema 1995, 180). Th is distrust of immigrants also took on a racial 
element as the team in charge of selecting refugees for Dutch visas was instructed 
not to select any communists, AVH agents, criminals or gypsies (Hellema 1995, 
181). Th us, domestic level considerations, and even individual ones such as racism, 
were transmitted into international policy which complicated any attempt to close 
ranks against Hungary and the Soviet Union. Even artistic policy was aff ected as 
the Hungarian pavilion at the 1958 Brussels Expo was used to legitimize the new 
Kadar regime for an international, individual, audience (Peteri 2012, 139).
Unlike the Dutch, the Canadians let in many refugees, without the same 
restrictions, which provided new impetus for the local community. Although the 
post-war wave of immigration of displaced persons had started in 1947 the stream 
of refugees became a torrent after the revolution, and after sustained eff orts by 
Hungarian social and cultural networks within Canada (Lanphier 1981, 114), 
which resulted in 30,000 refugees arriving by the end of 1957 (Dreisziger 2000, 
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249). Th e class and cultural makeup of these refugees, diff erent than that of the 
members of the pre-war wave of immigrants, aided in the collapse of leftist Hun-
garian organizations in Canada and the creation of new cultural ties and forms of 
media both within Canada and across the border with the US. New publications, 
such as Kanadai Magyarsag and the Jewish Menora Egyenloseg shifted established 
new readerships in the region with the latter even becoming the principle paper 
of Magyar Jews in North America (Dreisziger, 2000, 250). Th ese same emigrant 
community networks fed back into international individual and political networks 
in Europe when the émigrés returned on travel, often returning home to Hungary 
bringing stories of the West and even while travelling in Europe where they spread 
stories of Hungary and were, for a while after the revolution, considered as victims 
and heroes through-out the West (Lenart and Cooper 2012, 381).
7. CONCLUSION
What is to be learned about these events from this broad and winding study? 
First and foremost is that any attempt to draw singular lines of causation from 
event to conclusion are problematic. What is more important is to understand the 
sheer volume of voices who, by their cacophony, can shape policy in ways which 
would seem unclear from any singular study. Th is also aff ects the issue of memory 
as, when looking back for clear lines of causation, it can be easy to inadvertently 
miss out on some of the multitude of actors and networks who were touched and 
shaped by such an event.
Introducing a study of networks and network eff ects creates a more com-
plete picture of the event and of those aff ected by it. Diaspora, religious, and po-
litical communities across Europe and the Western World, shattering pre-existing 
linkages and reshaping their ways of being and understanding. Information net-
works shaped leader’s responses to the crisis and popular understanding of the 
events. Further research is needed to examine how exactly information was passed 
from node to node and how these networks interacted with other community and 
political networks. Failing to do so results in a partial understanding and memory 
of the event. While all information is valuable, including in depth studies of in-
dividual communities and leader’s positions and responses, without a conceptual 
framework the information remains isolated and unrelated. Th is volume of actors 
and connections needs to be understood when remembering an event or the vari-
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ety of impacts can be lost. And what is the study of history if not the study of the 
wonderful variety of events and personal experiences which make up our story?
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Based on the diplomatic reports of US representatives in Belgrade and 
Zagreb, as well as the British diplomatic cables and newspaper articles 
to which foreign diplomats are referring, the article gives a reconstruction 
of the Yugoslav government offi  cials’ day-by-day reaction to the events 
in Hungary from October and November 1956. It shows pragmatic 
adaptation in the Yugoslav stance on the “October Revolution” in Hungary 
in 1956, the Yugoslav party giving US diplomats excuses for their choices, 
the commentary in Washington.
Key words: 
1.  YUGOSLAV IDEOLOGICAL ZENITH AND 
IDEOLOGICAL FERMENTATION OF THE BLOC
Nikita Khrushchev’s journey to Yugoslavia in 1955 was the most important 
journey he took for the world communist movement or, at least, they saw it like that 
in Belgrade. Th e Soviet leader’s arrival in May 1955, after Yugoslav leader Josip Broz 
Tito declined to travel to Moscow, was reported in the Yugoslav media as a great 
diplomatic success, and rightly so. Journalists compared this to the newly signed 
Austrian State Treaty and the meeting of Asian and African states’ representatives 
in Bandung1. Th e journey of Soviet highest offi  cials to Belgrade came as a great 
1  NARA, RG 59, Records of the Department of State Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia 
1955−1959, Decimal File 768, Roll no. 4; 768.00/May Day/5.655, May Day in Belgrade, 
1955.
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surprise to everyone. Th e daughter of Nikolai Bulganin, the Premier of the Soviet 
Union, who was travelling with Khrushchev, asked her father why he would have 
travelled to this fascist country, she had been hearing so many bad things about on 
the radio for years.2 Just about a year later, it was clear that “the Soviet Canossa” 
was much more local in its range, important only for bilateral relations, and more 
of a confi rmation of the established status after 1948 than a real “game changer”.
As reported by the Second Secretary of the US Embassy, J. C. Ausland, the 
May Day celebration of 1955, was pompous but with little enthusiasm. As opposed 
to the ratio of weapons shown in 1954 that was 80:20%, it was only 60:40% in favor 
of the US armament, in 1955. Yugoslavia was changing. Th ere were more paintings 
of the classics of Marxism than previous years. Th e new allies in the Balkan Pact, 
the Greeks and Turks, were praised, but also the Burmese and Indians. It was the 
way Yugoslavia positioned itself between the two blocs.3 Th e American diplomat 
fi nished his report with irony: “When the parade was over, Tito left the tribunal 
with a wave to the populace, got into his shiny, black Rolls Royce and – under the 
banner of the hammer and sickle – drove away“.4 Th e thing that the May Day pa-
rade showed was the restoration of relations with Moscow. In May 1955, Khrush-
chev expected that his visit would have been enough for Tito to return to the arms 
of the USSR and correct his predecessor’s bad politics that way. Th e Eastern Bloc 
had to be strengthened and relaxed, and Yugoslavia had to be brought back to its 
place. Th e journey to Asia was supposed to expand the infl uence of the Krem-
lin outside the “traditional”, European area. At the end of the year, Khrushchev 
travelled to Burma, India and Afghanistan. At the beginning of December 1955, 
Yugoslav diplomats in Rangoon expected the arrival of the Soviet delegation with 
great interest. A few months earlier the encounter could have been uneasy. Now, 
Khrushchev walked to the table of four Yugoslavs. At the Yugoslav table, the over-
2  Americans wondered the same. In a comprehensive report of February 1956 about major 
political trends in Yugoslavia during 1955, US diplomats said: “The most interesting and 
perhaps the most important aspect of Yugoslav policy during 1955 was the regime's 
experiment in cooperation with men who only a short time ago were condemning it as 
fascist.“ (Dragović 2000, 12)
NARA, RG59, LOT 66 D487, PPS Office Files 1956; F780007-0724, Memorandum of 
Conversation, June 29th, 1956, Call of Yugoslav Ambassador on Secretary.
3  NARA, RG 59, Records of the Department of State Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia 1955–
1959, Decimal File 768, Roll no. 4; 768.00/May Day/5.655, May Day in Belgrade, 1955.
4  NARA, RG 59, Records of the Department of State Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia 1955–
1959, Decimal File 768, Roll no. 4; 768.00/May Day/5.655, May Day in Belgrade, 1955.
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weight General Secretary of the CPSU was surrounded by two tall men: a giant 
military envoy, Ilija Radaković, and Chargé d’Aff aires, Miroslav Kreačić. Th en he 
looked at their young, elegant wives and said: ”Ah, you, Yugoslavs, are very strange 
people.” (Jakovina 2002) What was important for the Yugoslavs, was to break the 
isolation from the East, open economic cooperation, reduce the dependence on 
the West, and that the diff erent paths to socialism become, if possible, the politics 
of all the countries of the Bloc.
It was clear that things were changing, but that still wasn’t the defi nite mo-
ment of realization that the Kremlin had really changed their stance on Stalin 
and everything that happened at the center of the communist movement. A true 
change happened in Moscow on February 25th in 1956, on the last day of the 20th 
Congress of the CPSU. Although many people in Yugoslavia probably mostly re-
membered the part of Khrushchev speech about Tito5, the blow delivered on the 
cult of personality and the condemnation of Stalin had dramatic consequences. 
Yugoslavia was a test case, a place in the speech that was supposed to serve as 
an example of Stalin’s disgraceful role in international relations. Shortly after the 
Moscow surprise, US Ambassador in Belgrade, James Riddleberger, (in Belgrade 
from the summer of 1953 to January 1958) reported that the Yugoslavs spoke and 
were not entirely sure how to rate the 20th Congress of the CPSU, but they all 
considered it positive. Th e cult of personality was condemned and diff erent paths 
to socialism were recognized, and with that Moscow came as close to Tito as pos-
sible.6 Khrushchev also mentioned parliamentary methods in achieving socialism. 
It was interpreted by US diplomats, who had not yet allowed party relations to be 
established, to be a step in the right direction.
A few weeks later, the Yugoslav government had a far clearer view of the 
new circumstances. “We should be supportive of Khrushchev’s group,”” said Tito 
5  “It would be enough for me to raise my little finger- and Tito would be gone. He would 
fall from power.” We paid a high price for that “raise of his small finger”. That statement 
reflected Stalin’s grandiosity mania, but that was the way he did things... But that did 
not happen to Tito. It didn’t matter how high he raised not only his little finger, but 
everything else, Tito did not fall. Why? The reason was that, in this case of disagreements 
with the Yugoslav comrades, Tito had a country and a people who had leant a difficult 
lesson of struggle for freedom and independence, a people who gave support to their 
leaders.”(Hruščov 1970,70)
6  NARA, Records of the Department of State, Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia 1955–1959, 
Decimal File 768; .00/1-355 to .00/9-2656; Roll no. 1; 768.00/2-2456; Confidential, 
Secretary of State; Riddleberger, February 24th, 1956.
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at the Executive Committee of the CC LCY Session at the beginning of April, 
1956. “Th e reputation of Yugoslavia in the world today demands greater activity in 
our foreign policy.”7 Reservation towards Moscow was no longer desirable; those 
fi ghting “bureaucratic Stalinist elements” needed help. Even more needed to be 
done with Burma and Egypt. Th e US military aid had to be cancelled. Th e changes 
in the “eastern countries”, Bulgaria and Hungary, had to be monitored. Th e rela-
tions with them were well developed, “although there was some wavering there””. 
“Strengthening of the socialist forces doesn’t happen along the bloc line. Th is does 
not mean that we would calmly observe strengthening of the antisocialist forces. 
Th e Russians have a narrow view of India and Burma, they want to reduce them 
to mere satellites of theirs, and that is how they sow the seed of distrust in these 
countries.” Everything that Tito said, along with the others at the meeting, basical-
ly traced or suggested the way Yugoslavia was supposed to act internationally in 
the upcoming months. It also showed how great the diff erences were in relation 
to Moscow, but also how big were the ambitions of Belgrade. Th e State Secretary 
for Foreign Aff airs, Koča Popović, said that Yugoslavia was at its peak, it was the 
“forerunner of these new relations”, the changes.8 Popović emphasized that it was 
important to stay out of the blocs, because any meddling of neutral forces in the 
bastion of socialism was weakening the world process (Jakovina 2009, 459−480). 
At the same session, Edvard Kardelj underlined that “Eastern Europe is increasing-
ly aff ected by the fear of Stalinism and it needs help.” Yugoslavia was not included 
in the “the Russian socialist bastion”, but it was included in the “socialist bastion of 
the whole world”. Th e fi rm commitment to socialism in the Yugoslav way and the 
sense of infl uence on the world events- which was a fact, given the fi erce campaign 
that Yugoslavia was exposed to- determined the changes in the next few months. 
Never modest, they were now convinced in Yugoslavia that they were actively 
“co-creating” the policies of the great powers.
Next, a proposal followed by the Supreme Council for the exchange of parlia-
mentary delegations’ visits, as a continuation of good relations growth. A Yugoslav 
contact in the State Secretariat for Foreign Aff airs commented that it would be 
hard to refuse this, when such visits to western parliaments occurred regularly. 
Only after a long wait, on April 14th, did Moša Pijade respond to the off er of Feb-
7 AJ, CK SKJ, Zapisnik sa sednice IK CK SKJ održane na Brionima. 2. april 1956.
8 AJ, CK SKJ, Zapisnik sa sednice IK CK SKJ održane na Brionima. 2. april 1956.
LIMES+  Vol. XIV (2017), No. 1: pp. 43–73
47
ruary 9th, 1955. Th is was an indication that there were still some uncertainties in 
Belgrade.9 Th en, the Hungarians requested the same, followed by the others from 
Eastern Europe. Journalists and diplomats at the US embassy, in Knez Miloš St., 
knew what kind of impression a large number of such visits could have created in 
public, especially in the West. Th e usual media practice was to report extensively 
and in detail, but they did not fi nd that the proposal should have been removed.10 
Finally, it was an easier way to present the Yugoslav views to their politicians and 
encourage the positions they might have had in common.
Th e situation intensifi ed. Th e Polish authorities released Wladyslaw Gomuł-
ka from custody in April 1956, and then invited him to be a part of the Govern-
ment. Th is Titoist had two conditions: a high position in the party, and the dis-
missal of the Defense Minister and the Marshal of the Soviet Union, Rokossovsky. 
Not before October 19th did the Polish United Workers’ Party (hereinafter: PUWP) 
do what was expected. First, there were protests in Poznan on June 28th, 1956. By 
the tone in newspapers’ reports, American diplomats were clear that the Yugo-
slavs’ expectations and wishes for realization of the satellite states’ freedom were 
limited.11 Yugoslavia condemned the Polish authorities and former Stalinists, but 
also the “reactionary elements” that fought for collapse of socialism. Th e Yugoslav 
media editorials expressed no doubt that there was a foreign element involved, 
but then denied such Soviet accusations by putting articles from US sources in 
the spotlight. It was clear to Belgrade authorities that the demands were not only 
economic; there was also a demand for democratization (Kemp-Welch 2008, 92). 
On Saturday, October 20th, at the Central Committee of the PUWP, Gomułka 
said that there was more than one path to socialism. “Th ere is the Soviet path, 
there is the Yugoslav path, but there are other paths too. Th e Polish people will 
defend itself by any means and will not move from the road of democratization”, 
claimed the new Polish leader (Eisenhower 1965, 59). Demonstrations in support 
of the Hungarians, held in front of the Central Committee of the PUWP, the So-
9  NARA, RG59, Records of the Department of State Internal Aff airs of Yugoslavia 1955–
1959, Decimal File 768, Rool no. 4; 768.00W/4-1555.
10  NARA, RG59, General Record of the Departmen of State, Bureau of Eurpean Aff airs, 
Offi  ce of Easte European Aff airs; Khrushchev's Trip to Yugoslavia, No. 2007 225/63, 
September 25th, 1963.
11  NARA, RG59, Records of the Department of State Internal Aff airs of Yugoslavia 1955–
1959, Decimal File z68, Rool no. 4; 768.00(W)/7-656, Joint Weeka; Oliver M. Marcy, 
First Secretary of Embassy.
Tvrtko Jakovina American and British Diplomats in Yugoslavia on Hungarian Revolution of 1956…
48
viet Embassy and a part of the old royal castle, were declared the beginning of the 
Warsaw-Budapest-Belgrade alliance (Kemp-Welch 2008, 104).
Matyas Rakosi, a Hungarian, Stalinist leader, marked the protests in Poznan, 
at the end of June, as an “imperialist provocation”. He said that the Americans sent 
parachutists to cause disorder, and he temporarily retained his position (Swain 
and Swain 1945, 97). Th e Soviets were aware that dissatisfaction was huge, but it 
temporarily slowed down Khrushchev’s course. Th e Hungarian workers rebelled 
and went into solidarity strikes. Th e “Petofi ” circle, created by the government 
as a youth forum, was banned after a long session on June 27th, when there was 
a discussion about the freedom of the press and Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister 
from 1953 to 1955, was called to return to the party. Mikoyan arrived in Budapest 
from Moscow and demanded that Rakosi fi nally step down, which was announced 
on July 18th. Ernö Gerö became the head of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, which 
is barely a step in a satisfactory direction. Mikoyan went to Belgrade on vacation. 
Th e Hungarians believed that Rakosi’s dismissal happened on Tito’s request, and 
that after the appointment of Ernö Gerö, Mikoyan went to report to Tito (Ivanji 
1956, 56, 58, 67−68). He returned to Budapest on July 21st. Gerö complained to 
Mikoyan that the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia would be diffi  cult, that 
the opponents of the party took over the Yugoslav model of socialism develop-
ment, and that the “Yugoslav Agency” collaborated with Hungarian intellectuals. 
After Yugoslav media openly called for Nagy’s return to the party on August 24th, 
Gerö was convinced that Belgrade was deeply involved in all the events (Swain and 
Swain 1945, 99).
Th e year of 1956 was in many ways crucial to Yugoslav foreign policy, but 
also to Eastern Europe. Tito signed the Moscow Declaration in Moscow in June, 
accepting the concept of “diff erent paths to socialism”, one of the values Belgrade 
never forgot or missed a chance to emphasize (Mićunović 1977, 138−141). Th e 
return visit to the USSR, as was reported by US diplomats, did not make a satellite 
country from Yugoslavia, but it made it an ally, primarily an ideological one.12 Po-
litically, Yugoslavia was still between the blocs. Tito denied that he had ever said 
that the two countries would marsh shoulder to shoulder in a future war. Tito’s 
triumphal visit also revealed to the Yugoslav side some of the troubling elements 
12  RG59, LOT 66 D487, PPS Office Files 1956; F780007-0723, June 22nd, 1956, Tito's Trip 
to the USSR. (... left Yugoslavia a fellow-traveller rather than a commoitted member of 
the Soviet bloc).
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in the CPSU hierarchy, particularly the “prolonged existence and strength of Sta-
linist elements”.13 Leo Mates, the Yugoslav ambassador to the United States, told 
Secretary of State Dulles, on June 29th, 1956, that the visit strengthened Yugosla-
via’s independent position, but that Tito’s impression was also that more and more 
satellites countries have been becoming more independent.14 It didn’t mean that 
independence would be anti-Soviet, but Dulles didn’t expect that. Th e problem 
didn’t lie with the Soviet borders or with regimes such as Finland or Yugoslavia. 
Dulles claimed that the problem was in non-free regimes, as demonstrated by the 
uprising in Poland (in Poznan in June 1956). It was evident in the low standard 
of living in Hungary, and in Czechoslovakia before coming under the Soviet rule. 
Tito showed, as Dulles said, that the countries in that area should be independent. 
Tito and Dulles spoke alone on Brijuni in 1955, anticipating trends that began to 
intensify.15
In the late summer of 1956, the Yugoslav parliamentary delegation travelled 
to Czechoslovakia. On the same day, September 3rd 1956, the Polish Sejm delega-
tion visited Belgrade. A day later, a trade union delegation headed by Đuro Salaj 
travelled to Bucharest.16 Newspapers were fi lled with news of arrival of the heads 
of the Greek Orthodox Church, the Moscow Soviet, the Greek royal couple, Israeli 
parliamentarians, the head of the Norwegian Workers’ Party visit, the Bulgarian 
parliamentary delegation’s visit, Sukarno’s visit to Yugoslavia, the visit of Federal 
People’s Assembly delegation, headed by Moše Pijade, to the Federal Republic of 
Germany etc. Much of the news in autumn was about the Suez crisis.17 In the up-
13  NARA, RG34, Records of the Department of State Internal Aff airs fo Yugoslavia 
1955–1959, Decimal File 768, 00/9-2756 to 00/1-2758, Rool no. 2, 768.00/10-2256, 
Memorandum of Conversation between Ilija Jukić, former Under Secretary for Foreign 
Aff airs in pre- War Yu and an Embbassy Offi  cer in Rome, October 22nd, 1956.
14  NARA, RG59, LOT 66 D487, PPS Offi  ce Files 1956; F780007-0724, Memorandum of 
Conversation, June 29, 1956, Call of Yugoslav Ambassador on Secretary.
15  Dwight Eisenhower wrote about this in his response to Tito on November 12th, 1956. 
Jakovina 2003.
16  Borba, 4.9.1956.; We sincerely wish that our visit serves to further strengthen the trust 
between the peoples of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; Polish Sejm delegation ar-
rived in Belgrade; Borba, 5.9.1956.; Our union delegation led by Đuro Salaj arrived in 
Bucharest.
17  Borba, 12.9.1956; Welcome! Selamat datang!; 18.9.1956. A joint Yugoslav-Indonesian 
statement was signed, the Federal People’s Assembly delegation travels to the Federal 
Republic of Germany on September 25th; Borba 24.9.1956. A formal luncheon in the 
Federal People’s Assembly was held in honour of Bulgaria’s parliamentary delegation; 
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coming weeks, Suez crisis took the spotlight and Koča Popović travelled to New 
York to UN Security Council Meeting.
 Th e Yugoslav media reported on September 20th that Nikita Khrushchev 
had arrived in Belgrade for a short vacation.18 Th at was the second meeting of 
Khrushchev and Tito in 1956. Tito’s guest visited Belje, Kopar, Brijuni, Zagreb, 
where the Zagreb Fair remained open for an additional day, and he launched 
the ship called “Uljanik”.19 Yugoslav newspapers briefl y reported that “Nikita 
Sergeyevich Khrushchev and President Tito attended the performance of the Indi-
an Art Ensemble, together with the Deputy Prime Minister of India, Anil Chanda, 
who was also visiting Yugoslavia”. Th e “Dances and Songs of the People of India” 
in the Pula National Th eater was a gathering place for the Croatian party and 
government offi  cials.20 Previously, on September 21st, Politika newspapers had an-
nounced that the Indian Ensemble was to have concerts at the National Th eater in 
Belgrade on September 24th and 25th, and then move on to Novi Sad, Zagreb and 
Ljubljana, but the plan was changed.21 On September 24th, Borba newspapers re-
ported that the ensemble had arrived and had been welcomed in Belgrade.22 What 
remained unclear to the reader was the decision to send the ensemble to Pula, on 
a “royal command”. “Norway would become a republic overnight” commented a 
Norwegian minister. “Th e British ambassador said that in case something similar 
had happened in Britain, it would have created a republican party overnight”.23 
US diplomatic sources commented the concert in Pula ironically, but the visit of 
the General Secretary of CPSU to Yugoslavia was regarded as a way to “ease the 
Borba, 10.10.1956. President Tito had an intimate dinner with the Greek royal couple; 
the delegation of the Federal People’s Assembly arrived in Warsaw.
18  Borba 20.9.1956; Nikita Kruschev arrived in Belgrade; Politika 20.9.1956. Nikita 
Kruschev arrived in Belgrade.
19  Borba 24.9.1956; Kruschev i president Tito attended the launch of the ship called 
„Uljanik“.
20  Borba; 27.9.1956. N.S. Kruschev i president Tito arrived in Belgrade; Politika, 
26.9.1956, „N.S. Kruschev i president Tito saw the performance “Dances and Songs of 
the People of India”. The symbolism of movement of the Indian Art Ensemble; BMD 
(article reports on the performance, but they don't say that „the National Theatre“ was 
actually in Pula).
21 Politika, 21.9.1956. Indian clssical songs and dances in our theatres.
22 Politika, 24.9.1956. Indian cultural delegation arrived.
23  NARA, RG 59, Records of the Department of State Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia 1955–
1959, Decimal Fil e768, 00/5-759 (cont) to 00/(W)/10-1956, Roll no. 4; 768.00(W)/9-
2156. Joint Weeka No. 38.
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diffi  culties” between Moscow and Belgrade, related to “the question of how much 
autonomy would the USSR allow to the European communist parties, especially 
in the satellite countries.”24 It seemed that the Yugoslavs encouraged the Italian 
communist leader Togliatti to question “polycentrism” in communist parties, and 
moreover, the fact that the Soviets seemed to quickly reintroduce discipline and 
criticize “national communism”, and demand that “the Yugoslav infl uence in the 
satellite countries be disabled”. It was fi rst learned by the British in Budapest, and 
then confi rmed by the Indian ambassador in Belgrade that the Soviets issued a 
warning that the CPSU, rather than the LCY, was to serve as a model.25 Yugoslav 
diplomats also spoke about this to their US colleagues, stressing that “Belgrade 
fi nds it is necessary to re-examine its views on Soviet moves in Eastern Europe”.
Much more serious news was that Tito and his guest, immediately after that 
tour in Yugoslavia, travelled to the USSR on a “vacation”. Th e newspapers didn’t 
bring the news with much excitement. “President Tito and Nikita Khrushchev 
travelled to the USSR”; “President Tito travelled to the USSR”, Politika and Borba 
reported on September 28th. “It is clear now that, whatever the diffi  culties in the 
USSR and the satellite countries, Tito now plays an important role, a role which, at 
this moment, we cannot assess, and such that can lead to profound changes in the 
Yugoslav-Soviet and Yugoslav-Western countries relations”, commented US diplo-
mats.26 In addition to the meeting and hunting with the Soviets, Tito surprisingly 
met with the new Hungarian leader Ernö Gerö, who replaced Matyas Rakosi on 
July 18th, 1956. “President of the SFRY J. B. Tito and his wife arrived this morning 
in the summer house where the First Secretary of the Central Committee of CPSU 
Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was resting. Th e First Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Ernö Gerö, also on a holiday 
in the Crimea, arrived there too. Th ey walked along the seashore, where they met 
with the citizens recovering in the sanatorium “Livadija”27...” Politika only added 
that Gerö took a walk to the nearby hill with Tito and Khrushchev, but that was 
all the news about him.28 Nobody wrote about this meeting anymore. John Foster 
Dulles, whose communication with Belgrade was intensifi ed, said on October 2nd 
24 Khrushchev's Trip to Yugoslavia, No. 2007 225/63, September 25th, 1956.
25 Khrushchev's Trip to Yugoslavia, No. 2007 225/63, September 25th, 1956.
26 NARA, September 27th, 1956, Tito's Sudden visit to Russia, (Mr. Elbrich).
27 Borba. 1.10.1956, President Tito visited Kruschev's summer house on Jalta.
28 Politika, 2.10.1956, President Tito visited Kruschev's summer house.
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at the press conference in the State Department, that the US does not consider 
Tito’s visit to the USSR a sign of a change in the “general line of politics” of the 
SFRY.29 At a later date, the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, Branko 
Drašković, said that Tito’s visit to Crimea was private.
Th e changes in some camps of the Bloc continued to accelerate. In the sum-
mer of 1956, the commander of the Soviet units in Hungary, Yevgeni Malashenko, 
reported that hardly anyone came to the concerts of Soviet orchestras in Székes-
fehérvár anymore, which would have been common before. Th e mood among the 
people also changed (Sebestyen 2006, 101). László Rajk was buried again in Buda-
pest. Th e speeches held at the funeral showed “determination and active eff orts of 
the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (hereinafter: HSWP) and the government 
to sweep up the remnants of the recent past”, so they were not to be considered 
very signifi cant.30 Th e national funeral of the “Titoists”, held on October 6th, ex-
actly on the day of execution of 13 Hungarian generals who rebelled against the 
Habsburg Monarchy in 1849, contributed to the seriousness of the situation, but 
also sent a message to Belgrade that the relations should be improved (Gough 
2006, 75; Kemp-Welch 2008, 107, Gati 2006, 136. After the funeral, they visited a 
monument to Stalin and then the Yugoslav embassy, protesting in front of the fi rst 
one and cheering Tito and the Yugoslav path to socialism at the latter one (Kemp-
Welch 2008, 107). Th e fi rst interview with the widow was published by Zagreb’s 
newspapers Vjesnik (Zelmanović 1956, 193−200)31. Borba reported on October 
15th that the decision to exclude Imra Nagy from the HSWP was annulled. His 
mistakes, as big as they were, were not enough to justify the exclusion. More of an 
impact had “the personal bias of comrade Rakosi”. Nagy warned that the reasons 
why this happened and the disagreement within the party are neither necessary 
nor welcome. However, he would do everything to restore order within the party, 
in accordance with his “Marxist-Leninist beliefs and principles, as well as with 
29  Borba, 4.10.1956. Minister Dulles on President Tito's visit to USSR; Politika 3.10.1956., 
Dulles said there were no changes in Yugoslav's politics.
30  Borba, 13.10.1956, Tito-Kruschov meeting was mutually wanted and usefull for the 
politics of active coexistence.
31  Borba, 7.10.1956. The bodies of László Rajk and his comrades, executed in 1949 and 
1950, were buried yesterday; Gavro Altman.
LIMES+  Vol. XIV (2017), No. 1: pp. 43–73
53
communist and human moral”. After all, he agreed with the party line in the sum-
mer of 1953.32
2.  YUGOSLAVIA AND HUNGARIAN OCTOBER 
REVOLUTION:
Yugoslavia had a role in the Bloc, but some countries hardly knew much 
about what was happening in Yugoslavia. Th e language barrier was a big one and a 
decade of anti-Slavic propaganda was intensifi ed in Rakosi’s time. Th e Hungarians 
knew that Yugoslavia was under attack by their Stalinist leaders, they knew about 
their “self-management”, knew that Belgrade did not obey Moscow, and that was 
enough to know. Th e Americans reported that the Yugoslav offi  cials thought that 
Tito had long felt that the events in Hungary where Titoism was mentioned were 
commendable, but they were unhappy with the growing defl ection from “liberal-
ism“ that depraved Marxism.33 Many people in Yugoslavia found the fact that one 
Stalinist was replaced by his own right hand stupid and responsible for the later 
crisis.
Ernö Gerö and the Hungarian delegation historically visited Yugoslavia and 
stayed a long time. Ferenc Münnich, the previous Hungarian ambassador in Mos-
cow, was also a part of the delegation and he handed credentials to Tito on Oc-
tober 11th.34 Münnich had served as ambassador to Moscow before he was sent 
to Belgrade and he was, as described by a British colleague of his, “a seemingly 
pleasant old chap”. He was always friendly, with a bit cynical sense of humor, more 
talkative than most ambassadors of satellite countries, and he spoke German and 
Russian well. However, he never talked about anything seriously, never expressed 
any opinion of his own. Th e old cynic “would be a great puppet”, but there was no 
way he could make a “serious statesman or popular leader”.35 Th e British diplomats 
32  Borba, 15.10.1956. The decision to exclude Imra Nagy from the HSWP was annulled 
in the autumn of 1955.
33  NARA, Records of the Department of State, Internal Affairs of Hungary 1955–1959, 
Decimal File 764, 00/8-1056 to 00/11-356, Rool no. 3, 764.00/10-156, Budapest.
34  Borba, 12.10.1956. President Tito received credentials from ambassadors of Sweden, 
Hungary and Finland's delegate.
35  FO 371/122399, Northern Department, Sir W.G. Hayter, Moscow to Mr. Reilly, 23rd 
Nov 1956, Comments on Ferenc Münnich, former Hungarian Ambassador in Moscow 
who is playing a prominent part in the Kadar Government, NH 10110/793.
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guessed that Münnich belonged to a group of “old communists”, the Spanish Civil 
War fi ghters, led by László Rajk’s widow, who were now linked to Nagy support-
ers, a nationalist and a more pragmatic group of communists.36 Th e interviews 
of the leading politicians were considered satisfactory for the Yugoslavs, with an 
emphasis on “self-management and democracy”.37
After the new delegation from Romania arrived and there were no more 
planned meetings with Tito (since Ranković was the one to attend the fi nal meet-
ing on October 22nd), Gerö did not seem to be afraid of the events in Hungary 
anymore. He left Yugoslavia for Budapest on October 22nd, on the same day when 
hundreds of students gathered at the Budapest University of Technology and start-
ed writing a list of requests, until someone proposed they organized a protest the 
next day in support of the Polish people and praising General Bem, a Polish hero 
of the 1848. Th e students wrote a manifesto with 16 requests, one of which was for 
the withdrawal of Soviet forces. After arriving in Budapest, Gerö gave an optimistic 
statement about reunifying the socialist bloc. Th e Yugoslav declaration wasn’t pub-
lished before October 24th, only after Hungary had already changed. Before that, 
there were protests, Gerö was deposed, a monument to Stalin was demolished, 
and the Soviets intervened for the fi rst time. It was the beginning of the Hungari-
an “October Revolution”. Imre Nagy addressed the people gathered in front of the 
Parliament, and, as usual, he didn’t speak well. Borba reported the event in their 
last pages along with Gerö’s earlier speech upon arriving in Budapest.38
On the evening of October 24th, 1956, Khrushchev and Bulganin attended an 
exhibition opening of Belgian masters’ paintings. US Ambassador Charles Bohlen 
could not talk to either of them. He wrote to Washington that they seemed even 
more somber and gloomy than before. Veljko Mićunović, the Yugoslav ambas-
sador, came to him later and quite nervously asked if there were any news from 
Budapest. As Mićunović heard from Tanjug’s correspondent, the Soviet soldiers 
36  FO 371/122376, Northern Department, Mr Fry to Mr. T. Brimelow, Esq, OBE, Foreign 
Offi  ce, Budapest, NH 10110/78, Reports on Manoeuvrings for power withn the com-
munist Party in Hungary since the fall of Rakossi, British Legation , Budapest, October 
12th, 1956.
37  FO 371/122376, Northern Department, Mr Fry to Mr. T. Brimelow, Esq, OBE, Foreign 
Offi  ce, Budapest, NH 10110/78, Reports on Manoeuvrings for power withn the com-
munist Party in Hungary since the fall of Rakossi, British Legation , Budapest, October 
12th, 1956; Borba/Politika, 23.10.1956. Th e world today; the Eighth Plenum of the CC 
of the PUWP
38 Borba, 24.10.1956. Events in Budapest; The meetings in Yugoslavia were the crossroads.
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opened fi re on the citizens. Th e situation was completely diff erent from the one 
in Poland.39
Nagy was appointed Prime Minister on October 25th and János Kádár re-
placed Gerö. Th e fi ghting in the streets did not stop, not even when the new gov-
ernment was created in Budapest. Riddleberger, the US ambassador to SFRY re-
ported that panic among the Yugoslav offi  cials on October 25th, 1956 could have 
been implicitly confi rmed, because Mladen Iveković spoke at the central celebra-
tion of UN Day, which was in sharp contrast to Kardelj, who was the main speaker 
the previous year. Th e rumor was that everyone else was at the meeting discussing 
the events in Hungary. However, they did come to the reception at a later point, so 
the fi rst US diplomat in Yugoslavia spoke with Pijade, Tempo, Velebit, etc. Iveković 
told him that the connection with the Yugoslav embassy in the Heroes’ Square in 
Budapest was cut all day long, but the American diplomat did not believe him. 
Ernö Gerö’s deposition was not shocking. “Tempo described Gerö as more of a 
Russians than a Hungarian.” Srđa Prica, the acting Secretary of State, similarly 
talked about Gerö and said that the Yugoslav leadership felt sorry for the action 
of Soviet forces and the bloodshed. Prica hoped that the western countries would 
not intervene, despite the Soviet bloodshed, because their insistence on “reac-
tionary and fascist elements” can only give an excuse for the Soviet use of force. 
Gerö was still “a Stalinist in his heart and limited intellectually.” Unlike Gomułka, 
the Hungarian did not understand the interests and feelings of the masses and his 
“stubborn and limited view” contributed to the tragedy. “Th e Yugoslav govern-
ment hopes that the new leadership will have a better understanding of the real 
situation” and that both, Gomułka and Nagy would arrange for the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops.40
Th e events in Warsaw were diff erent. Both Hungarian and Yugoslav fl ags 
could have been seen at the gathering of 300,000 Poles.41 A British diplomat in 
Belgrade reported that, according to Vladimir Velebit, Srđan Prica and Svetozar 
39  NARA, Records of the Department of State, Internal Aff airs of Hungary 1955–1959; 
Decimal 764, 00/8-1056to 00/11-356, Roll no. 3; 764.00/10-1456. (Mocow, October 
24th, Bohlen).
40  NARA, Records of the Department of State, Internal Aff airs of Hungary 1955–1959; 
Decimal 764, 00/8-1056to 00/11-356, Rool no. 3; 7664.00/10-2656, Belgrade, October 
26th, 1956.
41  NARA, Records of the Department of State, Internal Aff airs of Hungary 1955–1959; 
Decimal 764, 00/8-1056to 00/11-356, Rool no. 3; 764.00/10-256, Riddleberger.
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Vukmanović Tempo, the Vice President of Federal Executive Council (hereinafter: 
FEC), the Yugoslav leadership expected a Titoist regime, like the Gomułka one in 
Warsaw, to be established in Hungary. However, “Gerö and Nagy” slowed down 
the transition. Gerö stayed in Yugoslavia a bit too long. “Velebit told me that Gerö 
was very upset during the last two days and in constant radio-connection with 
Budapest.” Unlike Gomułka, Nagy did not make careful preparations for taking 
over power. Th e Yugoslavs were afraid of the way Nagy would set the order. Gerö 
was blamed for the Soviet intervention. As Velebit told the British diplomat, Nagy 
did not seem to be strong enough to handle the situation. It was tragic for the 
Hungarians, as he said that there had not been strong personalities there.42 So it 
seemed that Nagy was a half-choice, a person Belgrade didn’t count on, or had 
much confi dence in. Th at was the reason for the not so enthusiastic reaction to 
Nagy, which had been seen earlier.
As the Americans reported from Rome, the Italian Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs Gaetano Martino was informed by his ambassador in Belgrade Guiodotti, 
who kept his eye on the Italian Communists’ visit to Yugoslavia, led by Luigi Long, 
that Tito was seriously scared because of the Hungarian situation, just as much as 
he was pleasantly surprised by the development in Poland. All that was happening 
could have sent the message to the Kremlin that “the encouragement of Titoism 
is a dangerous policy for the USSR and that those events could ultimately have 
dramatic consequences to the future of Tito’s relations with Khrushchev and the 
Kremlin.” Th e Italians were excited about the news from Budapest, the best to 
come to the West after the end of the Second World War. As Martino had just 
fi nished his meeting with Nehru, he hoped that the Soviet behavior would show 
New Delhi that there was no point in hoping for anything from Moscow.43
Th e US analysts reported on October 26th that the Yugoslav media reported 
the situation in Poland closely and with approval, on “the border with enthusi-
asm”. What happened in Hungary fi lled them with anxiety and reservation. Th e 
United States was supposed to support the Polish independence. “Th e Yugoslav 
reaction, private and public, should have illustrated that the Yugoslav interests, 
42  FO 371/122376, Northern Department; Belgrade, Mr. Hayman, October 26th, NH 
10110/105, Reports on reactions of Yugoslaves concerning events in Hungary, October 
26th, 1956.
43  NARA, Records of the Department of State, Internal Aff airs of Hungary 1955–1959; 
Decimal 764, 00/8-1056to 00/11-356, Roll no. 3; 764.00/10-2656, Rome, October 26th, 
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at least in Eastern Europe, were not the same as those of the Soviet Union.”44 Th e 
Yugoslav views were faithfully refl ected in one unsigned commentary in Borba on 
October 23rd, 1956. “He praised Gomułka’s choices and decisions on the Eighth 
Plenum as a clear measure of socialism strengthening in Poland.”45 Th e “mistakes 
made in the past, especially those in relation to socialist democracy,” would now 
be corrected. A way for improving relations with the USSR was now secured, but 
also with other equally socialist countries. At that point, Poland was the closest 
country to Yugoslavia. Th ere was no other country with the ideas as close to the 
ones that Yugoslavia insisted on. Poland was also the most important one because 
it was the only one that could, not only withstand the Soviet pressure, as had been 
demonstrated, but could have been much more infl uential on the overall situation 
in the Bloc. It seemed that Yugoslavia had more direct mechanisms in connection 
to Hungary, but the more important thing was what Poland could do. In addition, 
Poland positioned itself close to what Yugoslavia had done, so it was necessary to 
cultivate such a trend, where “diff erent forms only accelerated the pace of socialist 
development in the world”.
As Kos, the Th ird Secretary of the Foreign Aff airs Department in the Ameri-
cas, reported, the Yugoslavs thought that Nagy and Kádár hadn’t made the decisive 
moves that Gomułka had made in Poland. Gerö should have been removed and a 
government created immediately. Only this could have stopped the uprising that 
was now developing among the “rebels” in Budapest, in the west of the country 
and at the border with Yugoslavia. Nobody in Belgrade believed that 100,000 Hun-
garians were counterrevolutionaries, although there were some fascist elements. 
Disappointment erupted because the Stalinist repression lasted for ten years, the 
Yugoslav diplomat claimed, and because it turned out that socialism cannot be 
“brought on the Soviet Army bayonets”.46 Kos said several important things, argu-
ing that it is possible that Poland would now go even further than Yugoslavia and 
that both Budapest and Warsaw must agree on their own with the Soviets on their 
mutual relations. “I repeat the Yugoslav way is not the only possible one. We do not 
44  NARA, Records of the Department of State, Internal Aff airs of Yugoslavia, 1955–1959, 
Decimal fi le 768, 00/10-1656 to 022/11-156, Rool 5; 768.00(W)/10-2656, Weeka no. 43, 
October 26th, 1956.
45  NARA, Rool 5; 768.00(W)/10-2656, Weeka no. 43, October 26, 1956; Borba, 23.10.1956. 
Th e world today; the Eighth Plenum of the CC of the PUWP
46  NARA, RG84, Records of the Department of State, 320 Greece 1956 to Hungary Nagy 
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ask for, I repeat, we do not ask for the leading role”, said the senior Yugoslav diplo-
mat, and the US ambassador paid close attention to the most important words. It 
all didn’t last very long, just a few days before the Hungarian events had gone too 
far. Kos then denied a possibility for Kádár to come in front of Nagy, something 
the Americans suggested.47
At the same time, Nagy was in power thanks to the Soviet tanks and he had 
no public support, claimed the Yugoslav sources. As Srđa Prica told his American 
colleagues, Belgrade saw in the emotion of the Hungarians the power that would 
drive democratization, and the people would make the reforms despite the Sovi-
et troops.48 Unlike many in the East, Yugoslavia did not say that the uprising in 
Budapest was supported from the West, but they were ready to accuse “domestic 
fascist elements” aided by “provocations of Stalinist elements.” In fact, the Yu-
goslav interpreted the protests and the revolt as two events: a general uprising, 
involving everybody, and the extremists going wild, who did not represent the will 
of the people.49
Th e commentary of Joze Smole, who had previously commented on Hungari-
an developments commentary, in Borba, published on October 29th, was highlight-
ed in the embassy. Borba welcomed the Budapest government’s open statement, as 
Nagy clearly stated that the “great mass movement” is not “counterrevolutionary” 
but “a major national democratic movement” that could now fi nally prove itself. 
Smole clearly showed great concern over Soviet intervention, underlined that the 
Soviet withdrawal was the only hope for the new government. Intervention of the 
Soviet Red Army was a major problem for Yugoslavia.50 At the same time as news-
papers exploded with news on UN negotiations over Suez, when the tour of Koča 
Popović in New York was closely reported, the Israeli parliamentary delegation 
visited Yugoslavia. Tito hosted them at Brijuni and they left Yugoslavia feeling that 
47  NARA, RG84, Records of the Department of State, 320 Greece 1956 to Hungary Nagy 
1958; October 27th, 1956; Secstate 550, (Riddleberger).
48  NARA, RG84, Records of the Department of State, 320 Greece 1956 to Hungary Nagy 
1958; October 27th, 1956, Embtel 546.
49  NARA, RG84, Records of the Department of State, 320 Greece 1956 to Hungary Nagy 
1958; October 27th, 1956, Control 53 (Riddleberger with Kos).
50  NARA, Records of the Department of State, Internal Aff airs of Hungary 1955–1959; 
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they had achieved their goals.51 Only a day later, on October 31st, 1956, both Yu-
goslav and the world media exploded with the news of the Israeli attack on Egypt, 
the British ultimatum on Egypt, and vitriolic attacks compared to Nazi bombings 
during the war. Because of such reporting, as the Americans said, Srđa Prica, the 
head of the house while Koča Popović was on his tour, received complaints. Th e 
Americans wrote: “Th e way the “aggression” against Egypt was described was in 
sharp contrast to the refrained mentioning of the Soviet military action in Hunga-
ry”. At that point, the attack on Suez was just an “aggression”. From that moment 
on, Egypt overshadowed all the other news.
Th e US Consul reported from Zagreb on November 1st that there were 
“private celebrations due to events in Hungary”. Radio Zagreb’s reports about the 
events there were mostly based on Radio Budapest’s report, except for concealing 
the “anticommunist segment of the uprising.” Th e consul said quite confusingly 
and totally inaccurate, that “many people understand Hungarian”, so they can lis-
ten to Hungarian stations. “Although there are no, I repeat, no obvious manifesta-
tions, many Croatians are beginning to think that if Hungarians can do everything, 
why not them?” Th e “traditional regionalism” was strengthened, and the police was 
paid extra to patrol in civilian.52
On October 30th, Tito’s message to the Hungarians was published. “Th e 
appeal, apparently, marked the Yugoslav communists’ acceptance of the true an-
ti-communist nature of the rebellion in Hungary, and not only the relatively violent 
struggle for liberalization and democratization, which the Yugoslavs have so far 
claimed both privately and publicly. Th e appeal for simultaneous ceasefi re and full 
support for Nagy’s regime and program is a try to return the situation within the 
communist framework.” Tito’s comments that to continue armed struggles would 
only favor “bureaucratic deformation”, the Americans interpreted as facilitating 
the return of Stalinism to power. Th e statement that the continuation of fi ghting 
among brothers would have “immense negative consequences for the international 
workers’ movement”, could refl ect the fear of Yugoslavia that the new regime in 
Hungary, completely subordinate to Moscow, might be uncomfortable in relation 
51  NARA, Records of the Department of State, Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia, 1955–1959, 
Decimal file 768, 00/10-1656 to 022/11-156, Rool 5; 768.00/(W)/11-156, Join Weeka 
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to the Yugoslav politics of “socialism through peaceful coexistence”.53 Supporting 
Nagy was a call to bring everything back within the communist paradigm. Th e Red 
Army in Hungary could stop the processes of relations warming up and disgrace 
Belgrade.54
Th e Yugoslav media reported on November 3rd, 1956 the reactions of the 
new Polish party leadership to the events in Budapest. Th e attitudes coincided: 
what was needed was peace and creating discipline in the “reaction forces”. Former 
leadership of HSWP had made a “tragic decision” and invited the Soviets to inter-
vene. Now “the gangs of the reaction are bestially killing the communists”. It was a 
completely diff erent situation in Poland and Yugoslavia did everything to cultivate 
all the processes personifi ed by Gomułka.55 Th is close co-operation with Poland 
continued, so the Americans reported that, on January 15th, 1957, a delegation of 
Polish engineers was hosted by their colleagues from Yugoslavia. Th e Yugoslav 
media welcomed the maturity of Polish voters, following the elections that con-
fi rmed the decisions of the Eighth Plenum of the PUWP, and their rejection of 
“civic reaction” and “Stalinist conservatism.”56
Despite everything, the Americans were almost impressed by the way the 
Yugoslav journalists covered the events in Budapest. “Th e media cover of Julijus 
(Đuka) and Teslić (Vlada), of Hungarian story is still surprisingly objective.” Edito-
rial commentary directed their fear toward inner reactionaries. Julijus, Teslić, and 
undoubtedly Ivan Ivanji and Đordje Zelmanović, were afraid of Red Army’s move 
and they reported accordingly.57 Th e British analysis of the newspapers reports 
was diff erent. In the fi rst part of November, as the British claimed, the journalism 
reached its lowest point, “nadir”. Suez crisis and the war in the Middle East served 
well in concealing this “travesty of journalism”. It seemed that the speed with which 
Belgrade turned their back to Nagy and turned to Kádár was so great that even 
53  NARA, Records of the Department of State, Internal Affairs of Hungary 1955–1959; 
Decimal, 764.00/10-3056, Belgrade to Sec of State, Riddleberger.
54  NARA, RG 84, Records of the Department of State, 320 Greece 1956 to Hungary Nagy 
1958; October 30th, 1956, Secstate Washington 566, Control 261; (Riddleberger).
55 Vjesnik, 3.11.1956., Soviet forces and Polish attitude.
56  NARA, Records of the Department of State, Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia, 1955–1959, 
Decimal file 768, 00/10-1656 to 022/11-156, Roll no. 5; 768.00(W)/1-1057, Weeka 
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disciplined journalists could not hide it.58 On November 2nd, it was highlighted that 
there were more and more “Horthyist and clerical elements” that were involved 
in the revolution and how it all went in a undesirable direction. Th e American 
diplomats claimed that, on November 4th, there were reports on killing people in 
the streets who had been seen wearing “brown shoes” like those worn by ÁVH (the 
secret police), although such shoes could have been bought elsewhere. Rumors 
spread that the communists were being expelled from their apartments. American 
diplomats added: “Th e Yugoslav UDBA (State Security Administration) agents can 
be occasionally recognized by their new, robust, black shoes, and especially by 
their light blue shirts.”59 Overall, the Americans continued to report that the state-
run newsletter printed in English “strongly supported Nagy” by arguing that any 
other policy in Hungary, other than the one implemented by Nagy, would have 
endanger “the interests of socialism and of Hungary”. Against such politics were 
“reactionary elements”, which were against the Hungarians’ struggle for socialist 
democracy and did not believe in Nagy. It was to be hoped that the Hungarian 
people would have rejected all “anti-socialist tendencies”. At the end of the text, 
they commended the Soviet Union’’ declaration on the relationship with the so-
cialist countries, which had, unfortunately, been announced very late. Ambassador 
Riddleberger thought that this was undoubtedly an allusion to the Yugoslav exam-
ple and certainly a “possible Yugoslav pressure on the Soviets”.60
Riddleberger talked to Kos again on November 5th, a few hours after the 
Soviet Red Army re-intervened in Hungary. It happened after the secret visit to 
Brijuni by Nikita Khrushchev in the night between November 2nd and 3rd (Miću-
nović 1977, 157−163). Th e Yugoslavs repeated that they had had nothing against 
the expansion of the Hungarian government with the elements of the Small En-
trepreneurs and Peasants’ Party; they were for the Soviet withdrawal, but not for 
the return of the old regime. Later, things went too far, and Nagy tried to humor 
everyone, even the “Horthyist elements”. All this logically led to the Soviet inter-
vention, which would have never been such, as Kos thought, had the French and 
58  FO371/122389, Northern Department, From Chancery, Belgrade To Southern Dept, 
10th November 1956.
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British not intervened at the same time in Egypt.61 Th e British-French interven-
tion began on October 31st. Yugoslavia disregarded that the Soviet preparations 
were bound to have happened earlier, but the fact was that the crisis had become 
“double” and the Soviets certainly had some use of it. Kos’s opinion was that the 
Soviet intervention was temporary and the events in Hungary were a warning that 
the Soviets wouldn’t have been able to rule forever with terror. János Kádár was 
another problem. It was possible that he would not have been independent, Kos 
said, but added that Kádár could have achieved some of the goals, since his views 
and program were similar to Gomułka’s. Th en again, all of this could have had a 
negative impact on the events in Poland, claimed Kos.62 Riddleberger commented 
that Kos avoided saying whether the Yugoslav condemnation of the French and 
the British in the UN would be the same as their disapproval of the Soviets or 
tougher. Even in cases of far greater threats, the Yugoslav regime was fi rm on the 
Soviets. Now, “whether for security or ideological reasons” their interpretation of 
interests led them to the same side as the Soviet, even though “they were not, and 
I repeat, they were not exposed to any direct pressure and although their allegedly 
fundamental principle of “diff erent paths” was endangered”.63
 Koča Popović talked about the Hungarian events with Riddleberger upon 
his return from the US, and after he had meetings in the cabinet, the longest one 
being with Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo. It was unrealistic to expect that the Sovi-
ets would have allowed Hungary to leave. Kádár unfortunately came to power with 
the help of “Russian bayonets” but he would have to make concessions, claimed 
the Yugoslav diplomacy chief on November 5th, 1956. It was expected that the 
fi nal result would have been the weakening of the Soviet Bloc. “Th e Minister then 
went the furthest I have ever heard him in asking the United States not to change 
their policy, to have faith in the Yugoslav estimates of developments in the East, 
and to bear in mind what the US State Secretary John Foster Dulles said in Brijuni 
61  NARA, RG84, Records of the Department of State, 320 Greece 1956 to Hungary Nagy 
1958; Control 53, November 5th, 1956. (Riddleberger).
62  NARA, RG84, Records of the Department of State, 320 Greece 1956 to Hungary Nagy 
1958; Novermber 5th, 1956, Control 53 (Riddleberger with Kos).
63  NARA, RG84, Records of the Department of State, 320 Greece 1956 to Hungary Nagy 
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in 1955. It is a pity that Yugoslavia, since it is already so satisfi ed with American 
politics, does not state that more in public”, Riddleberger commented.64
Th e Hungarian crisis turned increasingly into a refugee crisis. Diplomats 
from the US Consulate in Zagreb went on a hunt near Čakovec, on November 6th, 
1956. “A lot of rabbits, not one Hungarian” Rabenold reported to the US Embassy 
in Belgrade. An employee of the Consulate, a Hungarian from Subotica, travelled 
home too, but there was much more activity there. Soldiers and civilians surren-
dered in Horgoš and were all put in camps.65 A few weeks later the hunting in 
Čakovec was cancelled, and rumors broke that there was a 20km long military 
zone along the border with Hungary.
When asked by the British Ambassador Hayman on November 10th, whether 
he felt that the Hungarian events tore the Belgrade and Moscow declarations, Srđa 
Prica was very “fl at” in his response. He was confi dent that the Soviet government 
would have not turned the clock back, did not believe that there would have been 
Soviet armed pressure on Belgrade. It would, however, take some time for the 
spirit of the Moscow declaration to be renewed. Yugoslav ideology would be in cri-
sis, there would be talks again about one path to socialism and the Soviets would 
probably reproach Yugoslavia again. Th at is why Belgrade was distanced from the 
speed of change in Budapest. Prica also distanced himself from Kádár. Yugoslavs 
had used to put much hope in the Hungary’s new fi rst man, but now, thanks to the 
Soviets, there was little hope for him becoming a Hungarian Gomułka. Th e Yugo-
slavs were upset by the announcement of the former politicians’ return, especially 
considering the memory of Hungarian aggression, and they could not justify the 
return of those forces.66
Kádár wasn’t an open Titoist. He was the best that could be found in Hun-
gary, a politician who would stand between the Soviets and the West. Ambassador 
Maks Bace conveyed to the US chargé d’aff aires in Sweden that, for Yugoslav dip-
lomats, Kádár was a guarantee that the country would not sink into chaos. And 
chaos meant that the Red Army stayed. Th e withdrawal of the Red Army from the 
64  NARA, RG84, Records of the Department of State, 320 Greece 1956 to Hungary 
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SFRY border would be a good solution for Belgrade.67 An Italian expert for Yugo-
slavia, Orlandi Contuccio, thought that Yugoslavia was worried that, if the Stalinist 
regime came back to power, the events in Hungary could lead to the isolation 
such as the one in 1948. At the same time, Hungarian developments were popular 
among people, and those changes were also popular even among the authorities, 
at least up to a point. Th at meant that it was important to do two things, mutually 
exclusive, at once: express sympathy with the Hungarians and maintain close ties 
with Moscow.68
Th e media wasn’t informed about Nagy’s visit to the Yugoslav embassy and 
the American diplomats in the beginning reported they could not get confi rmation 
of Nagy’s whereabouts from the Yugoslav hosts. Th e lower offi  cials pretended to 
know nothing. Prica merely stated that he would issue a statement in a few days, 
Velebit said nothing.69 Th e ordinary citizens of Zagreb and Belgrade, however, re-
acted to the Soviet intervention. Belgrade Orchestra held a concert that included 
“three old Hungarian songs for men’s choir”, on November 19th, in Zagreb. Th e 
applause that Belgrade musicians received was louder and longer than usual, and 
it was a big topic of conversation in Zagreb the next day.70
Because of the prolonged crisis, the situation for the authorities in Belgrade 
was more unpleasant. Belgrade backed Kádár, who grew infl exible in the nego-
tiations. Th e Yugoslav government was worried about what to do with Nagy if 
negotiations failed. Th e Soviets would probably try to create a “Stalinist Hungarian 
army” in order to leave Hungary more easily, but it would not come to that easily 
or quickly. Th e Yugoslavs stressed out that Kádár accepted a large part of Nagy’s 
program. Th e Soviets obviously did not intend to sharpen the relations with Yu-
goslavia to the extreme. However, apart from Poland and Hungary where Tito’s 
speech wasn’t fully published before the Soviet reaction, there were some ridic-
67  NARA, RG84, Records of the Department of State, 320 Greece 1956 to Hungary 
Nagy 1958; ; American Embassy, Stockholm, November 14th, 1956. Memorandum of 
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ulous accusations in the satellite countries that the Yugoslavs interfered with the 
internal aff airs of the satellites, and they totally minimized the Soviet intervention 
in Hungary.71
Th e US ambassador Riddleberger was invited to dinner at Kardelj’s residence 
on the evening when Nagy left the embassy. Riddleberger told the State Depart-
ment that immediately after entering the residence, upset Kardelj “asked me if I 
heard anything about Nagy’s whereabouts. Th e US ambassador replied that he had 
concluded from the radio news that the Soviets took him. “He also thought it could 
be true, but he speculated whether Kádár could have deceived the Yugoslav gov-
ernment.”72 During the evening, Kardelj learned on the phone that Nagy had been 
sent to Romania. Th at was the end of any hope for Nagy-Kádár agreement. “He 
added that the Soviets wanted to avoid at all costs Nagy escaping to Yugoslavia.” 
“What will Belgrade do now?” asked Riddleberger. “Th e only thing to do is to print 
the whole exchange,” answered Kardelj. Everything that happened showed that 
“the Stalinist wing was now dominant in the Kremlin”. Th e Soviets would now try 
to discredit Yugoslavia, and the Hungarian uprising would be quenched. Th e Sovi-
et action will be a clear message to all the satellites that would think of rebelling.73
Th e fi rst reaction of Edvard Kardelj obviously wasn’t the last version and 
attitude of Belgrade. Th e offi  cial communiqué of the SFRY Government on Nagy 
case was issued on November 23rd, claiming that everybody left the embassy on 
their own will. Nagy left it on November 22nd, after Kádár’s government had giv-
en written assurances that no measures would have been taken against him. Th e 
Th ird Secretary of the Foreign Aff airs Department, Kos, said that the Hungarians 
at the embassy “could stay if they wanted to.” Nagy agreed to Kádár’s request to 
hold negotiations on Hungarian territory, but he didn’t think Nagy would have 
approached the new government soon because he requested that all Soviet troops 
withdrawed from the Hungarian territory fi rst. When asked by the Americans 
whether the Soviets gave guarantees to the Yugoslavs regarding Nagy’s security, 
the answer was that it was not necessary, because “the Russians couldn’t over-
71  NARA, RG84, Records of the Department of State, 320 Greece 1956 to Hungary Nagy 
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power Kádár now”. Kos repeated that the representatives of “the revolutionary 
workers’ councils” urged Nagy to come closer to them, which allegedly was the 
reason for him to leave the embassy. However, Dobrivoje Vidić, demanded from 
the Hungarian embassy charge d’aff aires the information on why Nagy had not 
gone home.74
Th e tone of reporting changed dramatically only after Nagy had been kid-
napped. Hungary’s explanations of his willing departure to Romania were “sharply” 
rejected, the Americans reported. “Th e Yugoslavs are bitter and insulted by Nagy’s 
abduction that violated written assurances” given to the Yugoslav government by 
Hungarian authorities that there would be no maltreatment. Th e most energetic 
protest was fi rstly made to the fi rst Hungarian embassy charge d’aff aires on No-
vember 24th, with a warning that such a breach of the agreement would not go 
without consequences to their relations. Th e same document was submitted to the 
Soviets in Belgrade, but, as the Americans reported, “with a gentle and cautious” 
addition stating how “surprised” they were by the behavior of the Soviet authori-
ties in Hungary, and with “hope” that the Soviets “would do everything necessary” 
so the agreement is respected. Prica informed the Americans that they would have 
waited a few days for the Hungarian response and would have done something 
after that. Yugoslavia would insist on some kind of resolution.75 Belgrade waited 
for several days, and then, at the beginning of December, the newspapers re-acti-
vated the whole case, rejecting the idea that it was an internal matter of Hungarian 
authorities.
Th e British appeared to be given more accurate data by the Assistant Secre-
tary of State Dobrivoje Vidić, on December 3rd. By then, the Yugoslavs had been 
quite pessimistic about whether they would receive a reply to their protest letters 
from November 24th. Th ey thought that Kádár would not have changed his rhet-
oric on Nagy. As Yugoslavs had mentioned in their protest letters the violation 
of international law, when asked whether Belgrade would take measure in Hague 
or the UN, Vidić said that he wouldn’t have put much into it. Belgrade wanted to 
point out that in the case of Nagy there was an agreement between two govern-
74  NARA, Recods of the Department of State, Internal Affairs of Hungary 1955–1959, 
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ments and it wasn’t just Hungarian internal aff airs. “Vidić himself said that the 
Romanian authorities originally proposed to the Yugoslavs that Nagy travelled to 
Romania. Th e Yugoslavs agreed, but with a condition that Nagy agrees to that, 
which he didn’t do. Vidić believed that it was Kádár’s intention to allow Nagy and 
his friends to go back home, at least temporarily”, so the Soviet intervention on 
the bus surprised everybody. Vidić argued that, despite everything, “Kádár was an 
honest man” who could change his mind. He admitted that the workers’ councils 
are the only expression of the people’s will, but not a logical response, and that 
Kádár had the right to refuse their participation in the government. Th e Assistant 
Secretary of State claimed that the relations with Moscow should have remained as 
good as possible under current conditions, but that would have not been ideologi-
cally possible anyway. Th e British complained that London had been upset because 
of Belgrade’s unequal view of the two military interventions and their unusually 
quick and sharp condemnation of London for the Suez Canal crisis. Vidić admitted 
that such reaction could have upset the West, but it was even more troubling for 
the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia had to follow its own policy.76
3.  AFTER THE REVOLUTION: HUNGARY AND 
YUGOSLAVIA
All correspondents returned from Budapest, except for one. Th e tone on 
Kádár was sharper. Th ere was an increasing number of refugees, and that was 
what the diplomats reported intensely. At the beginning of 1957, the number of 
refugees in Yugoslavia was increasing by 600 every day in January. American diplo-
mats, based on their sources, estimated that the number of Hungarian refugees in 
SFRY was about 10,000 in 15 refugee camps. As the US ambassador Riddleberger 
was briefed by Amir Hoveyda, the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees, after visiting nine camps for Hungarian refugees, “food, accommodation 
and care for refugees, with the exception of the camp in Gerovo, were surprisingly 
good despite the increasing number of refugees and the Yugoslavia’s fi nancial dif-
fi culties”.77 Th e US diplomats assumed that if the refugees stayed too long in Yu-
76  FO371/122399, Northern Department, From Belgrade to FO, Sir. F. Robets, December 
4th, 1956. Addressed to FO telegram No.862 of Dec 3rd.
77  NARA, Records of the Department of State, Internal Aff airs of Yugoslavia, 1955–1959, 
Decimal fi le 768, 00/10-1656 to 022/11-156, Rool 5; 768(W)/1-1057, Weeka no. 2. 
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goslavia, it would put Belgrade in a diffi  cult situation with the Soviets, who would 
probably request for them to return.
Dalibor Soldatić, the ambassador of the SFRY in Budapest, was withdrawn 
and Jovo Kapičić was appointed in his place. Kapičić had previously, on Octo-
ber 16th, accompanied the Hungarian leadership of Gerö- Kádár to the laying of 
wreaths on the grave of the Unknown Hero, and walked with them on Terazije 
square and Kalemegdan fortress.78 Upon his return, Soldatić was appointed the 
Chief of Protocol in the Department for Foreign Aff airs.
One of the more obvious indications of the Yugoslav attitude towards Hun-
gary was the viewing of the US documentary produced by Th e United States In-
formation Agency (USIA), which was about the Hungarian developments. While 
the process of censorship was not over yet, the fi lm was seen, in the FEC club, 
by 19 leading politicians, including Edvard Kardelj, Aleksandar Ranković, Moša 
Pijade, Koča Popović, Mijalko Todorović. Th e Soviet fi lm on the same subject was 
rejected as mere propaganda. Th e audience laughed at some parts of that fi lm and 
rated the American version “the better of two approaches” of the propaganda ma-
chinery. One copy, as people from USIA in Belgrade claimed, was sent to Tito. It 
was the fi rst case that an USIA fi lm made it into such an exclusive society, which 
would be the case from then on.79
Th e events in Hungary showed the diff erences between Belgrade and Mos-
cow in relation to other socialist parties. Th e principles were not in accordance. 
Moscow was governed by state interests, and the unity of the socialist world was in 
fact the Soviet politics and state domination. To do this, everything could be used. 
Yugoslavia was afraid of such changes in Hungary, which would sharpen the Cold 
War. Belgrade was not aware that Washington was afraid of the same thing and 
they did not really plan to do much to “pull” Hungary to the West. Such was even 
the US reporting from Belgrade. Th ey paid more attention to how far Belgrade 
would have gone, then they expected any dramatic disturbances within the Bloc, 
and they certainly were not willing to do anything themselves.
Tanjug reported on 6.3.1957. there were 18.407 refugees in SFRY. 16.000 still with no 
status. 1410 Hungarians went back, 401 stayed in YugoslavIA, 257 went to the West.
78  NARA, Records of the Department of State, Internal Aff airs of Yugoslavia, 1955–1959, 
Decimal fi le 768, 00/10-1656 to 022/11-156, Roll no. 5; 768.00(W)/12-14456; Borba, 
October 17th 1956, Talks between HSWP delegtion and LCY continue.
79  NARA, Records of the Department of State, Internal Aff airs of Yugoslavia, 1955–1959, 
Decimal fi le 768, 00/10-1656 to 022/11-156, Roll no. 5; 768.00(W)/1-1057, Weeka no.2.
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Yugoslavia was scared by the big Soviet war activity at its borders. At the 
same time, little could be done without Moscow changing its position. Soviet in-
tervention in Hungary, as the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy Demajo said, 
signifi cantly hampered the Soviet reputation and position in Asia and Africa.80 In 
the light of the debate on Soviet imperialism at the conference in Bandung (Jak-
ovina 2017), and helped by the joint action of France, Britain and Israel on Egypt, 
it seemed that the impulse towards a no-bloc politics was justifi ed. It was the road 
that Yugoslavia started to pave, but it was now the most logical path for Belgrade. 
Tito eventually came out of all this with many scars, but Yugoslavia’s special po-
sition wasn’t ruined, the socialism in Europe wasn’t broken, there was no confl ict 
between the Cold War blocs, there was no renewal of Stalinism in Moscow, the 
United States did not lose their importance, and Yugoslavia’s clear stance on Suez 
kept it in close relations with the Th ird World countries.
It seemed that Yugoslavia quite accurately estimated what the Soviets could 
and wanted to do. Perhaps Yugoslavia only slightly overestimated its power, but it 
was more exhausted in helping to break down the Stalinists, then to search for Ti-
toists. Nagy was not one of those; he could have been tolerated, but not celebrated.
During the crisis, Tito gave a speech in Pula in 1956, about Stalinist spirit 
and methods, and he repeated it all in January 1957 on the session of Executive 
Committee of the LCY, saying that the Russians did not give up “stalinist methods”, 
although the style of communication with Belgrade was not like it was in 1948.81 
Ambassador Riddleberger wrote to Washington that, in the moments of honesty, 
the Yugoslavs admitted not to have any desire to quickly disintegrate either NATO 
or the Soviet Bloc, as that would lead to the regime’s collapse in Yugoslavia. Th e 
interest of Yugoslavia was that the ideological disagreements never sharpen again 
and leave Yugoslavia isolated again, but they were not interested in the return of 
the Soviet government as it was in the Stalin era. Hopefully, Poland would endure 
and there would be another Gomułka.82
80  NARA, Records of the Department of State Internal Aff airs of Hungary, 1955–1959, 
Decimal fi le 764, 00/11-456 to 00/11-1256, Roll no. 4, 764.00/11-956, Conversation 
with Mr. Demajo (mr. Mark, EE, Hoctor, EE), November 9th, 1956.
81 AY, CC LCY III/67, Records of CC LCY Session on January 24th, 1957 in Belgrade.
82  NARA, RG34, Records of the Department of State Internal Aff airs fo Yugoslavia 1955–
1959, Decimal File 768, 00/9-2756 to 00/1-2758, Rool no. 2, 768.00/2-1857, February 
18th, 1957, Belgrade.
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Nagy’s trial lasted a long time because, at fi rst, there was a hope that Yugo-
slavia would return to the Bloc and that the conference of the world’s communist 
parties in 1957 would heal everything and soften stubborn Yugoslavs (Gough 2006, 
114). When that didn’t happen, after relations with the West worsened and there 
was no meeting of the top offi  cials, Imre Nagy was executed on June 16th, 1958. 
After that, the recent usual polemics and ideological tensions between Belgrade 
and Moscow multiplied and became serious. Th is act was considered directed 
against Yugoslavia. Now the fears of a real Soviet invasion intensifi ed. Although 
some people said that Italy and the FR of Germany were not military signifi cant 
in 1948, but it wasn’t the case anymore. Many believed that the proximity of the 
border with Hungary and the Red Army was unpleasant. It was felt in cities like 
Varaždin, but also in arming Karlovac. All of that aff ected Tito’s popularity, which 
was higher than usual.83
In December 1959, Marshal of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito spoke at the ses-
sion of the City Committee of League of Communists of Croatia (LCC) in Zagreb. 
He responded to János Kádár’s critique of Yugoslavia at HSWP Congress for 
interfering with Hungarian aff airs and “attack on two countries”, Albania and 
China, “who were their friends” (Tito 1962, vol.15, 135−136). “Relations have im-
proved” Tito said. “Why would anybody want now to point out our guilt and our 
interfering in Hungarian internal aff airs?” “Th e unfortunate events” that had tak-
en place, had been condemned both in Budapest and in Yugoslavia. One day all 
the documents would be opened and nobody would wrongly accuse the Yugoslav 
government and its leadership. Belgrade did not want Hungarian events to be dis-
cussed in the UN, “despite the fact that it does not bring any benefi ts to us”, but 
they did consider that to be Hungarian internal aff airs. Even though they had been 
given a hand of friendship, the Hungarians were not loyal.
Imre Nagy was like John Subašić, a man who, obviously, wasn’t up to the task 
and was limited by some old ideas and loyalties. Nagy was actually ideal for Tito, 
but he went too far, more than he wanted. Yugoslavia wanted what Poland did, 
the thing Nagy could have done the fi rst few days of his new mandate as a Prime 
Minister. Everything that happened after that was too much, too dangerous, unre-
alistic. It was dangerous to provoke the Soviets, more than to be a competition to 
83  NARA, RG59, Records of the Department of State Internal Aff airs of Yugoslavia, 
1955–1959, Decimal File 768, 00/1-2858 to 99/5-759, Roll no.3, 768.00/6-2558, Am-
consul Zagreb, June 25, 1958, Political notes June 10th through June 24th, 1958.
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Yugoslavia. When Kádár came to power partly thanks to the lack of Yugoslavia’s 
objection to Soviet intervention, he became a leader who was apparently sup-
posed to rule for a long time in Hungary. What was to be done in such a case? It 
turned out that the decision to support Kádár was a logical one. He proved to be 
moderate. At the same time, they couldn’t expect to have any infl uence over their 
neighbor if there wasn’t any connection with the new authorities in Hungary. Th e 
reactions of the Yugoslav leadership during the crisis probably showed in part their 
confusion and inability to deal with the situation. However, they were not selfi sh 
when the unique Yugoslav position was concerned, perhaps only insisting on the 
already achieved standards in relation to Moscow. Th e standards achieved in 1945, 
which was a socialist revolution, were never called into question. Yugoslaviazation 
of Eastern Europe, something that had been thought of and wished for, completely 
failed in the events in Hungary in October and November 1956.
REFERENCES:
Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ) (Archives of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, Serbia 507, CC LCY (Central 
Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia)
National Archives (PRO, PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE), London, UK Foreign and Common-
wealth Offi  ce, FCO
National Archives and Record Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland, USA RG 
59, RG 84, RG 34,
Records of the Department of State, Central decimal File, 1960–1963 RG 84,
Newspapers
Borba, daily newspapers, Belgrade
Politika, daily newspapers, Belgrade
Vjesnik, daily newspapers, Zagreb
REFERENCES:
Bėkės, C., Byrne, M. and J. M. Rainer (Eds.). 2002. Th e 1956. Hungarian Revolution: A 
History in Documents. Budapest: CEU Press.
Dragović, I., R. 2000. Neka ostane zapisano (bilo je to ovako) [Let It Be Written (It Happe-
ned like Th is)]. Belgrade: Rantec.
Charles, G. 2006. Failed Illusion, Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution. Standford Uni Press/WWCenter Press.
Eisenhower, D., D. 1965. Waging Peace 1956−1961, Th e White House Years. New York: 
Doubleday and Company.
Tvrtko Jakovina American and British Diplomats in Yugoslavia on Hungarian Revolution of 1956…
72
Gough, R. 2006. A Good Comrade, János Kádár, Communism and Hungary. London: I.B. 
Tauris.
Hruščov, N., S. 1970. Tajni referat N. S. Hruščova [Th e Secret Report by N.S. Khrus-
hchev]. Translated by Nevenka Car Rubinić, Jure Šonje. Zagreb: Stvarnost.
Ivanji, I. 2007. Mađarska Revolucija 1956 [Hungarian Revolution of 1956]. Belgrade: Sa-
mizdat B92.
Jakovina, T. 2002. “Sjećanja koja čine povijest: razgovori s Miroslavom Kreačićem, vele-
poslanikom i diplomatom FNRJ/SFRJ.” Časopis za suvremenu povijest [Magazine of 
contemporary history] 34 (3): 901−916.
Jakovina, T. 2009. “1956. godina naše ere: vrhunac jugoslavenske vanjske politike.” [1956: A 
Year in Our Era: Th e Culmination of Yugoslav Foreign Policy]. In: Spomenica Josipu 
Adamčeku, 459−480. Zagreb: FF Press.
Jakovina, T. 2017. “Aktivna koegzistencija nesvrstane Jugoslavije, Jugoslavija u istorijskoj 
perspektivi.“ [Active Coexistence of Non-Aligned Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia from a 
Historical Perspective] In: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava Srbije; [Helsinki Com-
mittee for Human Rights in Serbia]: 434−485. Belgrade.
Kemp-Welch, A. 2008. Poland under Communism, A Cold War History. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Mićunović, V. 1977. Moskovske godine 1956−1958 [Moscow Years 1956−1958]. Zagreb: Lib-
er.Tompson, W., J. 1997. Khruschev, A Political Life. New York: St. Martin’s Griffi  n.
Sebestyen, V. 2006. Twelve Days, Th e Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. NY: Pan-
theon Books.
   Swain G. and N. Swain. 2009. Eastern Europe Since 1945. Pagrave Macmillan.Taubman, 
W., Khrushchev, S. and A. Gleason (Eds.). 2000. Niki Khruschchev. London and New 
Heaven: Yale University Press.
Tito, J., B. 1962. Govori i članci [Speeches and Articles]. Zagreb: Naprijed.
Zelmanović, Đ. 2006. Mađarska Jesen 1956. [Hungarian Autumn of 1956]. Zapresic, 
Fraktura.
NEDOSTAJE SAŽETAK i ključne reči
Paper received: .
Paper reviewed: 
Paper accepted:
LIMES+  Vol. XIV (2017), No. 1: pp. 43–73
73

75
UDC: 
BRITISH PERSPECTIVE 
ON HUNGARIAN 
REVOLUTION 1956
The Hungarian Revolution caught unprepared Western powers 
preoccupied with the Suez crisis. Th e clashes between the Soviets and 
the Hungarians were the fi rst ‚ever armed confl ict between communist 
countries in Europe. Th e British position in the Hungarian Revolution 
1956, as well as the French and American one, was based on the intent 
not to provoke the Soviet Union. Although British offi  cials gave assurances 
they would not interfere in the Hungarian crisis, diplomatic sources 
evidently demonstrate that those events were very important for them. 
After the collapse of the Imre Nagy government and the Revolution the 
British primary focus was not to allow Soviets and Kadar’s government to 
hide persecutions and humanitarian crisis that marked Hungary in the 
post-revolution period. Th e paper is based on the unpublished diplomatic 
reports of British diplomats in Budapest, Vienna, Moscow and New York, 
kept in the Foreign Offi  ce collections of the National Archives in London.
Key words: Hungarian Revolution, Imre Nagy, British, 1956, United Nations, 
Foreign Office.
 The events of the Hungarian revolution 
were among the most important turning points in the early stage of the Cold War 
and the reactions of Western powers to the events of 1956 proved to be a good 
example of later inertia and restrained attitude until the last stage of the Cold War. 
Original scientific paper
Haris DAJČ, 
Faculty of Philosophy, 
University of Belgrade
Mladenka IVANKOVIĆ, 
Institute for Recent history, Belgrade
*  The reserach here presented is conducted within the frame of the scientific project 
"Modernization of the western Balkans" (177009), financed by the Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.
hdajc@f.bg.ac.rs; ivankovic_mladenka@yahoo.com
Haris Dajč and Mladenka Ivanković British Perspective on Hungarian Revolution 1956
76
After events of October – November there were no doubts that the Cold War 
would be both protracted and bitter, with hostile armies facing each other across 
the divided Europe (Kissinger, 2006, 16).
Th e case of Great Britain and its attitude in those turbulent days is very hard 
to understand without taking into account the Suez crisis where both Great Britain 
and France were involved. Th e interests of both countries were to maintain good 
relations with Soviet Union and not to allow Soviets to be accused for exploiting 
the events taking place in Hungary (Bekes 2006, 502). Both British and French 
governments were caught unprepared by the developments in Hungary. French 
Foreign Minister Christian Pineau gave a report to the media on the crucial 26th 
October that France wouldn’t intervene in Hungary (Bekes 2006, 502–503). Both 
French and British attitude was that they didn’t want to be accused by Moscow 
that they are to be blamed for the beginning of the Hungarian Revolution. British 
stance was very similar to the French one as two nations had a similar challenges 
waiting for them in Egypt. Days before the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution, 
Great Britain and France were engaged in negotiation with Israelis at the negotia-
tion held in Sevres where they master planned the attack on Suez and Sinai.
American government was equally unprepared as British and French were 
when the events in Hungary broke out. On the October 26th the National Security 
Council, highest level advisory body, met for the fi rst and the last time during the 
Hungarian Revolution. Th e result was the acceptance of the proposal made by 
Harold E. Stassen, the president’s adviser on disarmament. His fi rst suggestion 
was modifi ed, and according to the revised plan, the US should either through Tito 
or through some other diplomatic channel attempt to convince the Soviets that a 
zone of strictly neutral, non-NATO countries, like Austria, would off er them as 
much security as satellite countries of the Warsaw pact (Bekes 1997, 500–501). Th e 
importance of this was that Americans stated that they don’t look upon those sat-
ellite nations as potential military allies. Th at was the State Department position 
in their European policy until the end of the Cold War (Bekes 2006, 499).
Similar to the British and the French, the Americans were also more occu-
pied with the situation in the Middle East. Th at’s why their focus was on Egypt 
during the fi rst few days of November and only the Soviet attack on Hungary on 
4th November had alarmed them. However, they concluded that they had no means 
of exerting its infl uence in the Soviet sphere of infl uence (Bekes 2006, 500).
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Th e beginning of the Revolution in Hungary was looking less violent than 
the June riots in Poznan. However, public demonstrations on 24th October turned 
into full-blown uprising. Th e success of Wladyslaw Gomulka as Party leader in Po-
land, in the opposition to the Post Stalinist Soviet leadership, made a strong mes-
sage to Hungarians. Momentum for the demonstration in Budapest was initially 
set by the demonstrations and demands made by students in Szeged (Rainer 2006, 
246). Th eir actions made a chain reaction in other university cities across Hungary, 
which led to the student assembly at the Budapest Technical University on 22nd 
October. As students were unsuccessful in their wish to present their demands on 
the radio and decided to take to the streets on next day (23rd October). Th eir most 
important goals were: the departure of the Soviet troops from Hungary, a mul-
ti-party political system, the freedom of the opinion and the press, the removal of 
the Stalin statue and the new government. Th ey also had very pragmatic demands, 
such as freedom of Hungary to sell its uranium to whomever they would prefer for 
the market price.1 Two major factors motivated the demonstrations: they wanted 
to present their demands and to show their sympathy for the Polish reforms (Hor-
vath 2006, 266–269). Hungarian Party leaders didn’t seem to have been prepared 
for the demonstrations that changed its character from the students’ demonstra-
tion into large scale civil protest. Imre Nagy addressed demonstrators on 23rd from 
the Parliament building in quite despondent way that disappointed the crowd. Th e 
open rebellion on the 24th couldn’t be stopped even by the newly appointed Prime 
Minister Imre Nagy. Fights that broke on that day led to victory of the demonstra-
tors, Soviet suff ered their fi rst causalities and loss of tanks and artillery in an East 
European capital since 1945. By the end of the month it looked like the Revolution 
was about to achieve its aims. On 28th October Imre Nagy announced the imme-
diate withdrawal of the Soviet troops, Hungarian Secret Police (Th e AVO - Allam 
vedelmi Osztaly) was disbanded, an amnesty was announced for participants of 
the Revolution, the coat-of-arms from the Rakosi regime was replaced by the Koss-
hut coat-of-arm that was seen as the nationalistic by the communist in the postwar 
Hungary. Th e National holiday was restored at 15th of March. Just few days later, 
on 1st November Prime Minister Imre Nagy declared that Hungary was an inde-
pendent and neutral state, something that Gomulka never did. Th e Soviet reaction 
was felt on 4th November with the full scale attack on Budapest that marked the 
beginning of the end of the 1956 Revolution.
1 http://www.americanhungarianfederation.org/news_1956_16Points.html
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*     *     *
Still, by reading intelligence reports from Foreign Offi  ce in London and 
embassies and delegations in Budapest, Belgrade, Vienna, Washington, Moscow 
and Rome, it is clear that British were watching very closely all developments of 
Hungarian Revolution and that the humanitarian crisis was among their most im-
portant concerns. Th eir attitude towards the situation in Hungary, according to 
the sources available for this paper, were closest to the French one and were not 
necessary similar to the stance of the State Department.
Th e British mission was worried very early about the humanitarian crisis, 
and already by 28th October the Foreign Offi  ce sent the request to the embassy in 
Vienna to start collecting medical supplies for the Hungarian Red Cross.2 In the 
early afternoon hours of 28th October 1956, we can trace the hope for the ceasefi re 
between the Hungarian side and the Soviet troops in the text of the appeal made 
by three Western ambassadors. Austrians were already prepared by 26th October 
for the Hungarian frontier crossers and their actions were to follow Geneva Con-
ventions, so any unarmed individual would be given asylum.3
Austrians furthermore organized the transport for the prospective asylum 
seekers from the border area. Th ey were also preparing with the Red Cross In-
ternational for the Hungarians fl eeing to Austria. Even that early on, British rep-
resentatives were asked if they could host some of the refugees.4One of the main 
concern of British delegation was distribution of the relief supplies though the 
Red Cross and with strong cooperation with Austrians that were present in Hun-
gary already in the last days of October. Th e top concern was regarding medical 
equipment and drugs.5Th e British organized the fi rst Convoy of the humanitarian 
aid on 2nd November, after the fi rst option of sending it by plane from Vienna to 
Budapest was abandoned, since Soviets were controlling the airport, so the trans-
2  The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 London 28th October 1956 to Vienna 
embassy.
3  Th e National Archives, Foreign Offi  ce 371/122380 Vienna 28th October 1956 Sir G. 
Wallinger to Foreign offi  ce and Whitehall.
4  Th e National Archives, Foreign Offi  ce 371/122380 Vienna 28th October 1956 Sir G. 
Wallinger to Foreign offi  ce and Whitehall.
5  Th e National Archives, Foreign Offi  ce 371/122380 Vienna 1st November 1956 Sir G. 
Wallinger to Foreign offi  ce and Whitehall.
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port started its journey by land with as many as possible Union Jack fl ags hanged 
on lorries.6
In the report from North Atlantic council we can see the complexity of the 
situation in Hungary, since after the fi rst fi ghts started there was little hope that 
Imre Nagy was in control of situation, and it looked like none of the fi ghting sides 
trusted him. His position as well as the position of the Communist party in Hun-
gary was completely opposite of the Gomulka’s one in Poland. Polish scenario saw 
that the national emotion was channeled in his support, rather than against him.
Even one week after the start of escalation it seemed there was not much 
possibility for a compromise because Hungarian nationalists didn’t want to lay 
down their weapons as long as Soviet troops were in Hungary. At the same time, 
it was concluded that Soviets most likely won’t allow weakening of their position 
in satellite states by withdrawing from Hungary.7
NATO had made very swift reaction to ongoing process in Hungary: Gov-
ernments of NATO members made appeal to the UN Security Council to consider 
the situation in Hungary. Appeal to the Soviet Government was focused on three 
key requests: to order its troops to cease all off ensive actions in Hungary; halt fur-
ther troop movement in Hungary and agree to the withdrawal of all troops from 
Hungary as soon as the situation permits. It was very important for the NATO to 
at least off er to Soviets some kind of assurance that the NATO won’t establish any 
kind of military ties with Hungarian Government and that the best future model 
for Hungary would be the Austrian model of neutrality. NATO forces would use its 
bases in Germany and Italy only for off ering and distribution of medical supplies, 
ambulances, doctors, nurses, food and any other humanitarian aid for the benefi t 
of all Hungarians. All NATO Governments were encouraged to do whatever they 
can to mobilize world public and make an avalanche of telegrams to Moscow to 
make as much pressure as possible to stop further Soviet intervention.8 – 27/10
Th e 31st October was the point of no return, as correspondence of foreign 
diplomats in the UN made it clear that the future of Hungary was very uncertain. 
Hungarian representative in the UN Mr. Koss had the opportunity to address Se-
6  Th e National Archives, Foreign Offi  ce 371/122380 Budapest 1s November 1956 to For-
eign offi  ce and Whitehall.
7  Th e National Archives, Foreign Offi  ce 371/122380 Paris 27th October 1956 to Foreign 
offi  ce.
8  Th e National Archives, Foreign Offi  ce 371/122380 Paris 27th October 1956 to Foreign 
offi  ce.
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curity Council although Mr. Sobolev (USSR) was against it and Mr. Brilej (Yugo-
slavia) abstained during the vote, other nine votes were in favor to give the fl oor 
to Mr. Koss.9
Soviet representative remained isolated as all the Security Council mem-
bers accused Soviets of opening fi re against Hungarian nationalists and stated that 
there was no justifi cation for that. His reply was focused on suppressing of peoples’ 
rights in Algeria, Cypress and Singapore. Mr. Sobolev tried to accuse Americans 
and British of plotting against Soviets in Hungary. Th rough the insight into dip-
lomatic correspondence of Foreign Offi  ce it is clear that those accusations were 
groundless.10
During the last days of October the Secretary of State had among its top 
priorities the humanitarian crisis that was happening in Hungary.11 British Red 
Cross was already active and was operating mostly through Austria, but Govern-
ment Ministers were also organizing non-party meetings in order to raise money 
for medical aid for Hungary.12
During the 2nd November we could follow big diplomatic off ensive of the US 
diplomats backed by British and French partners in the UN. As after intelligence 
report confi rmed that Imre Nagy is willing to shift his alliance with West.13 Sir 
Dixon, British representative in the UN, had faith in his plan that could see Soviets 
isolated in the Security Council and that could later lead only to the acceptance of 
the resolution on the situation in Hungary in the General Assembly.14 Still, British 
diplomat thought that there were very slim chances that Soviets would not seek 
to go into reverse in Hungary. One of the few benefi ts of that could be improving 
9  Th e National Archives, Foreign Offi  ce 371/122380 New York 29th October 1956 Sir P. 
Dixon to Foreign offi  ce.
10  The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 New York 29th October 1956 Sir 
P. Dixon to Foreign office.
11  The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 London 29th October 1956 Sir J. 
Ward, a statement of the Deputy Secretary of State.
12  The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 London 30th October 1956 Thomas 
Brimelow, a statement of the Secretary of State.
13  Fresh reports that the British were getting not only from Budapest but also from Vienna 
were in favor of that. British representative from Vienna consulted the Foreign office 
that this was the great moment for joint action that will make Hungarians independent 
of Soviet influence. The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Vienna 2nd 
November 1956 sir G. Wallinger to Foreign Office.
14  The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 New York 2nd November 1956 Sir 
P. Dixon to Foreign office.
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situation in Suez, for that kind of actions would make ridiculous very strong posi-
tion which the Soviet Government was taking regarding Suez.15
Imre Nagy’s declaration of neutrality of Hungary came in the very turbulent 
time when the Soviet troops were pouring in Hungary. Although he addressed 
the Secretary General of the United Nations and asked for the protection of the 
Hungarian neutrality, not much could have been done as there was no will among 
great Western powers to confront the Soviets.
British ambassador to Moscow, Sir Hayter, concluded that Soviets might also 
use pretext of anarchy to step in Hungary and that they might be well tempted to 
set up a Communist Government and “accede to its request” for support in re-
storing order.16 According to his reports Soviet leadership was already preparing 
for the off ensive in Hungary. Khrushchev was “at home” for a few days during that 
period and no foreign diplomats could meet him.17
At the same time the situation in Budapest was calmer than at the end of 
the October, but still the Soviets were making moves that suggested the upcoming 
storm. Th e railway lines in the northeast of the Hungary were occupied by the 
Soviet troops, same as the railway station at Nyiregyhasa, at least two airfi elds in 
the southern cities of Szeged and Kecskemet, were also in Soviet hands.18 Moves 
of the Soviet troops in Austria that were getting closer to the Hungarian borders 
were also additional proof of attack that would follow.19
On November 3rd, as Soviet troops were ready to pass into Hungary from 
the direction of Vienna, a minor accident happened when they opened fi re on the 
column of the refugees that also included a Swedish Red Cross vehicle. Th at was 
quite a jittery reaction of the Soviet troops.20
15  The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Moscow 2nd November 1956 Sir 
W. Hayter to Foreign office.
16  The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Moscow 2nd November 1956 Sir 
W. Hayter to Foreign office.
17  Sir Hayter reported to Foreign Office that his American colleague got very lame answer 
from the Bulgarian ambassador if the Soviets were planning the attack, he understood 
that the Soviets will strike soon. The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 
Moscow 2nd November 1956 Sir W. Hayter to Foreign office.
18  The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Budapest 2nd November 1956 Mr. 
Fry to Foreign office and Whitehall.
19  The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Budapest 2nd November 1956 Mr. 
Fry to Foreign office and Whitehall.
20  The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Budapest 3rd November 1956 Mr. 
Fry to Foreign office and Whitehall.
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Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy, who announced the new coalition 
government via radio on 3rdNovember, was trying to get the Secretary General of 
the United Nations to visit Hungary as soon as possible. One of the options was 
that he could even fl y to New York to try to urge him to come.21 British intelligence 
didn’t have any other information about other reasons of his possible trip from 
Budapest and Hungary.
In the early morning of 4th November heavy fi ghting broke out. On that 
day the Soviet troops attacked Budapest. According to the British sources, Soviet 
troops progressed very swiftly after penetrating and occupying the most important 
city buildings including the Parliament, but still were not in the complete control 
of the city. Members of the freshly elected Hungarian government were not very 
optimistic about their destiny, but were strongly convinced that reestablishment 
of the Communism in Hungary will be very tough task for Khrushchev and his 
Hungarian aides.22 By the end of day the Soviets were in control of all the bridges 
and various other points, although fi ghting continued in the city.23
Th e Foreign Offi  ce after receiving news of the Soviet invasion urged its rep-
resentative at the East River to do all he could in order to obtain a condemnation 
of Soviet actions and recommendation of calling for immediate cease-fi re and re-
sumption of negotiations about withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and 
recognition of Hungarian neutrality.24 Sir Dixon got clear instructions to condemn 
evident Soviet plan to impose by force new puppet Government.
Soviet operation named “Whirlwind” was even more effi  cient as the leaders 
of the Revolution didn’t have a clear position of how to react to Soviet invasions. 
Two opposing attitudes can be followed through reactions of the Prime Minister 
Imre Nagy and the Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee for Public Safety 
and commander of the National Guard Mayor General Bela Kiraly. While Imre 
21  The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Budapest 3rd November 1956 Mr. 
Fry to Foreign office and Whitehall.
22  Those information British got in their embassy in Budapest though the Hungarian 
Minister of State Mr. Jozsef Fischer. The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 
Budapest 4th November 1956 Mr. Fry to Foreign office and Whitehall.
23  Through the Austrian Red Cross intelligence from the ground the British embassy 
staff heard that there are hundreds of Hungarian causalities lying in the streets. The 
National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Budapest 5th November 1956 Mr. Fry 
to Foreign office and Whitehall.
24  The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 London 4th November 1956 Mr. 
from Foreign office to New York.
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Nagy had taken refuge in the Yugoslav embassy, accepting the off er of asylum 
that proved to be insincere and that doomed him after the Soviets took over the 
country, Bela Kiraly continued with resistance. His actions frustrated the Soviets 
as they were aware that he was an excellent soldier and capable organizer. Still, he 
lost the battle at Nagykovacsi, but managed to escape on 10th November westward 
to the Bakony mountains and he crossed to Austria in late November (Horvath 
2006, 458).
Th e grimmest expectations came true as the Soviet response was very eff ec-
tive and the crush of the Imre Nagy and his short-lived Government was complete. 
British and French got stuck in Suez where the defeated Egyptian managed to got 
the upper hand after the joint Anglo-French forces withdrew and left space for 
the United Nations force to come in. Th e British and French focus was away from 
Hungary in the weeks after the Soviets crushed Imre Nagy’s side.
In December and January 1957 Foreign offi  ce shared the same frustration 
as their French colleagues with indolence of the Secretary General of the Unit-
ed Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld. French thought that he did very little to make 
any of General Assembly Resolutions concerning Hungary work. Th eir view was 
that Hungary, although Soviets were there in full power, should not be forgotten. 
French informed Foreign Offi  ce that the State Department was not in favor of 
French initiative and thought that any actions of Dag Hammarskjöld were bound 
to fail. Th eir attitude was that it would be more useful if individual Governments 
keep Hungary in the public eye by organizing a fl ow of resolutions and petitions 
from public organizations, trade unions etc.25
Th e French referred to four resolutions passed by the General Assembly 
from November 4th till December 12th.26 Th e resolutions didn’t prove to benefi t 
25  The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/128676 London 6th April 1957 Thomas 
Brimelow to New York.
26  Th e resolutions referred to in the attached French telegram were: (a) November 4th: 
Called upon the Government of the USSR to desist from any intervention and to with-
draw its forces; reaffi  rmed the right of the Hungarian people to its own Government; 
requested the Secretary General to investigate the situation caused by foreign inter-
vention in Hungary, to observe this situation through representatives named by him 
and to report thereon to the General Assembly; and to suggest methods to bring to an 
end foreign intervention in Hungary; and call upon the Secretary General to inquire 
into and report to the General Assembly on the Hungarian need for food, medicine 
and other similar supplies; (b) November 9th: Reaffi  rmed the previous request to the 
Secretary General to investigate through representatives named by him and to report 
to the General Assembly; (c) November 21st: Requested the Secretary General and 
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Hungarians as the Soviets were fi rmly in control of the situation on the ground. 
Even though Secretary General set up ad hoc special committee for the Hungary 
on 10th January 1957, after the General Assembly passed the resolution on 10th 
January there were no doubts for French that the Soviets and the puppet Hun-
garian Government would prevent them from taking any eff ective action. French 
were still of the opinion that they could achieve most if they waited for the report 
of the Special committee, as that report could have proved the best basis for the 
publicity of the situation in Hungary. Th ey were also afraid that the Soviets would 
veto any further actions in the Security Council. Th e Foreign Offi  ce agreed with 
French that the Secretary General should visit both Budapest and Moscow as soon 
as possible, it also agreed with other conclusions of their French colleagues and 
stressed that the North Atlantic Council should have a common position towards 
the situation in Hungary.27
Although initiatives in the United Nations actually didn’t help much, they 
were still quite frustrating for the Soviets and Kadar’s Government. Th e joint dec-
laration of the two Governments published in Pravda on 29th March 1957 is a good 
example:
Th e facts show that the ruling circles of the Western powers, who bear heavy 
responsibility for the bloody events in Hungary, do not at present wish to cease their 
activity, which is aimed at intervention in the internal aff airs of Hungary and of the 
other countries of the Socialist camp. Th is is shown in particular, by the fact that the 
so-called Hungarian question was brought up for discussion in U.N.O. A shameful 
role at the session of the General Assembly of U.N.O. was played by the represent-
atives of the imperialists powers who, in contravention of the Charter of the Unit-
ed Nations, tried to intervene in the internal aff airs of Hungarian question, doing 
their best to keep it artifi cially on the ground. Both Governments declare that the 
rising and discussion of this question in the U.N.O. and the adoption of a resolution 
on this question by the General Assembly seriously undermine the prestige of that 
the High Commissioner for Refugees to continue their eff orts to meet the needs of 
Hungarian refugees; (d) December 12th: Requested the Secretary General to take any 
initiative that he deemed helpful in relation to the Hungarian problem in conformity 
with principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the General Assembly. Th e Na-
tional Archives, Foreign Offi  ce 371/128676 London 6th April 1957 Th omas Brimelow 
to New York.
27  Th e National Archives, Foreign Offi  ce 371/128676 London 8th April 1957 Th omas 
Brimelow to New York.
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organization and constitute a gross intervention in the internal aff airs of Hungary 
as well as in questions which are within the competence of the Government of the 
U.S.S.R., Hungary and the other states of the Warsaw Pact.28
Th e Foreign Offi  ce was having detailed reports on repression in Hungary by 
the Kadar’s regime that was using judicial and police machines for the campaign of 
the repression contrary to the human rights and when the Soviets were trying to 
consolidate the position of their troops in Hungary through the negotiations of a 
military agreement with the authorities which they themselves have put into pow-
er in that country. British diplomats had no special expectations of the Secretary 
General’s visit to Hungary but were aware it was important not to allow attempts 
of forgetting the Hungarian aff air, something that Moscow and Budapest wished.
Reports from the British embassy in Budapest from late winter and spring 
gave a clear picture of growing infl uences of “Rakosists” party members that start-
ed to take up infl uential posts. Th at trend started in 1957 after they started to 
get back to Hungary from their previous appointments in Soviet service.29 British 
reports also gave a look of the everyday persecutions that were happening all over 
Hungary and to diff erent social groups. Targets were in most of the cases heavily 
beaten and would have diffi  culties to have treatment in ambulances as they were 
marked as state enemies. If they wanted any help they had to lie and to state they 
injured themselves.30
*     *     *
Th anks to the insight into material of the FO, a conclusion can be made 
what was position of Great Britain regarding revolution in Hungary, and what 
were conclusions apropos behavior of the Soviets. Th e Suez crisis was much more 
important not only to Great Britain, but also to France and USA, than revolution 
taking place in the center of Europe. Still, despite impossibility to oppose Soviet 
invasion, it is obvious that all three big Western powers tried to maximally use all 
possibilities that United Nations Organization off ered in order to oppose Soviets 
28  Th e translation of the article from Pravda was part of the report. Th e National Ar-
chives, Foreign Offi  ce 371/128676 London 8th April 1957 Th omas Brimelow to New 
York.
29  Th e National Archives, Foreign Offi  ce 371/128676 Budapest 11th April 1957 to Foreign 
Offi  ce.
30  Th e National Archives, Foreign Offi  ce 371/128676 Budapest 12th April 1957 to Foreign 
Offi  ce.
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and Kadar’s regime that Soviets imposed in Budapest after the break of revolu-
tion. British reports are focused on humanitarian catastrophe they closely watched 
from the very beginning of turmoil in October 1956, while after the collapse of 
the Revolution they were watching the issue of Hungarian refugees as well (Kova-
cevic 2003, 99–101); also, they were very focused on permanent reprisal suff ered 
by Hungarian citizens. Th e sources made it clear that the FO precisely analyzed 
Soviet wishes to impose ‘limited sovereignty’ on their allies in Warsaw pact. But 
yet, the correspondence used in this paper does not give impression that London 
developed strategy to oppose Soviet interfering in Eastern European any way. It 
might be that attention to problems in the Near East had certain impact, or maybe 
answer is to be found in other fonds of national archives. Still, events in Hungary 
in 1956 encouraged USSR for further reactions to challenges in the Eastern camp 
(Cvetkovic 2013, 377–379). Th e fi rst war between two socialist states in Europe 
and victory of aggressor with no consequences was an indicator that showed how 
Soviets could react in future disputes with rebellious satellites. At that time, Amer-
ica was more occupied with the Suez crisis, and its attitude towards Eastern bloc 
countries could be summed up to: “we do not look upon these nations as potential 
military allies”. Such attitudes at fi rst surprised and afterwards encouraged bold 
and interventionist policy of the Soviets. One of consequences of 1956 Revolution 
was strengthening of the role of NATO among Western allies who increasingly 
wanted their joint position to be constructed within consensus frame of NATO 
pact, and decreasing infl uence of UNO, for despite several resolutions it didn’t 
manage to provide effi  cient answer to challenges of Hungarian revolution of 1956.
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Britanski pogled na Mađarsku revoluciju 1956
Izbijanje Revolucije u Mađarskoj iznenadilo je Zapadne sile, kao i Sovijet-
ski savez. Razvoj događaja koji je tekao drugačije u odnosu na Poljsku doveo je 
do otvorene borbe protiv Sovijeta i napuštanja Varšavskog pakta nakon uspeš-
neg početka revolucije i formiranja vlade Emre Nađa. Britanska i francuska pa-
žnja, kao i američka bili su okupirani Sueckom krizom. Pored toga u izjavama 
zvaničnika tri najveće zapadne sile Sovijetima je stavljeno do znanja da se oni 
neće mešati u unutrašnja pitanja Mađarske. Izveštaji koji su korišćeni u ovom 
radu, iz fonda Foreign Offi  ce iz Nacionalnog arhiva u Londonu pružaju jasnu 
sliku o tome šta je britanskim diplomatama i državnicima bilo najvažnije u vezi 
a događajima od oktobra do početka 1957. Na osnovu neobjavljenih izvora i 
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korsepodencije iz Budimpešte, Beča, Nju Jorka, Moske i Londona zaključuje se 
da je pored humanitarne katastrofe koja je zadesila Mađarsku važno i pitanje 
progona politčkih neistomišljenika i državnih neprijatelja nakon uspostavljanje 
Kadarove vlade. Uticaj NATO kao krovne organizacije za zapadne saveznikeje 
porastao tokom i nakon Mađarske revolucije. U okviru te ogranizacije su od 
novembra donosili koncenzus o daljim koracima u vezi sa izazovima u istočnoj 
Evropi. Suprotno tome, Organizacija Ujedinjenih Nacija i pored nekoliko re-
zolucija koje su osuđivale sovijetsku agresiju, nisu uspele da izvrše bilo kakav 
značajniji uticaj ni na Sovijete, ni na Kadarovu vladu, što je veoma frustriralo 
britanske i francuske zvaničnike. 
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UDC: 
SOVIET-YUGOSLAV 
RECONCILIATION AS
 A BASIS FOR 
UNDERSTANDING TITO’S 
ROLE IN THE HUNGARIAN 
REVOLUTION OF 1956
Th is paper analyzes Soviet-Yugoslav relations in the context of the fi rst 
major crisis between the two countries that started in 1948. Th e focus 
is on the period after Stalin’s death, which was followed by a period of 
detente and reconciliation. Th is process was not without tensions because 
the interests of the two countries were in opposition to one another. While 
the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, wanted to return Yugoslavia to the 
Soviet sphere of infl uence, Tito considered Yugoslav independence won 
during the confl ict with Stalin as his foreign policy priority. Due to these 
circumstances, the Hungarian rebellion in the autumn of 1956 against the 
Soviet occupation was the catalyst for further development of relations 
between Yugoslavia and the USSR, and these relations are a necessary 
frame of reference for understanding the politics of Yugoslavia during this 
Hungarian crisis.
Key words: Hungarian Revolution, 1956, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Nikita 
Khrushchev, Josip Broz Tito, Imre Nagy
  If one takes into consideration the 
frame work of Cold War international order, the division of spheres of infl uence 
and the importance of the formative interwar period for most Yugoslav commu-
nists, who were inextricably linked with Moscow and the Comintern, it would 
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come as no surprise that relations between socialist Yugoslavia and the Soviet Un-
ion were never merely an issue of foreign policy, but were also an internal political 
topic par excellence (Clissold 1975). Th e journey for Yugoslavia, from a country 
perceived in the West after the Second World War as “the most loyal Soviet satel-
lite” to the perception of Tito as a cancer and a potential leader of the dissolution 
of the Eastern Bloc, was a long one (Lis 2003).
Relations with the Kremlin, the hegemon of the Eastern Bloc, were undoubt-
edly primary for Yugoslav diplomacy, and therefore became a sort of personal do-
main for President Tito as well as one of the most delicate issues not just in terms 
of foreign policy, and access to it was permitted only to a select few. Tito even 
demanded that the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow send regular reports to him 
personally along with those routinely sent to the government and the Ministry of 
Foreign Aff airs (Mićunović 1984, 33; Kuljić 2005, 302). However, Soviet-Yugoslav 
relations oscillated in the postwar period between divergence and confl ict, and 
cooperation and understanding, and this was illustrated by three such major crises 
between Moscow and Belgrade identifi ed by researchers: 1948, 1958, and 1968. 
Th e fi rst escalation of hostilities occurred in 1948 with the Comintern Resolution, 
Stalin’s harsh accusations against Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 
and a total breakdown in relations between the two countries (Kačavenda 1999; 
Dedijer 1969; Banac 1990; Radonjić 1979; Petranović and Dautović 1999; Kardelj 
1980, 99−137). For the Yugoslav president it was, as he would later admit, the most 
diffi  cult experience of his life. Even though Tito exhibited great determination and 
perseverance in the resistance against Stalin, he also demonstrated a high degree 
of fl exibility due to his fears that a continuation of the confl ict would lead to the 
open anti-Stalinism and anti-Soviet sentiment characteristic of most of the West-
ern world.
Improved relations with the West remained the only alternative until Stalin’s 
death when the new leadership in Moscow demonstrated a desire to overcome 
antagonisms. In June 1953, three months after Stalin’s death, the Soviets revealed 
their intention to send an ambassador to Yugoslavia, thus indicating a desire to 
normalize relations (Luburić 1999, 145−146). Th e appointment of a Soviet ambas-
sador to Yugoslavia on June 17, 1953, and the reciprocal act by Yugoslavia were 
the fi rst steps in this normalization (Luburić 1999, 153). Th e Yugoslav ambassador, 
Dobrivoje Vidić, arrived in Moscow later that year on September 21. Th e highest 
party body, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
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the Soviet Union, at Khrushchev’s initiative, had previously declared normalizing 
relations to be a necessity. Th e Soviet objectives were clear: Yugoslavia had to be 
pulled away from the West, further integration into the Balkan Alliance (whose 
agreement was almost fi nalized) needed to be stopped, the Yugoslav paradigm’s 
impact on other countries of the Soviet sphere needed to be reduced, and fi nally, 
the country had to be gradually pulled back into the Eastern Bloc.
In January 1954, the Yugoslav party began what became known as the Đilas 
Aff air, in which Milovan Đilas, one of the foremost protagonists of de-Staliniza-
tion and greater distance from the Soviets, was dismissed from all functions and 
banished from public life.1 Th is created conditions for the emergence of the fi rst 
Eastern European dissident, of whom Urbi et Orbi announced the “worm is in the 
apple,” but also sent a message to the Soviets that Tito would deal with all radical 
anti-Soviet elements within his surroundings. It did not take long to receive an 
answer.
Symbolically, on June 22, 1954, a proposal arrived concerning the re-estab-
lishment of friendly relations at both the state and party levels. Uncoincidentally, 
this letter was sent two days before the fi nal meeting of diplomatic representatives 
from Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, which had been focused on adopting a draft 
agreement on the future Balkan Alliance (Luburić 1999, 307–309; Dimić 1998, 26). 
Th e Yugoslav president perceived the Soviet initiative as a “tremendous victory.” 
A relaxing of tensions was undoubtedly in the interest of Yugoslavia, which had 
lived for years with the constant threat of war, and had been subject to daily border 
skirmishes with Soviet satellites, in which hundreds of Yugoslav soldiers had been 
killed. Tito believed that the new Soviet leaders did not have the power of Stalin, 
and that a period of transition of power in the Soviet Union would be a good time 
to normalize relations while simultaneously rejecting any possibility of returning 
to the Eastern Bloc. Th e Yugoslav political leadership perceived itself as the winner 
in an unequal battle with the Soviet Union, and Tito felt not only on equal footing 
in relations with Khrushchev, but also began to perceive himself as a role model 
for aspirations for reform within the Eastern Bloc. A particularly important point 
for Tito was that the end of hostilities with the USSR would mean continuing con-
1  In a letter to Tito on June 22, 1954, Nikita Khrushchev wrote that, “Đilas, that pseudo-
Marxist…contributed signifi cantly to the deterioration in Yugoslav-Soviet relations,” 
thus putting him in the same rank with Lavrentiy Beria, whom the Soviets had declared 
to be a traitor. Luburić 1999, 308−309.
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vergence with the West, viewed then as a threat to Yugoslavia’s social and political 
system, would become less of a necessity (Dimić 1998, 26−27).
Now that visible progress in normalizing relations–the Yugoslav precondi-
tion for a meeting at the highest level–had been achieved, there was an exchange 
of letters at the highest level, and on May 15, 1955, news of an upcoming Sovi-
et-Yugoslav summit was announced to the press. On the same day, the Soviet Un-
ion and the countries of the Eastern bloc signed the Treaty of Friendship, Co-op-
eration and Mutual Assistance in the Polish capital, forming the Warsaw Pact as 
a military alliance in response to the creation of NATO. Th e Soviet delegation 
landed at the Belgrade airport on May 26, 1955, and its leader and fi rst secretary of 
the Central Committee of the CPSU, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, immediately 
began with praise for the Yugoslav struggle against fascism in the Second World 
War, saying that the aim of this visit by the Soviet state and party delegations was 
to “strengthen friendship and cooperation.” While remembering the joint struggle 
of Soviet and Yugoslav troops in the liberation of Belgrade, Khrushchev also said 
that good relations had been hampered and emphasized his “sincere regret,” but 
placed all the blame for this development on the “provocative role…of the ene-
mies of the nation, Beria and Abakumov.”2 He said that the party leadership had 
thoroughly investigated the evidence for which “serious accusations and insults” 
against Yugoslavia and its leaders had been based. “Th e facts,” he said, “show that 
these materials were fabricated by the enemies of the people, despised agents of 
imperialism, who have infi ltrated the ranks of our Party through fraud.” (Luburić 
1999, 388−389) Th us the Soviet leader stayed within the boundaries of the prop-
aganda of a totalitarian regime while still attempting to explain the causes of the 
confl ict in 1948. However, the arrival of the Soviets in Belgrade, the expression of 
regret over the confl ict, and the attempts to establish an even closer relationship 
on as much of an equal basis as possible were perceived in Western circles (with 
good reason) as a repentance visit, and referred to it as the Kremlin’s Canossa.
2  In his secret speech Khrushchev gave a completely diff erent but certainly signifi cantly 
more realistic interpretation of the causes of the Soviet-Yugoslav confl ict in 1948. While 
defi ning Stalin's role in the confl ict with Yugoslavia as “shameful,” Khrushchev said that 
there was no real motive for the confl ict with Yugoslavia. According to Khrushchev, 
Stalin had been “monstrously magnifying” the drawbacks of the Yugoslav leadership 
and this is what had led to a confl ict with a “friendly country.” On the same occasion, 
the new Soviet leader recounted that Stalin had said to him: “It would be enough to just 
move my little fi nger and Tito will be no more. He will fall.” Vrhovec and Čepo 1970; 
Aksjutin 1989, 14−18.
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During the conversation with Tito in Belgrade, Khrushchev mentioned the 
situation in Hungary, which was becoming increasingly complex. He reminded 
the Yugoslav president that in the Eastern Bloc, which still included China, “there 
are no disagreements or cracks.” However, problems had arisen only in Hungary 
“with that Imre Nagy.” Аs an Old Bolshevik who had long lived in Russia, he was, 
according to Khrushchev, a proposal by Lavrentiy Beria.3 However, Khrushchev 
continued, “he was a real opportunist,” but the Hungarian party “had a discussion 
with him,” he admitted “his faults” and “therefore will be given an opportunity to 
improve.” (Luburić 1999, 403) Tito did not comment on the situation in Hunga-
ry, primarily because he wanted to improve relations with the Soviet Union and 
convince Khrushchev to sign a joint declaration that would leave Yugoslavia more 
space for future diplomatic maneuvering. Because of this, all issues of potential 
disagreement outside of the main development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations were 
seen as ephemeral, even though his views were undoubtedly diff erent than those 
of the Soviets.
Imre Nagy’s ideas were reminiscent of the independent reformist socialism 
already confi rmed by Yugoslav practice, and Hungary was the fi rst Eastern Bloc 
country after the Soviet Union to establish diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. 
(Dimić 1998, 29) Th e Hungarian emancipatory movement Nagy announced in his 
June 1953 speech involved a discontinuity with the Stalinist practices of Mátyás 
Rákosi, restriction of repression, economic reform, etc. All this inevitably led to 
the creation of a diff erent model of socialism and to a distancing from the Soviet 
paradigm as the only model. Yugoslav-Hungarian relations during the two years 
of Imre Nagy’s government had signifi cantly improved. However, during the So-
viet delegation’s visit in 1953 Tito pragmatically decided to focus all attention on 
relations between Belgrade and Moscow and on persuading the Soviet leader to 
accept the right of Yugoslavia to determine its own path to socialism. Th is was 
precisely the aim the key document of the policy of reconciliation, the Belgrade 
Declaration, was supposed to serve. It guaranteed the right to a diff erent path to 
the development of socialism, and essentially meant that Yugoslavia was undisput-
edly the winner in this confl ict.
Th e Belgrade Declaration, signed on June 2, 1955, by Yugoslav President 
Tito and Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin, states both sides agreed that “coopera-
3  Imre Nagy was an informant for the Soviet secret service for more than a decade. Ivanji 
2007, 229.
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tion between peoples” must be based on the principles of “respect for sovereignty, 
independence, integrity, and equality.” Acceptance and recognition of “peaceful 
coexistence…regardless of ideological diff erences and diff erences in social sys-
tems” was agreed on, as well as adherence to the principle of “mutual respect 
and non-interference in internal aff airs…because issues of internal organization of 
diff erent social systems and diff erent forms of developing socialism are exclusively 
an issue for the people of individual countries.” At the same time, condemnation 
of “any aggression and any attempts to impose political and economic domination 
on other countries” was emphasized, along with the statement that the policy of 
military alignment “undermines trust among nations and increases the danger of 
war.” Th e following year, the Moscow Declaration was signed, which affi  rmed the 
key postulates of the Belgrade Declaration. (Bekić 1988, 667−734; Luburić 1999, 
510−515; Kardelj 1980, 145−49; Rajak 2011, 135) Th e Soviet regime’s approval of a 
former member of the Bloc to develop its own path to socialism and granting the 
right to develop a diff erent model of internal organization for the state undoubt-
edly opened a Pandora’s box of discontent among other members of the satellite 
states, which were developing under the watchful eye of the Soviet Union and 
according to a Soviet paradigm.
In June 1956, Eastern Europe was one of the topics at a meeting in Moscow 
between Tito and Khrushchev. Tito advocated for the position that Yugoslavia 
should normalize its relations with these countries without “Russian mediation.” 
His intention was to develop relations with the countries of the Bloc independent-
ly from the USSR, to avoid future interrelatedness, and for these relations to be 
determined by the fl uctuations and changes in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. During 
this meeting Tito also described Hungary under the Stalinist Mátyás Rákosi as a 
neighbor with whom Yugoslavia had many diffi  culties in establishing good rela-
tions. Th e Soviet leader defended Rákosi by claiming that it was Stalin rather than 
he who had been responsible for the situation in Hungary, and that the leader of 
the Hungarian communist party “properly understands” the necessity of good re-
lations with Yugoslavia. (Dimić 1998, 36−38)
But, after Khrushchev delivered a report entitled, “On the Cult of Personality 
and Its Consequences,” also known as the Secret Speech, at the 20th Congress of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the situation in Hungary became more 
complex. However, according to Veljko Mićunović, the ambassador to Moscow, 
relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary had been improving while Rákosi was 
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head of the state. Th e situation in Hungary during 1956 began worsening, and in 
mid-July Mićunović spoke with the Soviet leader. Th en, Khrushchev sent a mes-
sage to Tito stating that the Soviets were determined to use “all means” to “handle 
the crisis in Hungary.” Th is was understood as a direct threat to Yugoslavia. Th e 
Soviet Union, Khrushchev thought, “cannot allow a break in the Bloc’s fi rst line of 
defense.” According to Mićunović, the aim of openly threatening Yugoslavia with 
the Red Army was to ensure the message would be “properly understood” and 
would result in silence during the dramatic events that were expected in Hungary. 
(Mićunović 1984, 107−108)
A secret letter to Mátyás Rákosi and other socialist leaders sent on July 13, 
1956, to all the communist parties of the Bloc countries is an excellent source for 
an analysis of the level of Soviet concern regarding the danger of the possible vir-
ulence of the Yugoslav example. Th e Soviet regime’s determined and resolute posi-
tion, as displayed in this document, that the communists in the Eastern Bloc coun-
tries had no right to be guided by the example of Yugoslavia in fact devalued the 
importance of the Belgrade and Moscow declarations. It even mentioned that the 
Yugoslav draft of the declaration had been dismissed as opportunistic. Finally, it 
emphasized that there were many issues on which the two parties diff ered, because 
“the Yugoslavs continue to observe things in their own way.” (Dimić 1998, 40) In 
addition to disavowing the documents already signed, in the Soviet interpretations 
Yugoslavia did not appear as an independent international entity but rather as an 
object of Soviet foreign policy. At the same time, diff erences in the policies of the 
USSR and Yugoslavia were attributed to Yugoslav “delusions” and to its economic 
dependence on the West caused by the failure of the self-management model of 
socialism. Th is secret document written for internal use in the countries of the 
Bloc also contained an allusion made by the Soviets that the return of Yugoslavia 
to the Bloc was possible because it had promised to “become better.” In contrast to 
offi  cially signed declarations, Mićunović considered this document to refl ect the 
real policy of the USSR towards Yugoslavia. (Mićunović 1984, 127−128; Žarković 
2017; Rajak 2011, 163−165)
However, on July 16 relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union 
seemed to be improving. Khrushchev told Mićunović that the visit to Budapest 
by Anastas Mikoyan, the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers 
of the Soviet Union, had gone unexpectedly well and it had been agreed that 
Rákosi would resign. According to Khrushchev, this was a necessary step in 
Milivoj Bešlin and Momir Samardžić Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation as a basis for understanding…
96
resolving the Hungarian crisis. At the same time, the Soviet leader told the 
Yugoslav diplomatic representative that after successfully resolving the crisis 
in Hungary, Mikoyan would make a stop in nearby Yugoslavia. It was obvious, 
Mićunović thought, that the idea behind the Mikoyan’s visit without a previous 
invitation was to send a clear message to the world that Yugoslavia was a major 
Soviet ally in resolving the Hungarian crisis. (Mićunović 1984, 109) Th is was 
not only incorrect but also dangerous because Yugoslavia was being drawn 
unwillingly into events in Hungary, which would later become dramatic during 
the coming autumn. For the Soviets, it was an opportunity to compromise Yu-
goslavia, and thus its development model, and to disparage the Yugoslav neu-
tral, “out-of-Bloc” policy. On the other hand, in Budapest the assessment was 
that the Hungarian opposition and the rebel movement enjoyed the support 
of Yugoslav media and diplomatic representatives, and thus it was believed 
that Yugoslavia needed to be given a warning due to its support of “non-party 
elements” in Hungary.
At the July 18–21 session of the Central Committee of the Hungarian 
Working People’s Party, Mátyás Rákosi was replaced and thus enabled further 
reform and de-Stalinization of Hungary. Th e rehabilitation and subsequent 
ceremonial reburial of László Rajk, executed in Stalinist purges in 1949 as 
a Titoist spy, was a preparation for public resistance to the Soviet occupa-
tion. Th ese processes began to turn Hungary towards Yugoslavia with the rec-
ognition that its southern neighbor was indeed creating a form of socialism 
Hungary could aspire to. Publicly withdrawing libels addressed in previous 
years to Yugoslav leaders was recognition of an erroneous position toward the 
neighboring country and its population, and they were a part of the process of 
dealing with Stalinist crimes in Hungary. Hungarian Communists were clearly 
demonstrating a tendency toward deepening friendly relations with Yugosla-
via, especially in the areas of science and culture. (Dimić 1998, 44−46)
Th ese were the circumstances in which Khrushchev came to Yugosla-
via on September 19, 1956, with his family on a private visit, allegedly for a 
family vacation. During dinner with Tito, he said he hoped to continue the 
rapprochement between the two countries, and that it would one day be “com-
plete.” Without a doubt, this meant the return of Yugoslavia to the Eastern 
Bloc. After that, the Yugoslav president was Khrushchev’s guest on a holiday 
in the Crimea in early October 1956. Without any knowledge of the Yugoslav 
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delegation, Ernő Gerő, the fi rst secretary of the Hungarian communist party, ap-
peared in Crimea. An impression was created that Yugoslavia was slowly re-
turning to the Bloc, and that a complex and sometimes confusing Soviet policy 
towards Hungary was at the same time Yugoslav policy. Th is was all part of 
a Soviet strategy to draw Yugoslavia within the Bloc and an attempt to pull it 
away from the West. (Mićunović 1984, 137−46) With this Crimean maneuver, 
Khrushchev thought Hungary would be kept in the Bloc and Yugoslavia fi nal-
ly drawn into it. Khrushchev thought Yugoslavia had to adapt to the Eastern 
Bloc, and not vice versa, because it was “not the unit that needs to catch up, 
but the soldier.” (Bogetić 2006, 61) Th e private nature of these encounters gave 
Tito an opportunity for maneuvering, so the talks were completed without a 
concrete agreement.
After Crimea, communication with Ernő Gerő continued in Belgrade in 
1956 from October 15 to 22. Th e Hungarian side was willing to recognize and 
eliminate any unfairness from the past after the Resolution of Cominform. 
Tito pragmatically assented to the necessity of forgetting the past and thinking 
about future cooperation according to the principles of the Moscow Declara-
tion. Gerő demonstrated great interest in the concept of Yugoslav socialism 
and diff erent paths for its construction. However, the situation in Hungary 
was becoming increasingly complicated, and on the day after the party dele-
gation returned riots broke out in Budapest, which then turned into a rebel-
lion against the repressive Soviet system. By October 24, 1956, the state and 
the party system were in complete confusion due to the revolt’s escalation, 
and the population was outraged by the growing presence of the occupying 
Soviet army. Some of the main demands were the introduction of a multi-
party system and political pluralism. It had become obvious that a majority 
of Hungarian citizens opposed the Soviet Bolshevik system and that it could 
only be maintained by force, which the Soviets fi rst used on October 24. How-
ever, the fi rst intervention was limited and somewhat uneven, and ended in 
complete collapse, an escalation of the insurgency, and the spread of armed 
confl ict and bloodshed throughout the streets of Budapest. Th e explosion of 
discontent among the population and a strong, immediate international reac-
tion forced Soviet troops to temporarily withdraw on October 29 and 30, and 
to consent to political changes in Hungary. János Kádár replaced Gerő as the 
fi rst secretary of the party, and Imre Nagy became the prime minister. Yugo-
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slavia condemned the Soviet use of violence and supported political change. 
Tito sent a letter to the new Hungarian leadership on behalf of the Yugoslav 
state and party leadership praising the policy of democratizing public life, the 
introduction of workers’ control, and even the initiation of negotiations on 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops. (Bogetić 2006, 62−63) Th e Yugoslav state and 
party leadership was obviously pleased with the possibility that there could be 
one more country with an independent policy and its own path to socialism 
such as the self-management model in Yugoslavia.
However, instead of bringing about peace, the political changes led to 
further escalation of the confl ict. Th e armed struggle expanded from Budapest 
to the rest of the country, and political demands were radicalized with explicit 
anti-communist and anti-Soviet overtones. Finding themselves in a dramat-
ic situation completely out of control, Imre Nagy and the party leadership 
adopted a decision to abolish the one-party system and to invite all the major 
political parties into the government, and demanded the immediate withdraw-
al of Soviet troops from Hungary. Th e Hungarian government declared its 
neutrality, announced its abandonment of the Warsaw Pact, and asked the 
UN and the great powers to guarantee its newly declared neutrality. Th is was 
a sign of the fi nal overthrow of socialism in Hungary and a signal to the Sovi-
ets that anti-communist revolutions must be suppressed with utmost, brutal 
force. At the same time, there was a radical change in the Yugoslav position 
toward the events in Hungary, which was under the new leadership of Imre 
Nagy. Th e announcement of the removal of the communist monopoly, politi-
cal pluralism, the restoration of the capitalist system, and the actions carried 
out by armed forces caused a disturbance in the Yugoslav leadership. It was a 
precedent Tito could not approve of, and he turned vehemently against Nagy. 
Th e Soviet response to the collapse of the Eastern bloc came quickly. On Oc-
tober 31, Soviet leaders decided at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central 
Committee to break the revolution with military force and to establish a new 
puppet government in Budapest. Prior to the planned military action, it was 
necessary to attain support from the satellite states and Yugoslavia. Th e Polish 
and Czechoslovak leaders objected to a bloody suppression of the Hungari-
an revolution (referred to as a counter-revolution), unlike other communist 
countries that provided unconditional support to the Soviets. (Dimić 1998, 
49−51; Bogetić 2006, 64−66; Žarković 2017)
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Due to these circumstances, Khrushchev and Georgy Malenkov, deputy 
chairman of the Council of Ministers, came to Tito’s residence on the island of 
Brioni during the night of November 2-3. Th ey were surprised when Tito sup-
ported the idea of military intervention. He said that “there has to be interven-
tion if there is counter-revolution in Hungary.” He described such a move as 
“the lesser evil” because he wondered “what kind of government is that when 
communists are murdered and hanged?” In an eff ort to cover up the brutality 
of such an act of aggression against a sovereign country and its legitimate 
government, the Yugoslav President proposed political preparations before the 
military intervention, and “to form or to declare something as a revolutionary 
government made up of Hungarians” with a political program prepared in 
advance for the people. Th e acceptance of this proposal would conceal the 
obviousness of aggression, and Tito was in some sense trying to relativize the 
negative eff ects of his support for intervention. By Tito taking such a stance on 
the issue, Yugoslavia became an accomplice to aggression, which was contrary 
to all its previously established postulates of foreign policy. Th e decision to 
intervene had already been made and the Yugoslav stance would not change 
anything, but Tito’s unreserved support for the removal of a legal government 
supported by a majority of the population was a precedent that undermined 
the credibility of Yugoslav politics and its reputation in the world. Later under 
diff erent circumstances, during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
Tito would not make the same mistake. (Bešlin 2011, 351−368)
Tito felt that intervention should not be reduced to the “weapon of the 
Soviet Army,” but should be accompanied by political activity, which was pri-
marily the creation of a “revolutionary government” that would include a pop-
ulation still supportive of further socialist development and which had not 
been compromised during Rákosi’s Stalinist government. Tito had proposed 
János Kádár because he thought he had the personality traits necessary at the 
time. At fi rst, Khrushchev did not agree with this idea, but later adopted it. 
Tito and Khrushchev had clear disagreements over the cause of the rebellion 
in Hungary and about how to resolve it. Th e Soviet side reduced the causes to 
interference from the West, while Tito claimed that causes were the repres-
sive regimes of Rákosi and Gerő, and thought a resolution of the crisis would 
be possible only on the basis of discontinuity with the Stalinist legacy, the 
principles of reform socialism, and the establishment of Hungary as an equal 
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member of the Eastern Bloc instead of an occupied country. However, it was 
clear that the new Hungarian government about to come to power through 
Soviet tanks and Hungarian blood would, at least in the beginning, be entirely 
dependent on directives from Moscow. By adopting Yugoslav suggestions in 
certain areas, the Soviets achieved their main goal: making Tito an accomplice 
to the bloody suppression of the Hungarian revolution and aggression against 
a sovereign state. Yugoslavia also agreed to persuade Imre Nagy to voluntar-
ily withdraw before the intervention, as well as to support the establishment 
of the puppet Revolutionary Workers’-Peasants’ Government of Hungary. By 
“voluntary” removing Nagy, Yugoslavia would remove part of its responsi-
bility for supporting the intervention, and the Soviets could easily break the 
rebel’s resistance. Both sides made use of the fact that Imre Nagy contacted 
the Yugoslav Embassy on November 2 asking for asylum. Th e Yugoslav gov-
ernment responded positively but suggested Nagy distance himself from the 
anti-communist and anti-Soviet decisions and actions of his own government. 
However, the Prime Minister refused to accept these suggestions. (Dimić 1998, 
56−57; Bogetić 2006, 67−68; Žarković 2017)
On the morning November 4, 1956, Soviet military forces broke the rebel 
resistance, while over the radio Imre Nagy denounced the action as aggression 
and took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest with his closest associ-
ates and their families. As the revolution was crushed by force, the destinies 
of Imre Nagy and other leaders of the Hungarian revolution came into the 
limelight of political events, and they were blockaded in the Yugoslav Embassy 
by Soviet military forces. Th e priority for the Yugoslav leadership at this point 
was to preserve what remained of its credibility, which had been seriously 
undermined by an inconsistent position during Hungarian crisis. Th e Soviet 
leadership resolutely refused a request to transfer Nagy and his associates from 
the Yugoslav embassy in the Hungarian capital to Yugoslav territory, which led 
to a serious deterioration of relations between the two countries. Th e govern-
ment in Moscow explicitly requested that Yugoslavia go back on its promise of 
asylum given to Nagy, and extradite him to the USSR, or more precisely, to the 
new Hungarian puppet regime of János Kádár. Tito was in a hopeless situation. 
He did not want a new deterioration in relations with the USSR and the new 
Hungarian government but, on the other hand, fulfi lling their demands would 
completely destroy Yugoslavia’s international credibility, particularly among 
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Western countries, which had already been badly undermined by supporting 
the Soviet military intervention. In a letter to Khrushchev on November 8, 
1956, Tito tried to explain the Yugoslav position and to secure amnesty for 
Nagy and other rebels, but was unsuccessful. Th e furthest the Soviets were 
willing to compromise was to extradite Nagy to Romania, or in other words 
extradite him to a Soviet satellite. (Rokai et al. 2002; Bogetić 2006, 69)
Tito gave a speech in Pula on November 11 that became a new cause for 
a breakdown in relations between the two countries. Tito declared that the 
Hungarian crisis and its tragic outcome had been the result of the support 
from the Soviet Stalinist Rákosi regime, which had produced the fi rst inter-
vention in October. “Th is mistake happened,” he said, “because they unfortu-
nately still think that military force can resolve anything. But it doesn’t. See 
here how an unarmed people so fi ercely resists when it has a single goal–to 
attain freedom and independence.” (Bogetić 2006, 70) On the other hand, Tito 
justifi ed the intervention of November 4 as a “lesser evil” than “chaos, civil war, 
counter-revolution, and a new world war.” He stressed that Yugoslav support 
for this intervention was conditioned by the withdrawal of the Soviet Army as 
soon as the situation in Hungary stabilized. Tito’s attempt to distance himself 
from the USSR and the violent methods used in Hungary caused a fi erce re-
action from Khrushchev and a new crisis in relations. (Žarković 2017) As part 
of diplomatic eff orts to remain on good terms with opposing sides in the Cold 
War, Tito asked the new Hungarian leader, János Kádár, to guarantee the safe 
return of Nagy and his associates. Reluctantly and with accusations that Yu-
goslavia was interfering in Hungarian internal aff airs, on November 21, 1956, 
Kádár guaranteed this in writing. When the leaders of the Hungarian revo-
lution left the Yugoslav embassy the next day, Soviet soldiers arrested them, 
took them into custody, and transferred them to Romania. Yugoslav protests 
against the violation of the agreement were in vain, and only provoked new 
accusations from Budapest of interference in Hungary’s internal aff airs.
Even though Yugoslavia’s inconsistent actions during the Hungarian rev-
olution undermined its international credibility, the country failed to develop 
stable relations with the USSR. In less than a year, a new crisis escalated in 
1958, initiated by the Soviet leadership’s dissatisfaction with a new program of 
the monopolistic party in Yugoslavia, which was undoubtedly reform-oriented, 
and thus emphasized the distance from the Soviet model of politics and social 
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organization. Essentially, reconciliation with the Soviet Union was not possi-
ble. Pressure on Yugoslavia from Moscow and attempts to force the country 
back into the Eastern Bloc, which was a contemporary version of nationalistic 
Russian imperial pretensions in the Balkans, necessarily led to the only possi-
ble reply–refusal. Th e Yugoslav paradigm was dangerous for the unity of the 
Soviet monolith, and it threatened the fragile legitimacy of the post-Stalinist 
structure within it. Th e Yugoslav precedent of independent socialism without 
reliance on Moscow and the reform basis of the self-government model were 
perceived in the USSR as disruptive, and with good reason. Th erefore, inter-
vention in Hungary was a threat to Yugoslavia and a way to return the “rogue” 
country to the Soviet sphere of infl uence. Although this would formally never 
happen, after 1971−1972 and a more permanent shift on the part of the Yugo-
slav president to dogmatism, in the 1970s two models of society–Yugoslav and 
Soviet–would move towards convergence.
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Sovjetsko-jugoslovensko pomirenje kao osnov za razumevanje 
Titove uloge u Mađarskoj revoluciji 1956.
Prvi sovjetsko-jugoslovenski disput pretvoren u krizu u odnosima izme-
đu dve države 1948. imao je globalni značaj. Ipak, posle Staljinove smrti sledio 
je period popuštanja zategnutosti i evolutivnog pomirenja, koje je realizovano 
međusobnim posetama i potpisivanjem Beogradske (1955) i Moskovske (1956) 
deklaracije. Navedeni proces neće proći bez tenzija jer su interesi dve zemlje 
bili suprotstavljeni. Dok je sovjetski lider Nikita Hruščov želeo da vrati Jugo-
slaviju u interesnu sferu SSSR-a, Tito je opstanak jugoslovenske nezavisnosti, 
izvojevane tokom sukoba sa Staljinom, smatrao svojim spoljnopolitičkim pri-
oritetom. U takvim okolnostima mađarska pobuna protiv sovjetske okupacije 
bila je katalizator daljih odnosa Tita i Hruščova, ali su ti odnosi bili i neop-
hodan referentni okvir za razumevanje poteza koje je Jugoslavija povlačila u 
vreme krize u Mađarskoj u jesen 1956. Titova početna pacifi katorska uloga u 
Mađarskoj revoluciji pretvorena je u nedvosmislenu podršku sovjetskoj vojnoj 
intervenciji u prvim danima novembra kada je izgledalo da se komunistički po-
redak u susednoj zemlji nepovratno ruši. Težak jugoslovenski položaj, izazavan 
sovjetskim uspehom da Tita učini saučesnikom nasilnog gušenja pobune, bio 
je pogoršan kada je Sovjetima faktički izručen Imre Nađ, koji se uz garncije 
sklonio u jugoslovensku ambasadu u Budimpešti.
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UDC: 
YUGOSLAVIA AND 
THE HUNGARIAN 
UPRISING 1956: Dilemmas 
and Controversies
The split-up of Yugoslavia with the Soviet Union from 1948 has 
encouraged centrifugal political forces in the Eastern Bloc. However, 
the Hungarian Uprising 1956 was a serious temptation for the Yugoslav 
government. However, Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito managed to seize 
the opportunity and redefi ne the status of Yugoslavia and his personal 
role in international relations. In the depths of the Yugoslav regime, there 
was enough understanding of the new approach to the Soviets dating 
from the previous year, and the cooperation in the suppression of the 
Hungarian Uprising. In one year, Tito met four times with Khrushchev. 
Apart from helping refugees and formal reactions, the West had no power 
to help Hungary to leave the Soviet orbit. Th e West remained inactive, 
and Yugoslavia silent, also during the suppression of the Prague Spring 
in 1968. 
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 The Hungarian Revolution of  (the 
Hungarian Uprising) has triggered dramatic events that have shifted from day to 
day. Th e dynamics of international relations and the dynamics of change require 
considering the role of neighboring Yugoslavia by taking into account the complex 
changes in the relations of strategic forces, political attitudes and concrete deci-
sions. In a rush of disorder that pervaded relations between the West, the East and 
even the looming Th ird World in 1956, one paradigm is almost apparent, one that 
is contained in the eff orts of the regime of Josip Broz Tito to preserve the political 
order and the new social architecture of the post-war communist Yugoslavia, but 
not without a careful refl ection on her international reputation.
Recent researches have confi rmed that the split-up of Yugoslavia with the 
Soviet Union from 1948 has encouraged centrifugal political forces in the Eastern 
Bloc. Th e Eastern European states otherwise mostly lagged in their democratic 
growth, compared to the West, however long-term controversial points in the rela-
tions between the Soviet Union and its strategic partners were obvious: Soviet mil-
itary occupation, political terror and economic exploitation, and the continuity of 
Russian territorial and strategic politics. Historical misunderstandings with Russia 
neither were helpful.1 “In Hungary the period from July, 1953, to March, 1955, re-
ferred to as the New Course, constituted the fi rst liberalization of the communist 
1  “While the Soviet Union was gradually recovering from the social and economic dev-
astation of World War II, the populations of Eastern Europe were subjected, mostly 
unwillingly, to occupation by Soviet forces and the rigid imposition of the Soviet system 
in its Stalinist form – a system that was widely but mostly silently resented as an ill-suit-
ed framework for economic, social and cultural life in the societies of Eastern Europe. 
By the end of the 1940s opposition political parties in Eastern Europe had either been 
banned and their leaders arrested, or they had been co-opted into popular front move-
ments under communist leadership, which eff ectively reduced them to mere puppet 
status. Th e East European communist governments proceeded to take most workplaces 
into public ownership, introduce y system of centralised state 'planning' of the economy, 
and collectivise agriculture. Strict censorship of the media was introduced and freedom 
of expression was severely limited. Th e ruling parties and secret police organizations 
took on similar roles to their Soviet counterparts. Furthermore, in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, struggles within the national communist parties resulted in similar mass 
political arrests, show trials and expansion of labour camps as had been experienced 
in the Soviet Union since the 1930s. Mirroring events in Stalin's Soviet Union, the East 
European communist leaderships turned on their own party comrades, accusing them 
on treason, and staging show trials of the most prominent ‘revisionists’ such as, in the 
case of Hungary, former underground resistance leader of the early 1940s, László Rajk” 
(Cox 2006, IV). 
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regime in that country. Th is period marked the rise and fall of the government of 
Imre Nagy. At the time of his accession to the premiership in 1953, Nagy criticized 
the bankruptcy of the economy which had adopted the Soviet pattern without 
making allowances for the capabilities and needs of Hungary. Furthermore, he 
stated that the people cannot be free if the nation is not independent and if it lacks 
complete sovereignty” (Gripp 1960, 942).
On the other hand, the Soviet Union needed an important success in the 
international relations after a series of post-war failures. During the Greek Civil 
War from 1946 to 1949 the Greek government army, representing the clero-na-
tionalist forces, backed by the United Kingdom and the United States has defeated 
the Democratic Army of Greece, the military branch of the Greek Communist 
Party, supported by Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria. Th e Austrian State Treaty 
re-established Austria as a sovereign state on 15 May 1955, after Soviet troops 
had been withdrawn a declaration of neutrality guaranteed that Austria would 
not join NATO. However, it was clear that Austria was joining the Western orbit 
after being liberated from the presence of the Soviet occupation forces. Th e Soviet 
Union established the Warsaw Pact in 1955 as a strategic answer seeking a balance 
of power or counterweight to NATO, but also to the obvious attractiveness of the 
Western World.
In the meanwhile, after a personal confl ict between the Yugoslav leader Jo-
sip Broz Tito and Stalin, Yugoslavia was expelled from Communist International 
in 1948. Otherwise Yugoslavia ran the fastest collectivization process of all East 
European communist regimes. Communism was victorious in Yugoslavia as an 
achieved authentic political force, and as a war prey of the armed resistance move-
ment. Th e West also accomplished the intention of the communist partisans to 
take over all the political power. Th e Soviet troops did not set their permanent 
presence, like in the rest of Eastern Europe, neither took important part in estab-
lishing a new political order. Yugoslavia has applied its authentic model of collec-
tivization. Even after the regime brutally punished the pro-Stalinist quislings, from 
the depths of the political and security order, otherwise a narrow minded dogmat-
ic pillar of Yugoslav totalitarianism, Yugoslavia continued to uphold the practice 
of Sovietization. It was only the collapse of the economy with human casualties 
characteristic of all the collectivist socialist experiments of the XX century that 
brought Tito’s regime to open cooperation with the West, at the beginning of the 
fi fties. Th us, Tito implicitly and reluctantly acknowledged the Western aid from 
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the last war and early postwar days, usually covered up by his propaganda, then 
basically Stalinist mannered.
Th e subsequent Soviet failures in Southeastern Europe occurred in Greece 
and Albania. But there were also important gains for the Soviet Union. In 1949 
they mastered they fi rst atomic weapons and founded the Warsaw Pact in 1955. 
At the very beginnings of the Hungarian revolt, the Non-Aligned Movement was 
launched from the Brioni islands in Yugoslavia, on 19 July 1956. Th e Declaration 
was signed by Yugoslav president Tito, India’s fi rst Prime Minister Jawaharlal Neh-
ru and Egypt’s second president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. From its beginnings, the 
organization was politically and ideologically closer to the Soviet communist bloc, 
as based on anti-colonial and anti-American rhetoric that has off ered legitimacy 
to new nationalist movements, anti-democratic regimes and violent dictatorships 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Regardless of the political losses in Yugoslavia and Albania, the Soviets man-
aged to curb the turmoil of dissatisfaction in Eastern Europe. Th ey apparently had 
problems primarily with the majority Catholic and Protestant states: in occupied 
Baltic republics, German Democratic Republic (DDR), Poland, and later in Hun-
gary and Czechoslovakia. More resistance was felt in Yugoslavia in its western 
republics, Slovenia and Croatia. East-orthodox peoples were more subdued, and 
less opposed. Only Romania exempted its foreign policy from the East-European 
pattern, while retaining Stalinist planning and practice. Th e „People’s Uprising in 
East Germany“ that started with a strike by East Berlin construction workers on 
16 June 1953 turned into a widespread uprising against the DDR government, and 
involved more than one million people in about 700 localities. Th e movement in 
East Berlin was violently suppressed the following day by Soviet tanks and the 
Volkspolizei, but the strikes and protests lasted even after the intervention. Th e 
Poznań uprising in Poland, with workers demonstrations on June 28, 1956, was 
also violently suppressed by the joined domestic and Soviet forces (Persak 2006, 
1308).
Th e Hungarian Revolution of 1956 happened to become the fi rst anti-Soviet 
uprising in Eastern Europe which implied important international evolvement and 
chances to succeed. Th e Uprising lasted from 23 October until 11 November 1956.
A short overview:
Hungary became a communist state under the authoritarian leadership of 
Mátyás Rákosi, with radically nationalized economy and organized political op-
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pression. Th e victims of the secret police (Államvédelmi Hatóság or ÁVH) were 
labeled as “Titoists,” “western agents,” “Trotskyites”. Th e thousands were arrested, 
tortured, tried, imprisoned in concentration camps, deported to the east, or ex-
ecuted, including ÁVH founder László Rajk. Russian language study and Com-
munist propaganda became mandatory in schools and universities. In 1949 the 
leader of the Hungarian Catholic Church Cardinal József Mindszenty was arrested 
and sentenced to life imprisonment for treason. Th e economy suff ered from war 
reparations, state management, collectivization and centralization, and also by the 
participation in the Soviet-sponsored Council of Mutual Economic Assistance that 
prevented free trading with the West. Real industrial wages fell by 18% between 
1949 and 1952. Th e collectivization of agriculture caused a fall in production and 
hunger. After the Stalin’s death in 1953, the reformist Imre Nagy replaced Rákosi as 
Prime Minister. However, Rákosi remained the General Secretary of the Party, and 
removed Nagy in 1955. After Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech”, Rákosi was deposed 
replaced by Ernő Gerő on 18 July 1956. Th e change encouraged political process 
with a series of public debates (forums). Massive protests, preceded by the move-
ments of students and the formulations of their political demands, began on 23 
October 1956. Th e protester’s manifesto called on the state’s independence from 
all foreign powers and a political system based on democratic socialism. Th e fi rst 
Party secretary Ernő Gerő condemned the demands, and demonstrators answered 
with the removal of Stalin’s public statue. Th e ÁVH was defending Radio Budapest 
building, and the Hungarian soldiers sided with the crowd. During the night of 23 
October, Ernő Gerő requested Soviet military intervention. On 24 October, Soviet 
tanks entered Budapest. Armed revolutionaries set up barricades to defend Buda-
pest, and captured several Soviet tanks. Th e same day, Imre Nagy replaced András 
Hegedüs as Prime Minister, and called for an end to violence promising political 
reforms. Th e protesters focused on the ÁVH, as the Soviet units were not fully 
engaged. On 25 October, ÁVH began shooting at the mass of protesters in front 
of the Parliament, and some Soviet soldiers mistakenly returned fi re on the ÁVH. 
Th e attacks at the Parliament led to the collapse of the government. Th e re-burial 
of László Rajk, on 6 October 1956 (minister of police falsely accused and executed 
in 1949), was considered a general rehearsal of the revolution. Imre Nagy took the 
power with János Kádár as the First Secretary of the Communist Party. Hungarian 
army led by Béla Király attacked the Party Central Committee. After a cease-fi re, 
by 30 October the most of Soviet troops had withdrawn from Budapest, and many 
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Hungarians believed that they were leaving Hungary. On 1 November Nagy de-
clared Hungarian retirement from the Warsaw Pact and stance of neutrality. Many 
political prisoners were released, including Cardinal Mindszenty, and previously 
banned political parties revived. Th e state was mainly run by revolutionary coun-
cils, the communist and Soviet symbols removed from public life. Th e workers’ 
councils took over the management over industrial enterprises. On 1 November, 
Imre Nagy was reported that Soviet forces had entered Hungary from the east and 
were moving towards Budapest, after false offi  cial assurances that the Soviet Union 
would not invade. Th e Soviets arrested a Hungarian delegation on 3 November 
invited to negotiate on Soviet withdrawal. In the meanwhile, Khrushchev informed 
his allies with the decision to intervene, and met with Yugoslav leader Tito on 
his resort island Brioni. Tito agreed to support the intervention, and persuaded 
Khrushchev to choose János Kádár as a new Hungarian leader. On 4 November 
the Soviet army again attacked Budapest. Th e second Soviet intervention “Oper-
ation Whirlwind” has split Budapest in half and established controls over main 
communication routes. Operation combined air strikes, artillery and tank-infantry 
actions. Th e Hungarian Army remained loyal to the revolution, however helpless 
to withstand more eff ective resistance. Th e fi ghting in Budapest lasted until 11 No-
vember. After the collapse of the uprising Nagy was given a refuge in the Yugoslav 
Embassy, however, despite of garantees given by János Kádár, on 22 November, 
Nagy was thrown out of the embassy, arrested by the Soviet forces and abducted 
to Romania, where he was sentenced to death and executed.
Th e role of Yugoslavia was important for the events of 1956, including the 
failure of the Hungarian uprising and the fate of revolutionaries, and, in particu-
lar, of Hungarian refugees on Yugoslav territory. Using the position of Hungarian 
neighbor and the renegade from the hard-core pro-Soviet nucleus of the Eastern 
European states, Yugoslavia used the uprising to redefi ne the relations with the 
East, and thus with the West.
Simultaneously, Yugoslavia had to take care of its Hungarian minority, the 
state of the border and, fi nally, the Hungarian refugees.
Considering Yugoslavia important in the policy of de-Stalinization and re-
vitalization of the Eastern Bloc, the new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev used 
conciliatory approach also as a stronghold of a rapid suppression of the Hungar-
ian uprising. In 1948, Yugoslavia started only with the path of de-Stalinization. 
Democratization of political system and social relations was not on the Yugoslav 
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regime’s agenda yet. Democracy and tolerance were overwhelmed, and Tito re-
mained their sworn enemy until their last days. While negotiating his personal 
treason of Hungarian rebels who had previously been given asylum, Tito com-
plained that “the reaction raised his head, especially in Croatia”. As he was taking 
a clear stand on Hungarian Uprising, Tito was ahead of the two options, equally 
sensitive and diffi  cult: to support the anti-Stalinist course of Hungarian revolu-
tionaries, or by supporting Soviet intervention protect his regime and the interna-
tional communism from similar challenges.
Hungarian uprising was a dynamic and complex process, imbued with con-
troversies. Th e revolution erupted under the shadow of the recent fascist heritage 
and participation of Hungary in the Second World War on the side of the Axis 
powers. Hungary was frustrated with the national borders plotted after the fall of 
Austro-Hungary after the First World War. Within the chaos of the 1956 uprising, 
anti-Semitism broke a decade after the Holocaust, as soon as being released from 
the clamps of the central state government. Th e uprising also refl ected Hungarian 
attitudes towards Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav confl ict with Stalin. Hungarian dic-
tator Mátyás Rákosi was removed (on 18 July 1956) after the long-term anti-Titoist 
campaign led from 1948, in agreement with the offi  cial Moscow.2
Initially, from the Yugoslav perspective, Imre Nagy was acceptable alterna-
tive to Rákosi. (From 1955, the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest held regular con-
tacts with Imre Nagy and his associates.) But the uprising threatened the Yugoslav 
regime with both security and ideological challenges.
Th e particularity of Yugoslavia in the communist world and internal changes 
was an important challenge that sometimes escaped the immediate Soviet infl u-
ence in Eastern Europe. “Many of the reforms in Poland and Hungary parallel so 
closely those which were worked out earlier in Yugoslavia as a simple explanation 
of coincidence, or nationalism. By Polish admission, Yugoslav obstinacy signif-
icantly infl uenced Polish Communists. As early as 1948 Gomulka demurred in 
2  “… in the Hungarian case, it was necessary to replace Rákosi to improve Soviet-Yugoslav 
relations. Th e Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia in 1955 became a major plank in 
Khrushchev's policy of destalinization.
Th e Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito detested Rákosi with his 'blood-soaked hands' so 
much for having 'staged trials, given false information and sentenced innocent men to 
death' for being Titoist spies that he even refused train through Hungary on his way 
to Moscow for the summit in June 1956, travelling through Romania” (Granville 2006, 
483–484).
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siding with Stalin against the Yugoslavs and declined to brand Tito as deviationist. 
When Gomulka was removed from Secretary-General of the Polish Communist 
party, Polish sources conceded that the dismissal was connected with the ‘disgrace-
ful Yugoslav aff air.’ In October, 1956, Gomulka stated that the paths for attaining 
socialism in diff erent countries may vary. Th e model for socialism, he said, may 
be that of the Soviet Union, of Yugoslavia, or something still diff erent. In 1957 
when Gomulka and premier Cyrankiewicz visited Yugoslavia, they supposedly dis-
cussed separate roads to socialism with Tito. In Hungary, Nagy (who earlier had 
been accused of ‘new Titoism’) referred to Titoism in Yugoslavia as the creative 
application of Marxism-Leninism in building socialism under the specifi c social 
and economic conditions of Yugoslavia. Just prior to the 1956 Revolt, a delegation 
of top Hungarian Communists visited Yugoslavia to study that country’s workers’ 
councils” (Gripp 1960, 948).
In the process of approaching the new Soviet Union, after 1955, Tito was in 
no hurry. Regardless of the visit to Moscow in 1955, he maintained tense relations 
with Khrushchev and other Eastern European leaders (Granville 2001, 1057). He 
needed Soviet support to maintain the communist regime and the counterweight 
to the Western liberal challenges, but did not intend to return to the Soviet sphere 
of infl uence. He founded his dictatorship on a multifaceted basis (army, police, 
social utopianism, etc.) learning how to balance between the East, the West, and 
manipulating the rising Th ird World and its global impacts. Th e Korean War has 
dislocated the stage for a potential new world confl ict outside the European scope, 
but Tito had to be careful about the increased threat of Soviet intervention. It is 
assumed that China also supported Soviet intervention in Hungary, but its appear-
ance in international communism and world politics did not make the steps sim-
pler, on the contrary.3 After the collapse of the Hungarian uprising, the Suez crisis 
confi rmed the weaknesses of the West in the face of controversies that pervaded 
the process of decolonization: new independent states, new emancipated nations, 
3  Mao Tse-tung recalled that at the end of October of that year the Chinese Embassy in 
Budapest had reported that the counter-revolution was gaining more and more ground 
and had warned that if the Soviet Union should fail to liquidate the Imre Nagy Govern-
ment, the restoration of in Hungary would be unavoidable. Mao said that, on the basis 
of this and other information received from the various East Communist Parties, he had 
sent an urgent message to the Kremlin asking Khrushchev to take quick military action 
against the revisionists. He claimed that he had discounted the danger of any foreign 
intervention, or an American nuclear threat, for America was after all a paper tiger” 
(Rádvanyi 1970, 126–127).
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sometimes even recently invented, could not always imply the development of 
political and economic freedoms in postcolonial world (Litván 2001, 212–214).
Th e Hungarian rebellion further illuminated even the complex relations of 
Yugoslavia with the United States. Th ese relations were not straightforward, sim-
ilarly to those with the USSR. Th e Yugoslav Communist regime was one of the 
indicative fallacies of the Western allies. Th e closing military operations at the 
end of the Second World War did not allow the fi ne-tuning of Yugoslavia and its 
political future. At the Yalta peace conference in 1945 Yugoslavia was reluctantly 
left to the Soviets in order to concentrate the Western Allied forces on Greece and 
the Eastern Mediterranean. In the process of establishing the totalitarian rule, Tito 
relied on a police and military forces concentrated in Belgrade and the general 
Serbian national majority within the repressive apparatus. Dissatisfactions with 
such instrumentalization of power he compensated with the federalization of the 
state while manipulating the internal identities, similarities and diff erences. With 
the priorities related to the needs of absolute and personal rule, Tito did not allow 
Yugoslavia to integrate in the sense of a state and ideological unity that will assim-
ilate its national and cultural diff erences. His opening to the West at the beginning 
of the fi fties did not imply democratization of the system. His opening to the West 
at the beginning of the fi fties did not imply democratization of the system. Neither 
the international relations were always exactly followed by ideological matrices. 
Th e US and USSR did not approve the Tito’s support of Greek communists dur-
ing the Civil War. Th e Yugoslav pretensions on Trieste, used by Tito in order to 
feed the Slovenian nationalism, have disrupted the peace settlement for Austria. 
Th e US economic support that followed the defeat of communists in the Greek 
civil war helped Tito endure against Stalin, but Tito was eagerly waiting for a new 
opportunity to reestablish a partnership with the Soviets. Th at opportunity was 
Stalin’s death in 1953. In the general context, he could use the dissatisfactions with 
Sovietization and Stalinism in Eastern Europe, but not allowing such dissatisfac-
tions to erupt in Yugoslavia itself. Eastern European leaders were disturbed by 
Tito’s independence. Tito’s initial support of Imre Nagy was wrongly interpreted as 
his call on the substantial change of Hungarian political system. Tito relied on the 
West only to preserve communism, and previously opposed to Stalin in attempt 
to preserve personal independent regime. And as if he waited for a moment to 
seemingly change the sides again.
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Between 1948 and 1955, Tito understood the benefi ts of strategic neutrality. 
(Granville 1998, 504). In time he learned to behave according to the weaknesses of 
each strategic group. Gradually abandoning the brutal violence and collective uto-
pianism, Tito was also placing his mechanisms of power in a global framework, by 
concluding the international partnerships beyond the dualism of the East and the 
West. Th e sovereignty of Yugoslav communism and neutrality in American-Soviet 
relations were unacceptable for the Soviet Union. Th e Soviet Union considered 
that the approach to Greece and Turkey in 1954 was a Yugoslav threat with the 
accession to the NATO from the back door. For the West, Yugoslavia was becom-
ing a kind of dictatorship without tyranny, for the East democracy deprived of 
democracy. When John Foster Dulles met Tito in May 1955, Tito expressed the 
views on Yugoslav independence, denying the similarity with Eastern European 
national communism. Tito had negative attitude toward the Yugoslav unitarism. 
His career was already based on the antithesis of the previous order in the King-
dom of Yugoslavia and its offi  cial integrative aspirations in attempts to overcome 
the national diff erences.
Tito welcomed the announcement of the possible “third way” of neighboring 
Hungary. Imre Nagy could become the support of Yugoslav independent policy. 
Tito could have settled his personal rule in a broader, more comfortable neighbor-
ing context. “Th e Th ird Way” was also Tito’s opportunity for international leader-
ship that concealed the political essence of his regime, for the West undemocratic 
and for the East insuffi  ciently loyal to the Communist international community, 
even too liberal. In this sense, Tito simultaneously worked on establishing the 
Non-Aligned Movement as the anti-colonialist and nationalist substitute for global 
democratization. As the idea of an integrated Yugoslavia was for Tito a symbol of 
monarchist and capitalist “dictatorship”, in the arising “Th ird World” democracy 
was a symbol of colonial governance.
Tito was gradually mastering the increasingly complex international rela-
tions. Th e initial power was given him by the unwritten Yalta agreement when 
Yugoslavia was considered as being “fi fty-fi fty” under Eastern and Western in-
fl uences. Th e Hungarian Uprising and the Suez Crisis of 1956 confi rmed that the 
world is rapidly changing. But the Yalta paradigm did not imply the permanence in 
international relations. Even Tito was surprised with the Hungarian Uprising. For 
Tito, however, the Soviet bloc was just a distant strategic shield against unwanted 
Western infl uence. While he considered the future of the Soviet bloc from the 
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Hungarian Uprising perspective, he primarily took care of his personal regime. 
Tito kept his power by any means necessary. After being pressed to collaborate 
also with the West, he raised the opportunity to reveal more openness and toler-
ance while preserving the order established by revolutionary violence.
But the Hungarian Uprising threatened to spill into Yugoslavia.4 Anti-Sovi-
et mood in Hungary grew into the anti-Communist anger.5 Th is did not happen 
in Yugoslavia in 1948. Th e attitude towards Hungary Tito defi nitely changed in 
late October, when the Yugoslav offi  cials began to make statements on violence 
and anarchy. By abandoning the rebel Hungarian government Tito sought to draw 
profi t from Khrushchev. Anyway, Tito could easily agree to a Soviet military in-
tervention in his immediate neighborhood and after the Soviet similar threats to 
Yugoslavia and himself in 1948. But Tito considered the Hungarian rebel govern-
ment to be weak, and the revolutionary violence as a more serious threat than 
the announced Soviet intervention, most likely restricted to the restoration of the 
pro-Soviet regime. 6
And although his behavior seemed volatile, Tito’s attitudes were consist-
ent with himself. When he betrayed the Hungarian Uprising he supported com-
munism in the neighborhood. He acted identically during the Civil War in Greece. 
He kept the solidarity with Imre Nagy remembering the 1948. Tito was actually 
consistent with himself when he off ered Nagy the asylum in the Yugoslav embassy, 
4  We can see that, although the Soviet leaders were the prime movers in 1956, they 
were not the only ones who feared the possible unravelling of the Warsaw Pact and 
'spillover' of anti-communist ideas across their own borders. Leaders in Czechoslovakia 
and Romania, for example, reported popular unrest in their own countries during the 
Hungarian conflict. Even Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslavia ended up supporting the Soviet 
use of military force against Hungary. Yugoslavia was the only independent communist 
state since the 1948 Moscow-Belgrade rift, aloof from the Warsaw Pact or Soviet bloc, 
courted in the 1950s by both the United States and the Soviet Union, admired by the 
increasingly independent Asian and African countries, and vehemently critical of Soviet 
great power chauvinism” (Granville 1998, 493).
5  Hungarian communists did not have enough resources to incorporate enough middle 
class layers into a privileged regime structure, although the members of the middle class 
“found success both in education and the workplace despite being officially excluded 
from the Communist state” (Mark 2005, 500).
6  “No effort appears to have been made by the Soviet Union to justify its action on the 
grounds of necessary self-defense. The Soviet territory was not threatened by events in 
Hungary. Doubtless there was a Soviet desire to maintain the satellite status of Hungary, 
but under inter- national law and the United Nations Charter, Hungary was entitled to 
sovereign equality with all other Members” (Wright 1957, 275).
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and when he ordered ambassador Soldatić expel Nagy out, on the street, when it 
was clear that this one is expected with certain death.
“On 2 November, Khrushchev and Malenkov fl ew to Yugoslavia, where they 
met with Tito at his villa on Brioni from 7.00 pm until 5.00 am the following day” 
(Kramer 1998, 204). A question is whether Tito decided to trade with the Soviets 
before or after the affi  rmed certainty that a defi nitive military intervention would 
take place. It may be also a matter of doubt if Imre Nagy was given the refuge in the 
Yugoslav embassy after the November 4 intervention began to take place, as Tito 
could charge more expensively his favors by doing so. Soviet offi  cials have attacked 
Tito personally, as he dared to protect the counterrevolutionary leaders. But Tito 
was self-confi dently regardless the pressure. He agreed to the Soviet intervention, 
and promised the Soviets that he would try to persuade Nagy to withdraw, in or-
der to stop the violence. By giving the asylum, and by renouncing the asylum, Tito 
transferred the burden and responsibility to Khrushchev, and Khrushchev was 
imposed to pay the full political price. Th e later execution of Imre Nagy confi rmed 
the character of the Soviet regime, and the justifi cation of the Hungarian Uprising. 
Th e legitimacy of Soviet intervention was brought into question. Yugoslav support 
provided the assumed normalization of Hungary, and Tito succeeded in not pay-
ing a price for his actions. On the contrary, after manipulating with Nagy and the 
Hungarian Uprising, he strengthened his position both in the East and the West. 
Th e Soviets could be grateful to his support of the intervention, even though they 
had previously condemned the asylum to the rebels. Th e West could not condemn 
Tito after leaving Hungary to its destiny. As the West subsequently betrayed Israel 
during the Suez crisis.
Th e events were accelerating, becoming extremely serious and complex. Th e 
Soviet intervention began less than 24 hours after Khrushchev left Brioni. Th e 
Soviets assumed that Tito would not easily decide to betray Nagy, so a tank on 
November 5 shot the Yugoslav embassy when the cultural attaché was killed. Yu-
goslav foreign minister Koča Popović accused the Soviet authorities that they did 
so with purpose. Yugoslav Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Veljko Mićunović, 
similarly protested to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Aff airs Dmitri Shepilov. Am-
bassador Dalibor Soldatić complained to the Soviet ambassador in Budapest, Yuri 
Andropov. Tito has decided to expel Nagy taking into account the credibility of 
Yugoslavia and his personal reputation. Th e meeting with Khrushchev on Brioni, 
although was a confi rmation of his importance, Tito kept secret from the Yugo-
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slav public for several days. Th e asylum in the Yugoslav embassy implied that the 
Nagy government ceased to exist. Th us Tito opened the way of cooperation with 
Kadar’s government. By accepting the asylum Nagy was discredited, as he allegedly 
betrayed the revolution. By discrediting Nagy, Tito prevented the overfl owing of 
anti-communism in Yugoslavia.
Tito decided to charge the Soviets costly for his services in order to con-
ceal his dishonor, and to prevent the Soviets from considering Yugoslavia their 
satellite again.7 Th e asylum could also be a Tito’s message that he would preserve 
independence regardless of the previous normalization with the Soviet Union. Th e 
Soviets decided to arrest Nagy as soon as he leaves the Yugoslav embassy, and thus 
agreed to the Tito’s game that would transfer the blame to their domain exclusive-
ly. Tito concealed his betrayal, and of his associates, with faked disappointment, 
as Kádár violated the promise that at Nagy will not be kidnapped. He recalled that 
during the meeting at Brioni he personally recommended Kádár to be appointed 
for the new president of the Hungarian government. Tito warned Kádár knew 
about the KGB plan of kidnapping, and the spinning was launched that Kádár op-
posed the Nagy future presence in Hungary, as he would encourage the “reaction-
aries”. Th e “Nagy Aff air” caused the deterioration in Yugoslav-Hungarian relations 
which helped Tito to seize a pleasant distance from the event. Yugoslavia also re-
fused to participate in the celebration of the forty-year anniversary of the October 
Bolshevik Revolution. Imre Nagy was hanged on June 16, 1958.8 Th e Hungarian 
7  “Even though Khrushchev suspected that the Warsaw Pact countries would remain 
vulnerable to recurrent crises unless the indigenous regimes became more 'viable' and 
the Soviet Union forged a more equitable relationship, he was determined to proceed 
far more cautiously in the future. Repressive leaders in Eastern Europe, such as Wal-
ter Ulbricht in East Germany, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in Romania, Todor Zhivkov 
in Bulgaria and Antonin Novotny in Czechoslovakia, were able to win even stronger 
backing from Khrushchev because they convinced him that their presence was the 
only safeguard against 'unexpected developments' of the sort that occurred in Hungary 
and Poland. When faced with a trade-off  between the 'viability' of the East European 
regimes and the 'cohesion' of the Eastern bloc after 1956, Khrushchev consistently 
chose to emphasize cohesion, thus forestalling any real movement toward a more du-
rable political order” (Kramer 1998, 213).
8  “On 16 June 1958 Imre Nagy, who had been the prime minister of Hungary during the 
ill-fated Revolution of 1956, was put to death by the Soviet-backed regime of János 
Kádár and buried in an unmarked grave. Th irty-three years later, in a spectacular re-
versal of fortune, the communist regime was delegitimized by the funeral and reburial 
of Imre Nagy. Well over 300,000 Hungarians attended the ceremony, a very sizable 
portion of the population for a country with less than ten million citizens. In a force-
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authorities have demanded from Yugoslavia to keep restrained, warning that he 
will reveal important disclosed details on Yugoslav engagement. However, the new 
Yugoslav ambassador Jovo Kapičić stated that the Nagy trial is “another link in the 
chain of the new anti-Yugoslav campaign, being conducted by the USSR and other 
bloc countries” (Granville 1998, 710–702).
Th e Hungarian Uprising raised the tensions between the East and the West. 
Th e success of the intervention confi rmed the rise of the Soviet prestige in the 
Middle East and Asia. Th e United States have planned to encourage the East Eu-
ropean states to leave the Soviet bloc, but the success was prevented by the unwill-
ingness of any global confrontation on this matter.9 Th e United States containment 
policy was therefore reduced to less immediate actions in the domains of econom-
ic and psychological infl uence and intelligence network. Hungary was obviously 
left to its destiny.10
ful assertion of the collective will, the Hungarian people demonstrated their power to 
resist the tyranny of foreign occupation and made plain their desire for an autonomous 
state. Th e funeral dramatically symbolized how Hungarian memory culture reasserted 
its demand for sovereignty and was powerful enough to sweep aside the thin veneer of 
legitimacy of the Soviet-backed regime” (Benziger 2000, 142).
9  “Th e irony was that the Soviets, by their abandonment of Egypt until 5 November, and 
the Americans, by their policy of 'active non-involvement' in Hungary and Poland, 
aided each other's attempts to quell the crises in their own sphere of infl uence. In ar-
eas of the world where they were relatively powerless, both the Soviet Union and the 
United States felt that in times of crisis, the status quo was preferable to a complete 
breakdown in the existing power balance. Neither was prepared to risk a major war 
over an area it had little prospect of controlling. Geography, then, played a central role 
in determining the responses of the Soviet Union to the Suez Crisis and the United 
States to the Hungarian revolt” (McCauley 1981, 795).
10  “At the October 26, 1956, meeting of the National Security Council, Eisenhower asked 
worriedly whether the Soviet Union might not ‘be tempted to resort to extreme meas-
ures, even global war,’ and advised that ‘this possibility [be watched] with the greatest 
care.’ And several years after the invasion of Hungary, Eisenhower, though nothing 
that Hungary was shielded from the reach of US forces by neutral Austria and Warsaw 
Pact member Czechoslovakia, admitted that fear of major confl ict with the Soviet Un-
ion was the main reason for US inaction. Dulles subsequently added that US military 
intervention in Hungary would have been ‘madness’ because of the danger of nuclear 
war and the faint likelihood of success. ‘Th e only way we can save Hungary at this 
time would be through all-out nuclear war. Does anyone in his senses want us to start 
a nuclear war over Hungary? As for simply sending American divisions into Hungary, 
they would be wiped out by the superior Soviet ground forces.’ Similar considerations 
encouraged Moscow to cut short what is called the Prague Spring of 1968” (Valenta 
1983, 88).
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Postwar dissatisfactions in Eastern Europe were driven by misery and the 
lack of freedom, by the consequences of war destruction and socialist collectiviza-
tion, the Soviet political domination and economic exploitation. Hungary ruled by 
the Stalinists (Rákosi, Farkas, Gerö) became a repressive police state reminiscent 
of the pre-war fascist dictatorship. Th e resistance to communism revealed, howev-
er, the nationalist conservative attitudes. Th e nationalist utopianism opposed the 
offi  cial social utopianism. From the margins of the Hungarian Uprising also ap-
peared the anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism was a crawling global trending within the 
context of decolonization and the Middle East Crisis. Th e offi  cial Yugoslav policy 
was becoming anti-Israel orientated. In the later period Yugoslavia has provided 
systematic support to Palestinian separatists and terrorists. Th e totalitarian reali-
ties of Hungary and Yugoslavia contributed to the relativization of antifascism. Th e 
Janos Kadar restoration of the “real communism” retained the anti-fascist rhetoric, 
considering the 1956 Uprising as counterrevolutionary. Initially opposed, fascism 
and communism eventually gained the similarities: totalitarian dictatorship and 
alien (Soviet) occupation. Th e nationalist resistances to communism warned that 
anti-fascism is limited by complex realities. Antifascism was an important political 
conviction in Hungary, after the Horti era, the coalition with Nazi Germany and 
the “Arrow Cross” regime.11 But already since the end of the 1940-s the anti-fas-
cist sentiments started to fade while facing the horrors and despair under the 
communism. Th e break-up of Tito with Stalin in 1948, and the concentration of 
the Soviet troops on the Hungarian border with Yugoslavia were suffi  ciently over-
whelming. Th e Red Army was no longer considered as liberating, but rather as the 
occupation force. Th e renunciation of anti-fascism remained the basis of Hungar-
ian resistance to the Soviet domination both before and after 1956. Conservative 
nationalism became a dominant alternative to the Stalinist state and Soviet impe-
rialism. Th e political conservatives and the radical right enabled Janos Kadar to 
characterize the Uprising as an attempt by fascists to confront the communist rule 
(Mark 2006, 2013).
Th e Hungarian Uprising was a serious temptation for the Yugoslav govern-
ment. However, Tito managed to seize the opportunity and redefi ne the status 
11  “Hungarian communists conferred legitimacy on their regime by referring to (and in 
most cases, exaggerating) their role in the antifascist struggle – as partisans and in 
alliance with the Red Army – and bolstered their authority by claiming to be the best 
protectors of Hungary from the return of Fascism” (Mark 2006, 2012).
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of Yugoslavia and his personal role in international relations. He already had a 
certain experience in that. In the depths of the Yugoslav regime, there was enough 
understanding of the new approach to the Soviets, and the concrete cooperation in 
the suppression of the Hungarian Uprising. In one year, Tito met four times with 
Khrushchev. Apart from helping refugees and formal reactions, the West had no 
power to help Hungary to leave the Soviet orbit. Th e West remained inactive, and 
Yugoslavia silent, also during the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968.
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